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ABSTRACT
Very little has been written about the political career of Matthew Lyon, who 
served in the United States House of Representatives from 1796 to 1800. Only a few 
biographies of his life have been written, which has contributed to the general lack of 
knowledge concerning his political affairs. The purpose of this thesis, then, is to 
identify Matthew Lyon the man, as well as his time in history, the Federalist Era. 
Special attention will be dedicated to Lyon’s controversial presence in the U.S. House, 
his violation of the Sedition Act of 1798, and the status of freedom of speech during the 
latter part of the Federalist Era. Cluster Bloc analysis will be used in order to 
ascertain the level of opposition Lyon encountered during his expulsion proceedings, 
as well as the level of support achieved for the Sedition Act.
Matthew Lyon arrived in America in the 18th Century as an indentured servant 
from Ireland. After being released from the requirements of his indentured servitude 
Lyon began a life-long struggle for status and recognition. He was viewed as an 
outsider who relentlessly fought to become an insider. He attempted to become an 
insider in Federalist America through business ventures and political exploits. Lyon 
would eventually own many businesses and factories throughout New England. After 
serving in the U.S. Army during the Revolutionary War, Lyon believed that he was 
ideally suited for politics, both local and national. Once in the U.S. House of 
Representatives he continued his quest for acceptance and recognition through actions 
largely negative in nature. Expulsion proceedings were put into motion on more than 
one occasion to oust him from Congress, with the most celebrated cause being a 
physical altercation with his Federalist enemy Roger Griswold on the House floor.
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Lyon believed himself to be a complete Republican. His Federalist enemies 
saw him as a Republican as well, but for different reasons. In short, the Federalists 
detested his presence in Congress, and this attitude towards Lyon was reflected in 
the passage of the Sedition Act, as well as his prosecution for violating the act. After 
his stormy four years in Congress and his jail sentence, Lyon moved west to Kentucky 
where he again took up his entrepreneurial and political activities.
Through the use of Cluster Bloc and other primary and secondary sources, the 
analysis will show that the group of Congressmen who voted in favor of Matthew 
Lyon’s expulsion will be the same one that voted in support of the Sedition Act, and 
that the Federalist Era, although not the only period of American History to witness 




MATTHEW LYON’S EARLY LIFE
Matthew Lyon suffered from an inferiority complex. He first came to America 
as an indentured servant from Ireland and lived in New England, an area of the country 
where people took pride in somehow being the “true” Americans. The blue-blooded 
aristocrats of the Eastern American seaboard often resented the presence of non- 
English inhabitants. Matthew Lyon was not exempt from feeling this resentment and 
fought most of his life either to make his Irish ancestry a non-issue, or to go 
completely overboard in displaying extreme Irish nationalism. In short, Matthew Lyon 
was an outsider who relentlessly strove to become an insider; but he never succeeded 
in becoming a true insider, due mainly to his provocative personality.
Matthew Lyon also exhibited a truly entrepreneurial nature in his business 
affairs. If he were alive today those who supported his behavior and accomplishments 
would call him an independent self-made man, while those who found themselves 
opposed to Lyon’s behavior would probably call him an opportunist. In terms of 
business, from the first day he arrived in the New World, Lyon possessed a plan of 
action whereby he too would become a wealthy businessman. Later on in this study a 
brief outline of his business activities will be provided, including his successful 
completion of an iron factory and textile mill. However, his business pursuits will not 
be the main focus of this study. It is rather a political study. Lyon’s business pursuits 
will be discussed mainly in terms of their relation to his brand of politics. Lyon’s 
success as a businessman actually opened up the door to his political career.
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But Matthew Lyon’s personality either repelled or attracted the people with 
whom he came into contact. To some, Lyon was an angry and rebellious man. His 
often rough-around-the-edges disposition immediately turned people off to whatever 
he had to say, whether good or bad. He loved a good adventure and spirited 
excitement regardless of the setting. Lyon certainly had his share of adventures, from 
his days as one of Ethan Allen’s “Green Mountain Boys,” to his near expulsion from 
the United States House of Representatives, to his trial on charges of violating the 
Sedition Act of 1798. His middle name could appropriately be termed “conflict,” 
because his name seemed to be associated in one way or the other with conflict. This 
antagonistic quality of Matthew Lyon again either endeared him to his acquaintances, 
or alienated him. More often than not it was the latter.
In every sense of the word, Matthew Lyon was a democrat. He literally 
loathed anything associated with monarchy, aristocracy, triviality, or Europe. To Lyon 
they were all one in the same. Monarchy was a trivial, unfortunate European 
institution which had no place in America. Lyon saw democracy as the one true form 
of government that embraced the best hope for a new nation. Matthew Lyon was 
above all a pragmatist, a realist who had no time for the trappings of monarchal 
Europe. He believed in honest, hard work, and the various rewards, whether political, 
business, or social, that resulted from that hard work. He despised the aristocrats of 
New England, who, according to Lyon, possessed no self-worth. A true man in 
Lyon’s estimation was a man who maintained a vision, who knew how to accomplish 
that vision, and while in the process never allowed himself to submit to arrogance of 
others.
Perhaps most important, Lyon can best be described as a survivor. Soon, the 
many roadblocks Matthew Lyon encountered, and for the most part overcame, will 
indicate his true nature. In fact, some of the obstacles Lyon encountered were
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potentially career-ending. Yet Lyon somehow, and in some way, was able to 
overcome those hazards, and move to new accomplishments. The reasons behind 
Lyon's success and resilience are theories at best. It seems no matter what 
controversy engulfed Lyon, or how bleak things looked for him while in the throes of 
controversy, he always emerged standing—a true winner.
Matthew Lyon was born on July 14, 1750, in Ulster, Wicklow County, Ireland.1 
He came from a distinguished line of proud and productive farmers. Lyon’s ancestors 
identified their entire existence with their land holdings. This seemingly unbreakable 
bond to their land made it especially difficult for Lyon’s ancestors when they were 
forced off their property by James I and his “Commission for the Investigation of 
Defective Titles in Ireland.” This English Commission investigated every land title in 
Ireland, a colonial appendage of England, searching for any abnormality that would 
allow the British government to evict the Irish inhabitants and in effect make them 
more subservient. The lands confiscated would become the domain of the British 
crown.2 The Irish inhabitants living on these contested lands did not allow the British 
to confiscate their property without resistance. An organization called the “white 
boys,” a quasi-military organization dedicated and sworn to the protection of Irish 
lands, was formed. Matthew Lyon’s father was a member of this military group. He 
was eventually captured and sentenced to death under the orders of James I. Not long 
after his death the Irish insurrection, succumbing to British pressures, came to an 
unsuccessful end. The British crown had succeeded in confiscating extensive tracts of 
Irish land.
After the dreadful experience of his father’s execution young Lyon, now only 
12, moved to Dublin in order to find work. It soon became apparent that young Lyon 
was not going to allow this significant tragedy in his life to prevent him from some day 
being successful himself, whether farming or otherwise. In fact, Lyon got a job as a
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bookbinder in a Dublin printing office. There he was exposed to the printing trade, a 
trade that would make him a successful businessman in the United States. Lyon 
succeeded well enough in Dublin that many acquaintances persuaded him to go to 
America to live out his dreams of wealth and status. In 1765, at the age of 14, Lyon 
resolved to go to America, but he did not have enough money to pay for his trip across 
the Atlantic Ocean. So, in a very Lyon-like manner, he struck up a deal with the 
ship’s captain, which included in exchange for Lyon’s safe passage to America, 
permission to sell him into indentured servitude, with the captain retaining the money 
paid for his service. At that time anyone being sold into servitude had to serve until 
he was 21 years of age. Once in America, however, the captain, out of regard and 
fondness for young Lyon, informed the auction crowd that he was 18, thus only 
required to serve three years of indentured servitude.
It seems the captain of the ship saw a quality in young Matthew that caused 
him to hide his true age. Lyon also must have appeared older than he really was to 
avoid detection by his potential purchasers. A man by the name of Jabez Bacon, a 
successful and wealthy merchant from Woodbury, Connecticut, paid $60 for 
Matthew’s three years of service.3 Bacon dealt primarily in commodities, namely 
pork, and saw various qualities in the boy that hastened his decision. Lyon biographer 
Tom W. Campbell had this to say about the union of Lyon and Bacon: “Bold, 
impetuous, and daring in the extreme himself, the young Wicklow emigre’, by a rare 
felicity of fortune, attracted the keen eye of the Connecticut merchant, in whom Lyon 
saw many of his own qualities reflected, but on the part of Bacon they were directed 
by mature judgment and the cool New England temperament.”4 It appears that Bacon 
and Lyon had something in common. Like Lyon, his “leading trait of his character 
[Bacon’sjwas self-reliance. This, with his keen intellect, enabled him to decide 
matters of great importance almost instantly.”5
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Throughout the first year of his indentured service Lyon began to realize that 
although he and Bacon had many things in common, such as the belief in hard work 
and determination, in terms of politics, they were on opposite ends of the spectrum. 
Using the appropriate political terms of the Colonial Era, Bacon can best be described 
as a Tory, one who remained loyal to the British Crown. This stands in considerable 
contrast to Lyon, who considered himself to be a Whig, one who questioned British 
colonial policies. Because these ideological differences became more extreme as time 
progressed Lyon began thinking of ways in which he might evade his obligations under 
his indentured servitude to Bacon. Lyon still had two more years left of obligated 
service to Bacon. By a process that has proven quite confusing to the historians who 
have studied Matthew Lyon’s early life, it seems a Whig businessman whom Lyon 
befriended, Hugh Hannah, gave Lyon two of his bulls to give to Bacon in order to pay 
off the rest of his service. Bacon accepted the animals, and Lyon, after serving only 
one year of his indentured service, became a free man in America.6
After unsuccessfully offering his indentured services to Hugh Hannah, Lyon 
thanked him for his assistance and moved to Salisbury, Connecticut. There Lyon 
worked at an iron works which was owned by Ethan Allen, a man whom Lyon would 
eventually get to know very well during the American War of Independence.7 While it 
is true that Lyon had no previous experience working in an iron factory, the Allen 
family apparently discovered a resourceful, plucky individual who would fit nicely into 
their business. It is important to note the political climate in New England at the time, 
both in terms of the individual colonies, and in terms of their colonial relationship with 
England. Both relationships, inter-colonial and intra-colonial, proved to be very 
strained at times. When Lyon came to America the future state of Vermont was 
known as the New Hampshire Grants. More succinctly, during “the colonial period, 
the territory that lay North of Massachusetts, east of Lake Champlain, and west of
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the Connecticut river was claimed both by New York and New Hampshire,” and both 
colonies granted lands for its respective citizens to settle. This tense situation 
ushered in a period of rival land claims with citizens of both colonies claiming the same 
parcels of land, leaving the British government to be the ultimate judge of ownership.8 
After both colonies stated their positions as to the proper owners of the land the 
British government settled the land claims in favor of New York, the more populous 
and more influential colony in the region. In 1767, after appealing the decision to the 
British government to respect their long standing land claims within the New 
Hampshire Grant of which Ethan Allen owned a considerable amount, New 
Hampshire was able to obtain from the Crown its own title to a portion of the Grants.9 
New York had managed to wrestle most of the land away from New Hampshire, and 
had made numerous half-hearted attempts to regain total control of the New 
Hampshire Grants. The citizens of the New Hampshire Grants were a stubborn lot, 
withstanding the desperate attempts of New York to take control of their own lands 
and livelihoods. In fact, one of the most stubborn of all grantees, Matthew Lyon, 
settled there in 1769.
The year 1771 was personally a very memorable one for Lyon, as he married 
the niece of Ethan Allen, a Miss Hosford.10 For unknown reasons none of the 
definitive biographies of Matthew Lyon mentions the first name of Lyon’s new bride.
It is safe to assume, however that Miss Hosford was a passive partner in her 
marriage to Lyon, moving according to Lyon’s latest whim or business venture 
without raising significant concerns. In fact, in 1774, after giving birth to two children, 
Hosford followed her husband to Wallingford, New Hampshire, a location whereby 
Lyon hoped to become one of the more influential citizens, positioning himself for the 
coming war of independence.11 Matthew Lyon wanted to be where the action would 
take place, whether involved politically or militarily, and he moved himself and his
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family accordingly. The most significant way Lyon positioned himself to become 
involved in the increasingly hostile colonies of New England was by joining Ethan 
Allen’s pseudo-military ensemble the “Green Mountain Boys.” The Green Mountain 
Boys was originally an organization aimed at preventing New York grantee’s from 
securing land within New Hampshire’s domain.
On the eve of the War of Independence the Green Mountain Boys numbered 
only about 300 men, a number disproportionate to the importance given to them by 
many historians. For all practical purposes the Green Mountain Boys was not a real 
military organization. Although they did take part in quasi-military pursuits, they did 
not train together as an official army. They were simply a band of young men who 
already knew how to shoot and march, and they assembled only when summoned by 
Ethan in response to some serious situation. The title of their organization merely 
added an “official” nature to their pseudo-military activities. One interesting piece of 
information about the Green Mountain Boys is the fact that they took part in what is 
called today “guerrilla warfare.”12 Their guerrilla tactics helped the Green Mountain 
Boys accomplish their biggest, if not their most widely known accomplishment, their 
successful attack on the British military establishment at Fort Ticonderoga. On May 
10, 1775, Ethan Allen, Matthew Lyon, and some 250 other Green Mountain Boys 
surprised the British post, forced the troops to evacuate their mighty fort, and 
surrender all of their munitions to the Green Mountain Boys.13 Historians have 
argued over the importance of this action, but there is no doubt that Lyon was a part of 
the preparations, as well as the actual assault on Ft. Ticonderoga. As a result of their 
valiant efforts the Continental Congress actually paid the Green Mountain Boys for 
their success in taking the British fort. The capture of Ft. Ticonderoga was Lyon’s 
first military expedition, and it would not be his last. As a result of his preparation 
and bravery in the military expedition, General Schuyler named Lyon a lieutenant,
8
then a captain, and finally a colonel. Lyon eventually led his own regiment of Green 
Mountain Boys in the battles of Bennington, Hubbarton, and Saratoga.14 This was 
the most significant period of Lyon’s military aspirations. At this time Lyon’s political 
convictions, especially his Whig convictions, surfaced fully to embrace the political 
philosophy of American independence.
On July 19, 1776, Lyon was commissioned a second lieutenant in the 
Continental Army.15 His first assignment as a second lieutenant was his most 
unfortunate, and haunted his entire political career and damaged his social standing. 
Lyon’s regiment was assigned to the city of Jericho, New York, with specific orders 
to protect a blockhouse, a building where wheat was stored during the harvest. After 
manning their post for only a short period of time, the men under Lyon’s command 
became upset because they believed that their assignment was to protect the 
interests of wheat speculators. Since most of the men were farmers themselves, Lyon 
faced a difficult task of preventing them from deserting. Another factor contributing to 
the regiment’s agitated state was the sighting of what appeared to be hostile Indians 
near their encampment. Believing themselves to be in a very vulnerable position, the 
men mutinied. The specific details are sketchy, but Lyon’s account contains repeated 
pleas to his men to stay and respect their orders. However, after the other officers of 
the regiment followed the exodus of the men Lyon believed that he had no choice and 
left with the others. Upon hearing this story General St. Clair, Lyon’s superior officer, 
ordered Lyon court-martialed for deserting his post. He was convicted and sentenced 
to be cashiered and to receive corporal punishment.16 In the end, General St. Clair, 
for unknown reasons, ignored his own judgment, refused to carry out the sentence, and 
appointed Lyon paymaster to General Phillip Schuyler in 1777. Matthew Lyon’s first 
experience as a second lieutenant proved disastrous for both Lyon and the Continental 
Army. The cashiering incident would dog his political career for years to come,
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especially during his expulsion proceedings during the Fifth Congress. Those who 
sought to gain politically at Lyon’s expense claimed Lyon had been sentenced to wear 
a wooden sword, a sign of humiliation and punishment, not trusted enough to wear a 
real weapon. All too often Lyon responded to these allegations with great anger and 
contempt. Lyon always maintained that technically he had not been cashiered from 
the Army and did not wear a wooden sword. This did not matter to his political 
opponents, who would use any evidence of dishonor to ruin Lyon politically.
After this misadventure, and as the colonies became embroiled in their war of 
independence, Lyon believed that he did not have much of a future in the Continental 
Army. He decided to move to Arlington, New Hampshire Grants, a Tory stronghold, 
where he hoped to bolster the Whig cause through his own brand of politics. Lyon 
attended the General Convention of 1776 and 1782, and was instrumental in creating a 
Constitution for the new state of Vermont.17 Although in terms of politics things could 
not have been going better for Lyon, personal tragedy befell him in 1782 when his wife 
died. According to the various Lyon biographies it becomes clear that he took the 
death of his beloved first wife very hard. Despite his grief Lyon found love once again, 
and married Beulah Chittenden-Galusha in 1783. Ms. Chittenden-Galusha was the 
daughter of Vermont’s first governor, Thomas Chittenden. With this marriage Lyon 
became a member of an elite family in New England. Whether by accident or design 
Lyon now held a position of prominence in Vermont and New England politics.
In 1793 Matthew Lyon purchased 1,000 acres of land in Western Rutland 
County, Vermont. There he founded the town of Fair Haven, which became the site of 
Lyon’s most important entrepreneurial undertakings.19 Lyon’s first task was the 
construction of a saw mill located at the confluence of the Castleton and Poultney 
rivers. The sawmill, along with the entire town, was designed by Lyon himself. Lyon 
even lent his assistance in the construction of most of the homes of the citizens who
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moved there. After the fortunate discovery of iron ore in the hills outside Fair Haven, 
Lyon proceeded to build an iron foundry. His other business pursuits included an inn, 
a tannery, and a printing plant that ran from paper produced from the bark of the 
basswood tree.20 Many historians have given Lyon credit for being the first 
commercial manufacturer of wood paper.21
Despite Matthew Lyon’s varied interests and numerous business ventures, he 
still held a special place in his heart for the printing business, the first business he 
encountered in Ireland. Recalling the education he had received in Dublin, Lyon put 
that knowledge to good use when he launched his own publication, The Scourge of 
Aristocracy and Repository of Important Political Truth.22 This publication was 
written, edited, and published by Lyon himself. The title explains Lyon’s particular 
political view. Anti-monarchal in nature, The Scourge of Aristocracy was a democrat’s 
newspaper. Lyons’s motivations for writing this publication were varied but by no 
means complicated. He was tired of numerous Federalist newspapers disseminating 
what in his estimation were outright falsehoods and wished to redirect the new nation 
on the proper political course. Lyon exhibited an “If you can’t beat ‘em, join ‘em 
attitude.”23 He believed the only way the Republicans could defeat the Federalist 
presses was by playing their own game. He simply started his own publication in 
order to set forth his own republican views.
His political views blossomed on the political scene between the years 1784 
and 1796 when Lyon actively represented the town of Fair Haven in the Vermont 
General Assembly.24 The assembly was charged with the responsibility of creating a 
constitution for the infant state. Here Lyon’s political views emerged quite clearly. 
According to the new Vermont Constitution, which did not simply copy the U.S. 
Constitution, the legislature, not the executive, was intended to be the most powerful 
arm of the new government. The reason for making the legislative branch the most
11
powerful branch finds its origin in Lyon’s fear of an all-powerful executive. Many New 
Englanders still had strong negative feeling towards George III and his repressive 
measures. The legislature, the people’s branch, would reign supreme in Vermont. 
Lyon and his colleagues made the executive subordinate in a number of ways. The 
governor of Vermont was not provided the power to veto legislation from the state 
assembly. The governor’s official duty was limited to carrying out the laws passed by 
the legislative branch.25 The democratic ideas inherent within the Vermont 
Constitution did not end there. The Vermont Constitution went as far as to outlaw 
slavery. Lyon’s democratic ideals were ingrained in the Vermont Constitution, the 
most democratic state constitution at that time.
Matthew Lyon’s constructive input into the new Vermont Constitution was a 
great honor for him as well as an opportunity to place himself in the political spotlight 
in New England. Just a couple of years later Lyon was involved in another significant 
occasion in Vermont when in 1791 he was active in promoting the chartering of the 
University of Vermont, an action that credited him with being the “Father of the 
University of Vermont” ever since.26 However, Lyon had his eyes set on an even 
larger prize, the United States Congress. After running unsuccessfully for the United 
States House of Representatives in 1790, 1792, and 1794, he was finally elected to 
Congress in 1796. Yet Lyon was a man who was never completely satisfied with his 
most recent accomplishments. Once in the House Matthew Lyon, above all else, 
accomplished one more important thing, he achieved notoriety. The following chapters 
will focus specifically upon Lyon’s turbulent and controversial career in the U.S.
House, devoting special attention to his stormy and violent relationship with his 
fellow Congressman, Roger Griswold, an ardent Federalist from Vermont’s 
neighboring state of Connecticut. Eventually due to the behaviors of both Matthew
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Lyon and Roger Griswold, two men who just could not get along, resolutions would be 
introduced into the House floor calling for the expulsion of both from Congress.
Congressman Lyon was the object of great political controversy within the 
Congress of the United States. His behaviors led to efforts by the House of 
Representatives to expel him, and his role in a strong mounted opposition to President 
Adams and the Federalist party was also a catalyst in the action of Congress to pass 
the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798. The political divisions and alignments on the 
issues can be read in the recorded votes of the Congress. The recorded roll-calls on 
the selected votes taken in the Congress are analyzed through a research technique 
called Cluster-Bloc Analysis.
Rice-Beyle Cluster Bloc analysis will be used to explore the voting patterns of 
the members of the House of Representatives, Fifth Congress, second and third 
sessions. The Congressmen of the Fifth Congress unfortunately left little in the way 
of personal papers, but they did leave an important record behind, the votes they cast 
as members of the U.S. House or Representatives. In its most basic form cluster bloc 
analysis allows the researcher to identify core groups of Congressmen on a given 
topic.27 In this study cluster bloc analysis will help to determine exactly who 
supported and who opposed the expulsion of Matthew Lyon, as well as who 
supported and who opposed the passage of the Sedition Act of 1798. Finally, cluster 
bloc analysis will contribute vastly to either proving or refuting the hypothesis of this 
paper which includes the assertion that the faction of Congressmen who supported the 
expulsion of Matthew Lyon from Congress will be the same one that supported the 
passage of the Sedition Act. All pertinent roll-call votes will be included in the study, 
with nine roll-call votes concerning the expulsion proceedings of Matthew Lyon, as 
well as four roll-call votes concerning the passage of the Sedition Act. An historically 
sound evaluation of the political climate of the latter part of the Federalist Era will be
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provided, a period when Americans were attempting to define and determine the limits 
of freedom of speech under the federal Constitution of 1789. The search, of course, 
continues to this day.
This study in no way claims to provide a complete history of Lyon’s political 
career, or the struggle to define the meaning of the First Amendment rights of 
American citizens. Because Lyon did not write specifically about his political career 
the research has focused primarily upon the Annals of Congress, newspapers, 
biographies, and other secondary sources such as journal articles, books, and law 
reviews. Because secondary sources were used in the compilation of this study, some 
difficulties became apparent while during the research, such as the fact that many of 
the authors lacked knowledge of the Federalist Era and the life of Matthew Lyon.
Also, the issues presented in this study were highly partisan in nature, which in turn 
tended to obscure the real issues facing Matthew Lyon, the Fifth Congress, and the 
American people during the Federalist Era.
Throughout the compilation of this study every effort has been made to portray 
Matthew Lyon accurately and fairly; therefore many notes have been utilized 
throughout the paper in order to allow for complete documentation. The words of 
Matthew Lyon, as well as the words of his contemporaries, will be used in order to 
arrive at a better understanding of the subject and the times in which he lived.
Although other biographies of Matthew Lyon have been written, none of them 
has utilized Cluster Bloc analysis as a primary research tool. I believe that it will add 
an entirely new dimension to Matthew Lyon and the Sedition Act of 1798.
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CHAPTER TWO
CONTROVERSY IN THE HOUSE
This early period of American History is known as the Federalist Era because 
the Federalist party, led by John Adams and Alexander Hamilton, was the most 
influential and powerful party of the time. Historians and political scientists have 
argued whether or not the Federalists and the other major party, the Republicans, 
constituted true parties, but by the Fifth Congress they can be considered true parties, 
and will be treated as such for the purposes of this study. First of all, the Federalists 
and Republicans adopted fairly solid political philosophies which differed markedly 
from each other. This ideological difference applied not only to domestic politics but to 
foreign policy as well. Secondly, the two parties were active in calling their 
adversaries names, not necessarily Federalists and Republicans, but often 
Monarchists and Jacobins. It is clear that they viewed themselves as fundamentally 
different. In order to differentiate themselves in terms of policy, the political factions 
demonized opponents with perjorative labels. A note of caution must be sounded at 
this point however; although the Federalists and the Republicans will be considered 
true parties within the scope of this study, they cannot be compared to the party 
system of the twentieth century. The parties of the Federalist Era were in their 
infancy, just beginning to emerge from the political fabric, and still unsure of their 
proper role to play in the new American society. One characteristic of the Federalist 
Era, strong partisan animosities, has stood the test of time, and continues to plague 




In terms of political ideology it is safe to state that the Federalists believed in 
a strong national government.1 They believed that only a strong central government, 
possessing powers superior to those of the various states, was the best way for the 
young nation to survive foreign interference and internal strife. The Federalists 
believed the loose political configuration established under the framework of the 
Articles of Confederation was a huge failure. Only with a strong central government 
could the fledgling republic manage to meet the myriad of challenging issues inherent 
in domestic and foreign policy. In contrast, the Republicans, led in the beginning by 
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, believed the best form of government consisted 
of a weak, decentralized central government with the states reigning supreme.
Heated debate over this issue of federalism, whether the real power lies with the 
states or the federal government, was commonplace during the Federalist period and 
continues to this day.
The Federalists peered across the Atlantic Ocean to Great Britain as the best 
available European model of government.2 Although the Federalists realized that the 
British system of government contained some weaknesses, they needed only to look 
to other European countries, especially France, to understand that America’s best 
hope was to mimic the British system of government, minus a few of its shortcomings. 
What exactly was it that attracted the Federalists to the British system of 
government? One of the major contributing factors for the Federalists pro-British 
attitude was the relationship in England between those who governed and the 
governed. Great Britain was an aristocratic country, marked by hierarchy and class 
differentiations. The Federalists embraced this political and social system, which 
included a sense of superiority of those who governed over the governed. In reality, 
many American citizens possessed a real fear and distrust of democracy.3 The elitism
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and aristocratic nature of British society appealed greatly to the Federalists, who 
enjoyed a political stronghold in New England.
The Federalists and other American citizens distrusted democracy because it 
involved the rule of the majority.4 The New England Federalists believed that only a 
select few people from society, invariably the upper echelons of the social ladder, were 
capable of governing.5 It was a very “gentlemanly” type of an attitude that somehow 
only “gentlemen,” those within the upper tier of society, were endowed with the 
proper skills for governing. The only true gentlemen were considered to be 
Federalists, hence the Federalists were the only citizens capable of ruling. Historian 
Aleine Austin had this to say about this Federalist social mentality: “Those to be 
entrusted with the reigns of government should be men of education and 
responsibility, which almost invariably meant that they should be men of substantial 
property interests.”6 This emphasis on status permeated the new nation’s social and 
political environments to the greatest extent in New England. Like Britain, the 
United States was divided between various classes of citizens. Elitism did not exist 
in America to the same degree as it did in Britain, yet it is safe to assume that it 
played an important part in the politics of the Federalist Era.7 This will become 
apparent shortly when Matthew Lyon’s elitist opposition questioned his social 
standing during his expulsion proceedings. Lyon continually fought in opposition to 
the elitist mentality which permeated Federalist and New England society.
Despite these extreme expressions of party, class, and nationalistic 
animosities, it is safe to assume that not every Federalist embraced such excesses of 
aristocratic elitism.8 Many Federalists realized that the United States, although tied 
to Britain by strong cultural bonds, was fundamentally different both in terms of 
society and in politics. A minority of Federalists believed that if the United States 
were to steer a different course from Britain and Europe in general, elitism would have
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to be moderated, if not thrown out all together. The United States was, after all, 
supposed to be a country of individuals endowed with basic rights, at least according 
to the Declaration of Independence. The United States was intended to be a country 
where every man was considered equal. This moderate wing of the Federalists 
realized that the future success of the Federalist party hinged upon acceptance of 
others, rather than outright rejection. Only through the winning of new recruits could 
the Federalists remain an important political force. Unfortunately for the Federalists, 
they were conducting a policy of exclusion rather than inclusion, handicapping their 
hopes of remaining a strong and lasting political force.9
Matthew Lyon, along with his Republican counterparts, could be just as 
narrow-minded as his Federalist enemies. One of the most illustrative examples of 
this incredibly partisan atmosphere surfaced during the United States’ quasi-war with 
France. Since the Federalists embraced a pro-British foreign policy the political affairs 
of revolutionary France attracted little sympathy from them. The Republicans 
countered the hostility to the French and their recent revolution with fierce 
accusations (occasionally rooted in fact) aimed at the Federalists. On more than one 
occasion Matthew Lyon and his Republican colleagues accused the Federalists of 
advocating violence, bent on nothing short of war with France.1*̂ Most historians 
writing about the political climate of the Federalist Era have cast the Federalists as 
the villains, with the Republicans cast in a moderate, reasonable role. It must be 
stated at the very beginning that both the Federalists and Republicans gave as well 
as they received. Both parties resorted to extreme partisan behavior. This political 
reality will become painfully clear during the debates concerning the possible 
expulsions of Matthew Lyon and Roger Griswold, as well as discussions surrounding 
Lyon’s trial under the Sedition Act of 1798. Both parties, with a slight edge given to
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the Federalists, administered low blows to their political opposition at every available 
opportunity.
For Lyon and the Republicans, belief in the proper functioning of government 
differed fundamentally from the Federalists. For the Republicans, government in the 
hands of the common man was the best form of government.11 The preceding 
statement begs the question, “who is the common man?” According to the 
Republicans the common man included men who embraced democracy with two hands. 
They were the men who did not own large amounts of property, nor did they hold 
dearly to the bonds of union with Britain. They differed markedly from elitist, 
monarchal, Federalist New England. Quite the contrary, the common man was the 
small farmer and the laborer who did not live in nation’s growing cities. Matthew 
Lyon, as a common man and as a Republican, believed that government controlled by 
the majority of the American citizens was good.12 This belief system was in direct 
opposition to the Federalist belief that the best form of government was the 
government controlled by the chosen few. This debate still surfaces from time to time 
today, with some Americans arguing that complete democracy, with all citizens taking 
part personally in most of the affairs of government, is the best course the United 
States ought to take. Yet others, like the Federalists in the Federalist Era, believed 
that a handful of competent, well-versed citizens alone were capable of making the 
proper decisions for the country.
The Republican party was perhaps most unified in its general opposition to
anything monarchal in nature. Thomas Jefferson spoke for Matthew Lyon and the rest
of the Republican party when he wrote to George Washington from Paris in 1788:
I was much an enemy to monarchs before I came to Europe. I am ten 
thousand times more so since I have seen what they are. There is scarcely 
an evil known in these countries which may not be traced to their king as 
its source, nor a good which is not derived from the small fibers of 
republicanism existing among them. I can further say, with safety, there
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is not a crowned head in Europe whose talents or merits would entitle 
him to be a vestryman by the people of any parish in America.13
It is difficult to imagine anyone reading this letter of Jefferson’s and failing to grasp
fully his viewpoint. In the eyes of the Republicans, monarchy was an evil to be
avoided at all cost, leaving the superior republican form of government alone capable of
affecting positive government for the nation. The Republicans, judging from Jefferson’s
quote, did not bother to hide their true feelings on the subject of European monarchy.
Another important difference between the two parties during the Federalist
Era was their judgment on the proper role of elected representatives. The Federalists
in general believed that once the voters of the nation made their choice of
representatives in Congress, their job was completed. In other words, once the voters
did their part by casting their votes, they failed to remain an active part of the political
process. The Republicans believed the opposite was true. A proper democratic
government was one in which the citizens were involved, not only at voting stations,
but throughout the political process. The act of voting by the nation’s citizens was
only the first step in that process. Unlike the subservient positions embraced by the
Federalist philosophy, the Republicans embraced a more active, involved citizenry.
Some caution must be injected here because it is far too easy to judge the Federalist
Era’s ideas on the role of democracy with the standards of today. If the Republicans
of the Federalist Era were alive today they would no doubt be horrified at the extent
to which democracy has been taken.
The final fundamental difference between the Federalist and Republican
parties, was that the two parties relied upon different power bases for their support.
The Federalists received much of their support from the New England area, especially
from the numerous wealthy merchants and substantial property owners, and from
South Carolina in the South.14 These were the men of considerable wealth, who in
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turn wielded significant influence in local and regional politics. The Republicans 
received a majority of their growing support from the southern and western sections of 
the country. The frontier regions and the South were fast becoming Republican 
strongholds, with Virginia and Maryland firmly in control of the Republicans. They 
received most of their support from the numerous propertyless citizens, as well as 
small farmers and a scattering of small business owners, of which Matthew Lyon was 
a part.15 Throughout the rest of this study keep in mind these differences in terms of 
varying power bases. They will become significant in the succeeding pages concerning 
the fate of Matthew Lyon.
This background to the Federalist Era should provide some sense of what the 
period entailed. This understanding will become crucial to fully grasp the political 
wranglings of the two parties over Lyon, his altercations with his nemesis Roger 
Griswold, and his trial on charges of violating the Sedition Act of 1798. It will soon 
become apparent that Lyon’s behavior as a Representative from the new state of 
Vermont during the Fifth Congress was frequently quite provocative. Yet his 
personality, often fiery and impassioned, endeared him to many of his constituents.
At times they enjoyed the fact that their small, often unnoticed state gained attention 
on the national scene, even if it was basically negative in nature. It is important to 
keep in mind that Lyon was not some renegade politician with little or no support from 
his constituents.16 He enjoyed great support from the voters in his Western Vermont 
district; they embraced nearly everything Lyon accomplished as their representative. 
In fact, Lyon was made a martyr in Vermont during his expulsion proceedings.17 
Lyon’s defense throughout these proceedings often rested upon the belief that he was 
simply doing what his constituents asked of him, a true democrat representing his 
constituents’ interests perfectly. If he did not represent his constituents properly he 
believed and expected that they would vote him out of office at the next election.
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The first important example of Matthew Lyon’s controversial behavior while a 
member of Congress occurred in November of 1797. It had become tradition that at 
the time of each opening session of Congress the President, then John Adams, would 
address both Houses of Congress concerning the legislation of the upcoming session 
of Congress. It had become a ritual for the House to draft and deliver a reply to the 
President’s speech. In accordance with this practice, a resolution was submitted 
calling for the Congress to respond to the President’s speech opening the Fifth 
Congress:
Resolved, That a respectful Address be presented by the House of 
Representatives to the President of the United States, in answer to his 
Speech to both Houses of Congress at the commencement of the present 
session, containing assurances that the House will take into consideration 
the various and important matters recommended to their attention.18
Matthew Lyon was opposed to delivering a reply to the President’s speech
because he believed it to be an outmoded tradition that wasted important
congressional time. Lyon contended that the reply to the President’s speech was a
very “troublesome and greatly derided custom of turning out en masse to wait upon
the President.” 19 Those who thought a reply to the President’s speech was
worthwhile, mainly Federalists, believed that the mere fact that it was the traditional
thing to do was reason enough to draft and deliver a reply. Lyon responded to this
blind faith in tradition by questioning these long-held parliamentary traditions, the
appropriateness of these traditions in a democratic body, and their usefulness to the
conduct of legislative business. Lyon believed the Congress would function more
efficiently if it omitted unneeded pageantry and tradition. Today this seems a trivial
matter, but in 1797 it was a very important debate. Would the nation retain its old
customs as England had done, or would it disregard them and get on to the business
at hand? Federalists viewed Lyon as upsetting established practices. After voting
on the resolution, the Congress proceeded to draft a reply to the President’s speech.
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Lyon was not finished, however, for he requested to be excused from waiting 
upon the President at his residence in order to deliver the response. He believed 
waiting upon the President was monarchal in nature and a waste of time. He wanted 
to replace the part of the resolution that read, “attended by the House,” with 
“attended by such members as may think proper.”20 On the one hand Lyon’s 
proposal seemed practical enough, for it simply stated that those who wanted to be 
excused from waiting upon the President, for whatever reason, would be excused. On 
the other hand it seems Lyon was looking for trouble. Was it after all such a terrible 
thing to participate in a traditional ceremony? To Lyon it was. His fellow 
representatives did not agree, and unanimously dismissed Lyon’s objections to 
delivering the Congressional response at the President’s residence.21 Representative 
Nathaniel Smith, a Connecticut Federalist said, “Whenever gentlemen gave a 
reasonable excuse for an absence from the duties of the House, they were constantly 
consented to; but when a gentleman came forward to ask for the indulgence, without 
giving any reason for telling the House they had acted like fools, he could not consent 
to his being excused.”22
Lyon’s preceding behavior may be chalked up to his extreme devotion to 
democracy. In his view Americans ought not be party to frivolous tradition adopted 
from England. The answer to the President’s speech simply provided Lyon an 
opportunity to muddy the political waters, as he “loved a fight or a frolic.”23 It seems 
Matthew Lyon was at his best when he was embroiled in political controversy, yet his 
convictions were sincere. Journalist Claude G. Bowers characterized Lyon as “A 
constant provocation to the Federalists. Hot-tempered, ardent, uncouth in his 
manners, but thoroughly honest at heart.”24 Although Lyon possessed a strong 
belief system, he was greatly misunderstood by many of his peers in Congress. To 
many colleagues he was a demagogue, playing on the emotions of the American
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people. To others he was a thoroughly realistic, sincere, motivated man. Perhaps his 
means were questionable, but hardly anyone could question his ends.
This question, however, of being excused from the traditional ceremonial 
functions of government continued throughout the second session of the Fifth 
Congress. Again on June 3, 1798, Lyon objected to the practice of attending the 
answer to the President’s speech, as well as the unified parade of Congressmen 
moving to respond to the Executive. On June 3rd, Lyon again made a motion on the 
House floor to be exempted from attending the answer to the President’s speech.
Lyon used the same justifications as he had in November of 1797, objecting to 
outmoded traditions. This time his colleagues supported his cause and excused him 
from marching in the parade by a unanimous vote.25 The Congress, believing it had 
more important tasks on its agenda, caved in to Lyon’s wishes.
Lyon struggled to uphold his varied convictions, as well as those of his 
constituents. His first commitment while a member of Congress was in fact to his 
district. In 1791 when he first ran for Congress he “sought to identify himself with 
those who labored productively.”26 This statement can be attributed to his desire to 
represent the common man in direct opposition to many elitist citizens of the country. 
In reference to the elitist politicians of New England, Lyon said he was fighting “to 
emancipate this country from the domination of a set of men who assumed all 
appointments upon themselves.”27 There was no doubt in the minds of the politicians 
of the early 1790’s, as well as in the minds of the historians who have since studied 
the Federalist Era and Matthew Lyon, that he was a man of conviction, unafraid to 
target his political opponents publicly.
In response, Lyon’s Federalist targets struck back by questioning about where 
the majority of his political support originated. Although the vast majority of Lyon’s 
support came from the mainstream of society, Lyon could not deny and the Federalists
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could not help but point out that much of his support came from the various Democratic 
Societies popping up around Vermont and the rest of the nation.28 These Democratic 
Societies were controversial and most people treated them with a great deal of 
skeptisicm. The Federalists both feared and loathed these quasi-political groupings, 
and promptly took advantage of every possible opportunity to remind Lyon that he 
received support from a highly questionable group of people, both in terms of their 
loyalty to the United States, as well as the means they utilized for attaining their 
ends. It would be like a candidate for Congress in our own time accepting support 
from the mafia or the Irish Republican Army. Perhaps no one but William Cobbet, the 
British editor of the Porcupine’s Gazette, reminded Lyon more often of his 
questionable power base. Throughout Lyon’s career in American politics, Cobbet and 
other Federalist newspaper editors sought to undermine Lyon’s credibility and ability 
to represent the people in his district.
Besides the issue of Lyon’s political support, the slavery issue was also an 
important one during the Fifth Congress. The Society of Quakers presented a 
memorial to Congress objecting to black enslavement. In that memorial, the Quakers 
demanded “neither import nor purchase [of] any slaves imported after the first day of 
December next, after which we will wholly discontinue the slave trade.”29 In firm 
support of of the Quaker memorial Lyon called upon his colleagues to support the 
resolution. Unfortunately his calls for no further slave importation fell on deaf ears. 
Another example of Lyon’s defiance as a member of the Fifth Congress revolved 
around the issue of a proposed Stamp Act. The Stamp Act proposed by the Federalist 
majority included a tax on certain paper goods, which in turn would help pay for a 
military build up, inspired by French threats, and recommended by President John 
Adams.30 Why was Lyon so opposed to to a measure that would conceivably protect 
the country from its foreign enemies? Lyon believed that the Stamp Act was a design
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of the rich which would have a disproportionate affect on the poor of the country.
During congressional debate on the act, Lyon expressed his opposition to it because it 
did not “bear equally on all classes of men.”31 It seems Lyon’s election promise to 
be the representative of the common man carried over to his initial actions in the U.S. 
House.
An additional bone of contention between the Federalists and Republicans 
during the Fifth Congress involved a Federalist proposed tax upon certificates of 
naturalization. In its simplest form the plan involved a tax upon every new immigrant 
to the United States. Lyon, an immigrant himself, opposed the measure vehemently. 
The proposed naturalization tax was eventually tabled.
Lyon did not always emerge on the winning side of every controversy of the 
Fifth Congress. He was accused by his Federalist opponents of abusing his franking 
privileges, privileges whereby Congressmen were allowed to mail a certain amount of 
literature home, informing their constituents of the business at hand.32 At that time, 
the mail was a vital link between a Congressman and his constituents, and Lyon used 
this privilege to the utmost. He was accused of including in various mailings to his 
district a highly partisan newspaper, the Aurora, printed by the arch-Republican 
newspaper editor, Benjamin Bache, a grandson of Benjamin Franklin. Lyon embraced 
Bache’s political philosophy so wholeheartedly that he was willing to replace his own 
words with those of Bache. According to the rules of the Congressional franking 
privilege, Lyon’s practice of including the Aurora with his own materials was 
considered highly questionable. Lyon eventually ceased including the Aurora in his 
literature home.
Although Lyon eventually gave in to the enormous political pressure for his 
alleged abuses of his franking privileges, he did not give up without a fight. He 
despised anyone who claimed any sense of authority over him. He resented both
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Federalist and Republican leaders for enforcing Congressional rules when they
involved his political affairs. This aspect of Lyon’s behavior probably was the one
aspect that divided his supporters and opponents most definitively. Lyon’s
personality was described as “black and white.” You either loved Lyon and
supported his political pursuits, or you hated him and opposed every move he made.33
Lyon demanded complete loyalty from his supporters; if for some reason he could not
count on their loyalty he tried as hard as possible to win them over. “His convictions
ran clear to the bottom of subjects, and nothing he said or did was commonplace.”34
These words from Lyon biographer James F. McLaughlin go to the very heart of
Matthew Lyon the man, and Matthew Lyon the politician.
Although Lyon frequently seemed to be too partisan to speak for all of society
on most policy questions, it must be understood that Lyon spoke for all of society
when it involved the possible advancement of democracy. James F. McLaughlin also
stated, comparing him to Thomas Jefferson, that
Matthew Lyon became a Democrat of Democrats, and regarding the 
Federalists as thinly disguised Tories, he waged ceaseless warfare against 
them. As Jefferson stripped to the fight in Virginia, grappled with promo- 
geniture, the title gatherers of the Established church and the ceremonies of 
religious liberty, so Lyon sprang into the breach in Vermont in the same 
fight, defeated the Federalists after a prolonged battle, and became the 
pioneer Democrat of New England.33
Judging from McLaughlin, Matthew Lyon had become a powerful political force to be 
reckoned with in New England.
Matthew Lyon was not the only strong-willed politician from New England, 
however. Just to the south of Vermont lies another small state, Connecticut. From 
Connecticut, a Federalist stronghold, emerged a politician just as strong-willed, just 
as partisan, and just as driven as Matthew Lyon. His name was Roger Griswold, a 
Federalist member of the United States House of Representatives. Roger Griswold 
became Lyon’s worst enemy during the Fifth Congress. It is difficult to imagine two
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men with such absolutely opposite political philosophies. Griswold was considered 
to be a high-Federalist, one of the few ultra-Federalists who led their party into battle. 
Griswold had heard of Matthew Lyon, and heard the rumors of his rough-and-tumble 
disposition. Griswold too was an aggressive politician, but prided himself on being a 
“polished” member of the fashionable Federalist party. The two Congressmen soon 
got to know one another very well. Both were soon to be targeted for expulsion.
Roger Griswold experienced a very different type of upbringing than that of 
Matthew Lyon. Unlike Lyon, Griswold was born in America, in Lyme, Connecticut, on 
May 21, 1762.36 He graduated with honors from Yale University in 1780, and was 
admitted to the bar in 1783. His family was a very influential one in the New England 
area, and Roger was the beneficiary of their social position. Griswold enjoyed the 
presence of both parents throughout his path to maturity. Lyon did not experience 
such a luxury. Griswold enjoyed a stable home environment, living in one place 
throughout his entire childhood. Lyon, again, did not. Griswold was the direct 
recipient of all that was bestowed upon a family enjoying a high social standing. Lyon 
had no such luck. In 1784 Roger Griswold became the Governor of Connecticut, and 
served until he was elected to the United States Congress in 1794, where he served 
until 1804. Again in 1811, Roger Griswold was reelected Governor of the state of 
Connecticut.37 Roger Griswold lived a life of comfort and accomplishment.
At the time of Roger Griswold’s death in October of 1812, the Connecticut 
General Assembly wrote that “the impartial Biographer will assign him a place in the 
temple of fame with the most enlightened, upright and virtuous of his 
contemporaries.”38 It went on to characterize Griswold as a man with “a sound mind 
in a sound body.”39 It also said that
his influence was not exceeded by that of any other man. His political enemies 
awarded him the praise of acting uprightly, and under the direction of an 
enlightened mind.40
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Obviously the Connecticut General Assembly overlooked his behavior toward 
Matthew Lyon in Congress.
The violent altercations between Matthew Lyon and Roger Griswold, both
verbal and physical in nature, will make it more difficult to believe that Roger Griswold
was an “upright,” “virtuous” man, and a man with “a sound mind,” and someone
who acted “uprightly.” Of course there is almost always a vast difference between
what people say about someone at the time of his death, and what people thought
about him while he was living. Like Matthew Lyon, Roger Griswold had many
positive qualities, but unfortunately the bad qualities are what people have most
remembered about both of them. Roger Griswold was well known for using dirty
tactics in order to get at his Republican foes. He was one who was known to have
initiated rumors about an enemy, hoping to use character assassination as a weapon
against his opponents. Claude G. Bowers has described Griswold, alleging that
no one could be more arrogantly dogmatic or more offensively intolerant.
His political views were those of the extreme Federalists, bitterly hostile 
to democracy. He did not confine his attacks to the open and on the 
floor, but was prone to busy himself in the circulation of whispered gossiping 
about the mess-table and in the cloak-rooms.41
Compare Bowers’s observation of Griswold with Tom Campbell’s on Lyon:
“He was essentially a man of action, accustomed by nature and habit to control men, 
as well as being a Democrat of long experience and courage of the Andrew Jackson 
type.”42 Both authors chose their words carefully, and with a proper understanding of 
the two politicians. The stage had been set for the clash of two hard-headed 
politicians, Matthew Lyon and Roger Griswold.
The first Lyon-Griswold altercation took place in the House of 
Representatives of the Fifth Congress. The Federalists held the majority of the 117 
Congressmen by a margin of 65 to 52.43 Although the Republicans were at a 
numerical disadvantage, their party was experiencing some growth and popularity.
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The Federalists realized this, which only added intensity to partisan politics. This 
rocky relationship between Federalists and Republicans helps to explain the 
expulsion proceedings of both Lyon and Griswold. Also, like most issues, the fate of 
these two controversial politicians will hinge on mathematics, on how many votes the 
Federalists and Republicans were able to muster in order to pass legislation.
The First altercation between Lyon and Griswold occurred on November 29, 
1797, while the House was conducting a ballot selection for managers of the 
impending impeachment of William Blount. While the ballots were being counted, and 
an air of general relaxation prevailed, Jonathan Dayton, a New Jersey Federalist and 
the Speaker of the House, walked around the House chamber in order to gain some 
exercise while the ballots were being counted. Speaker Dayton’s leisurely stroll 
through the chamber ended when he took the chair usually occupied by Samuel Dana, 
a Connecticut Federalist, who was also taking advantage of the break in the House 
activities. Mr. Dana ended up standing next to the fireplace next to Lyon, where they 
immediately struck up a conversation, which soon became heated. According to 
Dayton’s testimony, the Speaker responded forcefully to the discussion now taking 
place at the fireplace between Dana and Lyon, and said, “Gentlemen, keep yourselves 
cool, if you proceed much further, you will want seconds.”44
After Congressmen Dana and Lyon tempered their conversation, Speaker 
Dayton asked Lyon why he opposed the Stamp Act. Lyon responded to Dayton’s 
query with a verbal barrage against his Federalist enemies. He believed that the 
controversy over his opposition to the Stamp Act had been blown entirely out of 
proportion by his Federalist colleagues.45 Also, Lyon allegedly began a lengthy 
discussion upon the backwardness of the people of Connecticut, the state Dana and 
Griswold represented. Lyon stated his opinions loud enough so nearly everyone could
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hear his remarks. He proceeded to question the Connecticut delegates’ motives for
becoming representatives of their state. Lyon claimed
that the members from the state were acting in direct opposition to the 
opinions of nine-tenths of their constituents; that, regardless of the public 
good, they were seeking their own private interests; that their object was to 
obtain for themselves; that if they could not obtain the most lucrative, they 
would not refuse those that were less so.46
Clearly Matthew Lyon was out of line when he made these remarks about his
colleagues in the House. Congress was, after all, supposed to be a place where
people could state their personal opinions calmly and professionally. However, the
manner in which Lyon spoke angered many associates, especially those from the state
of Connecticut, the main focus of Lyon’s criticism. Lyon went so far as to say that if
he went to Connecticut himself he could single-handedly effect a revolution, and turn
out the Connecticut representatives.47
When Lyon made this final remark, threatening to raise a revolution in
Connecticut in opposition to self-aggrandizing representatives, Griswold took special
notice. He, like most of the people who heard Lyon, was offended. At the time Lyon
made the controversial remark Griswold was sitting in another member’s seat, and he
responded to the accusations. Griswold referred to Lyon being cashiered from the
Army, and the jokes surrounding it, which included the assertion that he was
sentenced to wearing a wooden sword, and chided Lyon that if he were to go into
Connecticut to raise a rebellion, “you had better wear your wooden sword.”48 The
House promptly erupted into playful laughter. It is not known how serious a remark
was intended by Griswold at that time. It does appear that it was meant to belittle
Lyon’s military record.
Lyon made no reply, positive or negative, to this remark. Either he did not 
hear Griswold’s remark, or he heard it and chose to ignore it. Either way, the 
discussion was not over. Lyon continued to talk to the Speaker about the state of
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Connecticut, with his back turned to Griswold. Lyon told Speaker Dayton that on 
many occasions various citizens from the state of Connecticut, who possessed a 
strong dislike for him (Lyon), visited Vermont, but after a short time he was able to 
win their loyalties by pointing out numerous negative features of the Connecticut 
delegation in Congress. Griswold, still privy to the discussion transpiring between 
Lyon and Dayton, got up from the chair he was sitting in, walked over to where Lyon 
and Dayton were conversing, laid his hand upon Lyon’s arm and said, “If you were 
able to enter into Connecticut for the purposes you mention, you could not alter the 
opinion of the nearest ostler.”49 Lyon, again ignoring Griswold’s remarks and the 
varied chuckles of the eavesdroppers, repeated his assertions, stating that if he were 
able to set up a press in Connecticut, within a year he could effect a revolution, and 
turn out all of its members.
At that juncture of the increasingly tense conversation Speaker Dayton 
questioned Lyon’s assertions that the Connecticut Representatives acted in direct 
defiance of their constituents’ desires, and that the people of Connecticut had 
repeatedly elected gentlemen of similar, negative political principles. Lyon responded 
to Dayton’s questioning by stating that the representatives had blinded their eyes to 
their constituents, dictated their political philosophies to them, and allowed only their 
own, narrow opinions to be heard. Lyon went on to add that he believed that there 
was perhaps only one member of the Connecticut delegation that he might spare, and 
that he had serious thoughts of moving into the state and “fighting them on their own 
ground.” At this point, hearing all he could bear, Roger Griswold restated his earlier 
remark that if Lyon chose to move to Connecticut and start a rebellion he had better 
wear his wooden sword. Lyon failed to ignore the insult a second time, and spat in the 
face of Griswold.50 Griswold proceeded to lift one arm in a quick motion appearing to
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strike a blow at Lyon, but instead pulled out a handkerchief from his breast pocket , 
refraining from violently assaulting Lyon.
Immediately the Federalist-controlled Congress burst into partisan warfare. 
The Federalists demanded some sort of punishment for the behavior of Matthew 
Lyon. Their search for the proper punishment resulted in a motion submitted by 
Samuel Sewall, a Massachusetts Federalist, made on January 30, 1798. The motion 
read as follows:
Resolved, That Matthew Lyon, a member of this House, for a violent attack 
and indecency committed upon the person of Roger Griswold, another member, 
in the presence of this House, whilst sitting, be, for this disorderly behaviour, 
expelled therefrom.51
After the resolution was presented to the Whole House, a “Breach of 
Privileges” committee was formed to investigate the Lyon-Griswold altercation.52 
The vote on the creation of that committee is the first relevant roll-call vote of this 
study. The resolution referring the Lyon-Griswold matter to the Committee of 
Privileges passed by a narrow margin of 49 votes in favor, and 44 votes opposed.53
It is interesting to note that immediately following this first Lyon-Griswold 
altercation, and immediately preceding Representative Sewall’s resolution, Mr.
Sewall moved that the galleries be cleared of all possible spectators, as the subject 
about to be taken up was one “which would considerably affect the feelings of the 
members of the House.”54 Judging by the events following, however, this was a 
considerable understatement. The expulsion proceedings ignited intense party 
antagonisms and caused acute embarrassment to the members of the House, 
especially the representatives who were chosen to be the members of the Breach of 
Privileges Committee: Thomas Pinckney, Federalist of South Carolina; Abraham 
Venable, Republican of Virginia; John Wilkes Kittera, Federalist of Pennsylvania; 
Isaac Parker, Federalist of Massachusetts; Robert Williams, Republican of North
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Carolina; James Cochran, Federalist of New York; and George Dent, Federalist of 
Maryland.55 These Committee members were assigned the unenviable task of 
holding congressional hearings inquiring into the question of whether Matthew Lyon 
ought to be expelled from the House. The Federalists no doubt enjoyed seeing Lyon 
under such extreme political pressure.
The second relevant roll-call vote on Matthew Lyon occurred on the same day, 
January 30, 1798. A motion was submitted, which stated, “Resolved, That this House 
will consider it a high breach of privilege if either of the members shall enter into any 
personal contest until a decision of the House shall be made thereon.” A separate 
motion was made, again by an unknown source, which would add to the previous 
motion the following: “And that the said Matthew Lyon be considered in the custody 
of the Sergeant-At-Arms until the further order of the House.”56 No doubt both 
resolutions were submitted by Federalists, since the Federalists were at risk of 
losing Griswold, a key player in Congress, if any further altercations followed. Also, 
many Federalists would have liked nothing more than to see Matthew Lyon placed in 
the custody of the Sergeant-At-Arms, because they believed him guilty of the stated 
charge. Being placed in the custody of the Sergeant-At-Arms would be tantamount to 
being placed under arrest.
There was no debate on this second roll-call vote, and the Annals of Congress 
do not specify why. The results of the second roll-call were in Lyon’s favor, however, 
as the motion failed by 29 votes in favor, to 62 votes opposed.57 This vote was a set­
back for the Federalist initiated resolutions to have Lyon placed in the custody of the 
Sergeant-At-Arms, and further demoralize their political foe. Lyon was free to go 
about his normal business, without conditions placed upon future behavior and 
freedom of movement. After this second roll-call vote the House, having had a very 
momentous day, adjourned at eight-o’clock in the evening. The fate of Matthew Lyon
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would be decided by committee on another day. One minor note bears mentioning at 
this point. When the Congress again took up the Breach of Privilege Resolution on 
February 1, 1798, two Committee members removed themselves from their appointed 
duties, Venable and Pinckney, claiming illness would not allow them to perform their 
Committee duties. John Rutledge, a Federalist from South Carolina, assumed a 
position on the Committee at that time. The Committee now had only one Republican 
member, leaving the Federalists free to do as they wished. Whether or not these 
defections from the Committee had anything to do with the notoriety of the 
embarrassing incident is unknown. It does, if nothing else, seem a bit peculiar.
Later on that same day, February 1, 1798, Speaker Dayton received a letter of 
apology from Matthew Lyon. A motion was made to read the letter, which read as 
follows:
To the Speaker: Sir: As the attention of the House of Representatives has 
been called to my conduct in a dispute with Mr. Griswold, on a suggestion of 
it being a violation of the order of the House, and the respect due to it from all 
its members, I feel it incumbent on me to obviate the importation of intentional 
disrespect. Permit me, sir, through you, to assure the House of 
Representatives that I feel as much as any of its members the necessity of 
preserving the utmost decorum in its proceedings; that I am incapable of an 
intentional violation of its rules; and that, if, in the present instance, I am 
chargeable with disregard of them, it is owing wholly to my ignorance of 
their extent, and that the House of Representatives claimed any superinten­
dance over its members when not formally constituted, and when they are not 
engaged in actual business. If I have been mistaken in my understanding on 
this subject, I beg the House to believe my fault has been without intention, 
and that I am very sorry that I have deserved its censure.58
Lyon’s letter of apology was then referred to the Breach of Privileges Committee.
Lyon’s letter of apology deserves further attention. First, Lyon claimed in his
letter to the Speaker that he meant no intentional disrespect to the House. This is
probably a sincere statement. Yet on too many occasions during Lyon’s political
career he acted before thinking about the potential results of those actions. His
personality did not always allow a cooling-off period. Lyon did not believe spitting in
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the face of his fellow colleague was an intentional act of disrespect, since it did not 
occur when the House was formally constituted. This reasoning served as a 
convenient loophole for Lyon. It was, however, perceived by many of his Federalist 
colleagues as an intentional act. It was an act which perhaps did not include 
premeditation, yet it is hard to believe that someone can accidentally spit at someone. 
Still, Lyon claimed that he believed strongly in the preservation of House decorum.
Second, and most important, Lyon claimed that the atmosphere of the House at 
the time of the incident proved that the House was not really conducting official 
business. Lyon’s latest claim did not gain much support, since despite the lack of 
immediate debate the House had been called to order by the Speaker. Still, Lyon 
utilized nearly anything on which to base his defense. Finally, the wording of Lyon’s 
pseudo-apology demands attention. For all practical purposes Lyon did not actually 
apologize to the House, or take responsibility for his actions. He simply said that he 
was sorry that he had deserved the censure of the House. The letter to the Speaker is 
very important because the House soon began to hear the testimony from the eye­
witnesses to the first Lyon-Griswold altercation. Perhaps if Lyon had been more 
sincere in his letter the House would have been more lenient in meting out his 
punishment. However it is difficult to believe the Federalists would have accepted a 
letter of apology; they wanted him expelled.
On February 2, 1798, after the Breach of Privileges Committee interviewed 
several witnesses to the first Lyon-Griswold altercation, Lyon stated on the floor of 
the House that he wished the information received by the Committee be made 
available to the entire House.59 In debate on this question Nathaniel Macon, a 
Republican from the state of North Carolina, stated his belief that once the House 
heard the report from the Committee, “the punishment which the report proposed was 
equal to death itself.”60 Lyon received at least some support at that time from his
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fellow Republicans. Lyon’s friends also supported the testimony to be released to the 
Committee of the Whole House. The third relevant roll-call vote on Matthew Lyon 
was now at hand. It revolved around the question of whether the Committee of the 
Whole House should be authorized to examine the testimony of the eye-witnesses. 
The vote resulted in a lop-sided victory for the Federalist majority, 88 votes in favor, 
and 4 votes opposed.61 The only congressmen who voted against release of the 
testimony were William Gordon, a Federalist from New Hampshire, Samuel Sewall, a 
Massachusetts Federalist, Samuel Sitgreaves, a Federalist from Pennsylvania, and 
George Thacher, a Massachusetts Federalist. No reasons have been found why 
these four Congressmen voted nay on roll-call three, except that they were perhaps 
hardliners who wanted to go ahead and convict Lyon without a close examination of 
the witnesses. Ironically all four of the members were Federalists. All of the 
testimonies in their entirety may be found in the Annals of Congress on February 12, 
1798. Those who provided testimony were Jonathan Dayton, Federalist of New 
Jersey, David Brooks, Federalist of New York, Hezekiah L. Hosmer, New York 
Federalist, Samuel Dana, Connecticut Federalist, Joshua Coit, Connecticut Federalist, 
Chauncey Goodrich, Connecticut Federalist, Christopher Champlin, a Federalist from 
Rhode Island, and Joseph B. Varnum, A Republican from Massachusetts.62 Note that 
only one Republican was invited by the Committee to provide testimony. The 
Committee accordingly received very partisan testimonies from its eye-witnesses.
The form of the presentations consisted of each member stating his personal 
recollections of what transpired the day of the Lyon-Griswold spitting incident, 
followed by a brief question and answer session between the witnesses and the 
Whole House.
In order to grasp the full meaning of the evidence and its effect on Lyon’s 
political fate, it is necessary to read all the testimony.63 Since space is short, a brief
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synopsis must suffice. For the most part all of the testimony agreed. When
Representative Dana gave his testimony, the only testimony which provided a slightly
different perception of the altercation than those of the other Federalists, the House
listened intently.64 The only significant difference revolved around the conversation
Mr. Dana had been having with Lyon at the fireplace, just prior to the Speaker’s
demand that they compose themselves. It had to do with Dana’s asking for a
clarification of Lyon’s alleged statement to another congressman, that if the
Connecticut representatives voted for the Stamp Act their constituents would throw
them out of office. Dana claimed that Lyon said that his words were taken out of
context. According to Dana, Lyon told him that they would be “carried out,” simply
by the natural process of electing new representatives. In Dana's own words:
In the course of this conversation, he spoke of the disagreeable reception 
which we might expect on returning to Connecticut, and made other 
observations of an irritating nature. I felt some disdain at what he said; and, 
as his conversation was by no means pleasing to me, I believe that my 
irritation was manifest from the manner in which I answered him. The Speaker 
being near, and, addressing us with an air of civility, interposed the caution 
which he has mentioned.65
When Nathaniel Chipman, a Senator from Vermont and a character witness for 
Lyon, testified before the committee, he claimed that Lyon had allegedly said 
sometime earlier that year that he would defend his military record and express his 
dissatisfaction with anyone who brought up the wooden sword. Chipman began his 
testimony by describing an occasion the summer before in which he had asked Lyon 
for his side of the Jericho desertion incident, in which he had allegedly been cashiered 
from the Army. Lyon freely provided his side of the story, but also added some 
information which foretold the present situation. According to Chipman, Lyon referred 
to the wooden sword, and said, “If anyone at Philadelphia, or if any member of 
Congress should insult him with it, or pretend to mention it to him, it should not pass
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with impunity.”66 Lyon’s statement, if true, came to fruition. One need only ask 
Roger Griswold.
During the free moments between testimony Lyon rose to defend himself. He
insisted that the House was not in session, or conducting official business when the
affront to Griswold occurred. Lyon believed that the members of the House were at
their amusement and recreation. He also pointed out that during actual business only
one speaker was allowed to speak at any one time. Lyon was not afforded such a
luxury. “How could I imagine that this House was sitting, when the Speaker suffered
me to be interrupted when speaking to him, by the remarks and jokes of four or five
gentlemen?”67 Also on the affairs of the House, Lyon stated:
Is it proper to say that the House was sitting, while half the members 
were standing round the table, while two-thirds of the other half were 
walking round the bar, the Speaker engaged in jocular conversation, and 
the few who remained in their seats, either in private conversation or 
writing letters?68
Lyon raised a relevant point; however there is little doubt, despite the cordial
atmosphere, that the House was indeed undertaking official business.
Lyon also defended his military record, which had been so seriously questioned
during the preceding testimony. Referring to the desertion incident, Lyon stated:
Had I reasonable opportunity, I could prove, by the Lieutenant Colonel, 
who is now General Stafford, and several other officers of that regiment, 
that when I left it, I left it with the regret of much the greater part of the 
officers and all the soldiers.69
Lyon was not only attacked specifically for his behavior while a member of the House, 
but for his military record which occurred before he was a member of Congress.
Clearly the Federalists were using every available piece of history with which to 
embarrass Lyon, and to question his ability to function as a representative of his 
state. Lyon responded to this latest charge by saying:
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By these things, and my standing in this House, I could prove that I have 
always been respected in the country I represent . The free electors of 
my district have given me a preference to a gentleman of very great 
respectability, yet evidence has been adduced in order to show that I am a 
person of disrepute.70
In a more defiant tone Lyon referred to his emotional disposition: “I never did receive 
impunity; nor did I come here to do so. I would sooner leave the world.”71
Lyon brought up a constitutional issue during his defense, as he questioned the 
authority of House members to hear and decide the situation between himself and 
Griswold. “I must think that the House of Representatives ought never to have taken 
up the matter of the difference between Mr. Griswold and myself.”72 Surely Lyon’s 
last statement rested upon shaky constitutional ground. The United States 
Constitution states, “Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish 
its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two-thirds, expel a 
Member.”73 Despite the legal and personal opposition facing Lyon, he continued to 
come up with novel ways of defending his behavior.74
As to Lyon’s being cashiered from the Army and forced to wear a wooden 
sword, the Federalists ignored the fact that he had been found not guilty of the 
charges of deserting his post. The real issue is not whether Lyon deserved to be 
treated fairly concerning his military record, but whether the Federalists completely 
ignored his being found not guilty in order to gain politically.75 In fairness to the 
Federalists in Congress, they were not the only ones choosing to ignore Lyon’s 
exoneration. Perhaps the most partisan Federalist newspaper, the Porcupine’s 
Gazette, would not let the wooden sword issue rest, even before his fracas with 
Griswold. The editor ridiculed Lyon as “the redoubtable hero who, a few years before 
[he] was sold for his passage from Ireland, and for his cowardice in the American 
War, was condemned by General Gates to wear a wooden sword.”76 The Gazette 
seemingly would not settle for anything short of expulsion, perhaps prison, reporting
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that “it has been mentioned to cage him—as he has discovered much uneasiness at 
going with the crowd.”77
A thorough reading of the nation's newspapers is not a reliable, non-partisan 
source for gaining an accurate understanding of the public sentiment concerning 
Lyon.78 Private letters proved more helpful. The mood conveyed in various private 
letters is overwhelmingly critical of Lyon. The best example of this negative tone 
originated in the letters of Abigail Adams. In a series of letters to her sister, Abigail 
Adams discussed her horror and great dissatisfaction with Matthew Lyon’s behavior 
and his continued presence in Congress. Abigail, believing more important business 
was in need of attention, rather than the expulsion proceedings, wrote her sister,
“You will see much to your mortification, that Congress have been fitting [fighting] 
not only the French, but the Lyon, not the Noble British Lyon, but the beastly 
transported Lyon.”79
Abigail Adams did not mince her words. The true meaning of her remarks is
not difficult to ascertain. A few days later she expressed her profound frustration over
the clause of the U.S. Constitution which requires a two-thirds majority for expulsion:
This act so low, vulgar and base, which having been committed, could 
only have [been] dignifiedly resented, by the expulsion of the Beast, has 
been spun out, made the object of party, and rendered thus the disgrace of 
the National Legislature, by an unfortunate clause in the Constitution which 
gives the power into the hands of the minority, requiring two-thirds to 
concur in an expulsion of a member. The circumstances were so fully proved 
of Lyon’s being the base aggressor, that as Gentlemen I could not have 
believed they could have got one third of the members to have consented 
to his continuance with them. I know not where it will end. In the mean 
time the business of the Nation is neglected, to the great mortification of the 
federalists.80
Republicans of the day would have taken great issue with some of her remarks; 
however Abigail Adams was at times one of the most ardent of Federalists. She was 
not an elected official; therefore she she did not feel the need to temper her remarks.
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One thing is for certain; anyone studying Abigail Adams need not dig very deep in 
order to discover her true feelings on a given topic. Her letters demonstrate the 
sentiments of Lyons’ opposition. If all Federalists spoke like Abigail Adams, and 
some came very close, one can definitely see the difficult position Matthew Lyon was 
in.
Returning to the debate in the House over Lyon’s fate, the Breach of Privilege 
Committee arrived at a decision, one that would profoundly affect Lyon’s political 
career. After interviewing all of the eye-witnesses to the Lyon-Griswold spitting 
incident, the Committee found Lyon’s behavior “highly indecorous, and unworthy a 
member of [the] House.”81 The groundwork was now in place for debate on whether 
or not Lyon ought to be expelled from the House. Had the Committee not found 
Lyon’s behavior to be unworthy of his position, Lyon’s future in the House would no 
longer be seriously questioned. Instead, the Committee’s decision opened up the 
question to the whole House.
The debates on Lyon’s expulsion were completely partisan in nature. 
Federalists demanded his expulsion, while Republicans, with equal vigor, demanded 
his retention. Both sides conceded Lyon’s actions to be serious, but also chose to 
ignore other factors. This becomes quite obvious with a thorough reading of the 
debates.
The Federalists were aware of the results of expulsion—one less Republican 
vote. Since there was near parity in the House, 52 Federalists and 44 Republicans, 
the Federalists could not pass up the opportunity to gain a more secure numerical 
advantage. The Lyon fiasco seemed like an ideal opportunity for the Federalists to 
put their plan into action. They claimed the vulgar nature of Lyon’s behavior was 
indefensible. Federalists believed they were simply removing a disgraceful political 
figure from an esteemed national position, rather than playing politics. Perhaps Lyon
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was a disgraceful figure, cheapening the new national government, but at its core the
Lyon debate was totally political. Those who supported Lyon, as well as those who
opposed Lyon, followed strict party lines. After all, Congressmen were under great
pressure to settle this matter. Josiah Parker, one of the few Virginia Federalist
representatives, quoted a citizen who stopped him on the way to Congress, and said,
“There is nothing to do in Congress today—there’s no Fighting going on!”82 Both
parties felt pressure to get the Lyon affair resolved, but the interests of party unity
prevailed over the interests of brevity.
Much of the legislative debate focused on the testimony of Matthew Lyon:
It appears, also, by the testimony, that Mr. Griswold, in Mr. Harper’s 
seat, gave me a most cutting insult. The Speaker, who I was in 
conversation with, heard it as well as the others; they testify that I did 
not hear it. Why not hear it as well as they? For no other reason than to 
keep up the prevailing good humor. But Mr. Griswold not satisfied with 
the insult already given, says to one of the witnesses, ‘He does not hear 
me,’ and removes himself to my side, pulls me by my arm to call my 
attention, and then more particularly and more deliberately repeats the 
insult, knowing it to be the most provoking abuse that one gentleman 
could possibly offer another. Under all these circumstances, I cannot 
but entertain the fullest assurance that I stand justified for the repulse of 
that deliberate insult offered me by Mr. Griswold, in the view of the 
Committee of the House of Representatives, and of every man of honor 
or feelings who shall ever hear the story.8^
Most Federalists believed that Lyon was not a victim of vicious lies, and was 
not in the least warranted to retaliate in the manner in which he did. Even a fellow 
Republican, Robert Williams of North Carolina, expressed his belief that no language 
could have possibly deserved the personal affront which Griswold endured, because 
as a member of a civilized society, one does not behave in Lyon’s manner.84 A bit of 
the elitist attitude of the Federalists presents itself at that point during the legislative 
debate. The Federalists believed themselves to be the well-bred members of society, 
never resorting to the low and vulgar tactics of Lyon. As William Shepard, a 
Massachusetts Federalist, remarked, “If he must be a legislator, it should be in a part
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of the world where all decisions were made by spitting and scratching.”85 The 
implication that Lyon was a socially inferior member of society hurt Lyon perhaps 
more than any other accusation hurled by the Federalists. Since Lyon had been an 
indentured servant, and did not value close ties with England, he was viewed as an 
outcast, and tried valiantly all of his life to join the upper ranks of society. The 
debates on his expulsion only brought his inferior social status into the open, and 
worked to lower his standing in society even further.86
Some Federalist Congressmen claimed that Lyon’s behavior insulted the 
sovereignty of the United States. Others likened his behavior to the “savage” nature 
of the Six Nations. Lyon’s actions were described as “monstrous” and 
“abominable.”88 Some Federalists went so far as to assert that the House was an 
institution of “purity,” and they must all unite in expelling the impurity from their 
environment. Federalists also asserted that Lyon’s public spitting in the face of 
Griswold was only half of the damaging insult. The other, the moral insult, cut more 
deeply into his hapless victim.89 The list of speeches against Lyon on the floor of the 
House goes on and on. It seemed by mid-February, 1798, that Lyon did not have any 
chance of survival. His only defense was the sheer numerical force of the Republican 
party. If the forty-four Republicans held together, the Federalists would not be able to 
muster the two-thirds vote necessary for expulsion.
The Republicans agreed that Lyon’s spitting in the face of Griswold was 
unnecessary, but supported the defense of his honor against Griswold’s cutting 
remarks. They did not believe his actions warranted expulsion, but many Republicans 
supported censure. Albert Gallatin, a Republican representative from Pennsylvania, 
was perhaps most supportive of Lyon when he defended his Republican colleague. 
Gallatin gave a compelling speech on the House floor when he both questioned Lyon’s 
manners as a member of society, but denied that those bad manners precluded him
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from making decisions in government. He asserted that spitting in Griswold’s face
was in poor taste, but that it did not show “corruption of heart.”90 He went on to
state that Lyon’s manners might not allow him to associate with every member of
Congress, but also stated that they were not members of Congress simply for the
sake of association. Gallatin, confident that the Federalists could not achieve the
two-thirds vote, wrote to an unknown recipient that
no man can blame Lyon for having resented the insult. All must agree in 
reprobating the mode he selected to show his resentment, and the place 
the act was committed. As two-thirds are necessary to expel, he will not, I 
believe, be expelled.but probably be reprimanded at the bar by the Speaker.91
In another letter, Gallatin wrote that the expulsion proceedings were “indeed the
most unpleasant and unprofitable business that ever a respectable body did
pursue.”92
Other Republicans defended Lyon on constitutional grounds. William Findley, 
a Republican representative from Pennsylvania, thought that Lyon’s behavior 
constituted only an indecency. He went on to state that indecencies occurring in the 
House were punishable, yet expulsion was the highest form of punishment, a 
punishment in his estimation reserved only for high crimes, such as treason. Lyon’s 
behavior may have been indecent, but it was not a high crime; therefore expulsion in 
this case was not in accordance with the Constitution.93 Mr. Findley and his 
Republican colleagues made a valid point. Did Lyon’s behavior deserve his 
expulsion? Was not expulsion meant to be applied only in the most extreme cases? 
The problem facing the Republicans was that no one really had the answer. The 
Constitution was phrased in such loose, general terms, it is difficult to ascertain what 
the framers had intended. Perhaps the framers themselves had not given it sufficient 
thought either. Federalist William Shepard from Massachusetts responded to 
Findley's constitutional defense, declaring that “if the member from Vermont were not
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expelled it would break up the entire session without doing any business; it would 
divide the states against each other, and finally end in a civil war.”94 Mr. Shepard 
was obviously exaggerating the importance of this issue, but he did demonstrate its 
importance in the eyes of the Federalist party.
When Republican Robert Williams took the floor on February, 12, 1798, the 
same day as the final roll-call vote on Lyon’s expulsion, he stated his belief that the 
punishment of expulsion was disproportionate to the offense. Williams believed that 
as long as order and decorum were reestablished in the House, no further action was 
necessary. Williams moved to amend the Breach of Privilege resolution by striking 
out the words, “be for disorderly behaviour expelled,” and replace them with, “is 
highly censurable, and that he be reprimanded by the Speaker, in the presence of this 
House.”95 A short debate occurred over Williams’ amendment, which for all practical 
purposes would prevent Matthew Lyon from being expelled.96 As expected, the 
Federalists cried foul, for they would accept nothing less than expulsion. For 
Republicans, the Williams amendment provided the best hope of saving face. By 
supporting the amendment they would both support some sort of punishment of Lyon, 
while at the same time retaining his Republican vote. This amendment received the 
full support of the Republican party. The outcome of the vote would depend upon the 
following question: does a reprimand constitute a proper punishment of Lyon’s 
behavior? If congressmen answered yes to this question, they would likely vote yea; 
if not, they would likely vote nay.
Later that day Williams’s amendment was put to a vote, and failed passage 52 
to 44.97 A few minutes later a motion was made to take a final vote on the expulsion 
resolution. Matthew Lyon’s political fate hinged upon the support of his party. Surely 
all of the Federalists were going to vote for his expulsion, and all of the Republicans 
were expected to vote against. If this scenario played itself out, the Federalists
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would not be able to achieve the two-thirds majority needed in order to pass the
expulsion resolution. But if a number of Republicans crossed party lines to the
Federalist camp, Lyon’s fate would not be so certain. When the final vote was taken
the former scenario prevailed. Every voting Federalist favored Lyon’s expulsion, and
every voting Republican opposed expulsion. The final tally was 52 votes in favor of
expulsion , and 44 votes opposed.98 The Federalists failed to gamer the required two-
thirds majority, and Lyon managed to hold onto his House seat.
Judging by the partisan nature of the final vote one wonders how seriously the
congressmen, Federalist and Republican alike, took the expulsion proceeding. Did
they really think clearly, deliberately and impartially, when deciding how to cast their
votes? Or did the spirit of party politics win their allegiance, blinding them from
making the proper decision? The final outcome represented a strict party vote. The
debates too were utterly partisan in nature. Only a few congressmen, such as Albert
Gallatin, succeeded in removing themselves somewhat from the intense party
antagonisms present in the House chamber. Most Federalists could not make the
same claim. Albert Gallatin was extremely upset:
The affection of delicacy, the horror expressed against illiberal 
imputations and vulgar language in the mouth of an Otis or a Brooks, 
were sufficiently ridiculous; but when I saw the most modest, the most 
decent, the most delicate man, I will not say in Congress, but that I have 
ever met in private conversation, when I saw Mr. Nicholas alone dare to 
extenuate the indecency of the act committed by Lyon, and when I saw at 
the same time Colonel Parker, trembling alive to the least indelible and 
vulgar expression at the Vermonter, vote in favor of his expulsion, I 
thought the business went far beyond forbearance, and the whole of the 
proceedings to be nothing more than an affected cant of pretended delicacy 
or the offspring of bitter party spirit.99
In the end, Lyon was allowed to retain his seat, yet ominous storm clouds were 
brewing on the horizon.
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The order of the House remained calm for only a short period of time, three 
days to be exact. On February 15, 1798, still fuming over the failure to oust Lyon from 
the House, Roger Griswold entered the House chamber, marched stoically to where 
Matthew Lyon was sitting, lifted a hickory walking stick above his head, and 
proceeded to beat Lyon in a violent manner.100 This was the second outbreak of 
disorderly behavior in only three months between Lyon and Griswold. Again, a 
thorough understanding of this latest fracas is necessary to understand the 
subsequent expulsion proceedings against the two embattled politicians. Lyon did 
manage to partially free himself from his seat, and tried unsuccessfully to grab the 
stick from Griswold’s clenched fists, suffering repeated blows from the vindictive 
Griswold.101
Eventually Lyon was able to get behind the Speaker’s chair to avoid the 
oncoming assault and grasped a pair of tongs from the fireplace. Lyon then had a 
weapon of his own. With tongs and cane in hand the two came together and wrestled 
to the floor with Griswold falling on top of Lyon. The congressmen who were present, 
who until now stood in complete shock, unable or unwilling to stop the violence, 
managed to separate Griswold and Lyon from one another. Speaker Dayton 
eventually called the House to order; while doing so Griswold and Lyon again would 
have renewed their combat if it were not for the doorkeeper keeping them 
separated.102 The tables had suddenly turned. This time it was a Federalist acting in 
an ill manner, with the Republican playing the part of the innocent victim. Some 
Republican congressmen and historians have questioned Speaker Dayton’s timing in 
calling the House to order, despite the shocking nature of the fracas. Many have 
maintained that he did not begin calling the House to order until he saw Lyon grab the 
pair of tongs from the fireplace. Tom Campbell, a Lyon biographer, claimed:
Jonathan Dayton, a rabid Federalist, had just taken the Speaker’s chair to
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call the House to order when Griswold made his assault on Colonel Lyon; but 
he sat and watched the cowardly blows fall upon the head of the unsuspecting 
member from Vermont, with great glee, until he saw Colonel Lyon seize 
the tongs and knock the club from the hands of Griswold, and then Speaker 
Dayton began to pound and loudly call for order.103
The next day, February 16, 1798, Thomas Davis, a Republican from Kentucky, 
proposed the following resolution: “Resolved, That Roger Griswold and Matthew 
Lyon, members of this House, for violent and disorderly behaviour committed in this 
House, be expelled therefrom.”104 The resolution of expulsion was again referred to 
the Committee of Breach of Privileges. The House was again about to undertake a 
debate revolving around the issue of the proper behavior of its members. Again, 
expulsion was the intended remedy. Again testimonies were given by the eye­
witnesses to ascertain whether or not the two should be expelled. Those providing 
their personal accounts were Samuel Sitgreaves, a Pennsylvania Federalist, Peleg 
Sprague, a New Hampshire Federalist, Thomas Claiborne, a Virginia Republican., 
James Imlay, a New Jersey Federalist, James Gillespie, a North Carolina Republican, 
Samuel Sewall, a Massachusetts Federalist, William Shepard, a Massachusetts 
Federalist, Jonathan Haven, a New York Republican, William Gordon, a New 
Hampshire Federalist, Lucas C. Elmendorf, a New York Republican, and Richard 
Stanford, a Republican from North Carolina. Again the Federalist outnumbered the 
Republicans with six and five members respectively. Again the spirit of party 
prevailed, influencing the decision-making processes of nearly all of the members.
The testimony concerning the caning incident demonstrated a high degree of 
similarity between those who provided it.105 Some of the testimony was brief, 
reflecting the Congressman’s belief that the issue was perhaps not as important as 
others during the Fifth Congress, or perhaps because they felt it was an open and shut 
case. Other testimony, such as that of Jonathan Haven, a New York Republican, and 
Lucas Elmendorf, also a New York Republican, was more exhaustive, containing a
high degree of clarity and specificity. Most of the witnesses testified that Lyon did not 
provoke the caning at the hands of Griswold. Each witness testified that Lyon was 
sitting at his desk, writing personal letters, when Griswold attacked him. Lyon had 
not seen nor spoken to Griswold on the morning of the caning.106
Each witness testified that in the opening moments of the caning Lyon was 
merely a passive victim. Jonathan Haven referred to the alleged passive nature of 
Lyon:
As soon as Mr. Griswold had come in front of Mr. Lyon, he struck 
him with all his force over his head and shoulders, with the smallest end 
of his cane, repeating his blows as fast as possible. Mr. Lyon, I think, 
received three blows in this posture, before he rose to disengage himself 
from the desk that was before him, and the chairs that were on either 
side of him.107
Not until Lyon was able to free himself from his seat was he able to defend himself.
The testimony called into question the role of the Speaker during the caning
incident. Did Dayton allow the incident to proceed too far before calling for the House
to order? According to some of the witnesses, he did not call the House to order at
the first sign of violence. Lucas Elmendorph claimed:
Immediately, I myself, for one, rose in my seat, and loudly and repeatedly 
called out to the Chair for order. I heard the same call from different parts 
of the House; but I did not observe or hear any effort from the Speaker to 
restore it.108
After Lyon had managed to extricate himself from his desk, and with the House still 
not called to order, Lyon became an active member of the fracas. No longer simply 
trying to defend himself from the rapid blows of Griswold, Lyon actively engaged in a 
physical grudge match with his most ardent foe. Clearly both parties desired to inflict 
bodily harm upon the other. Once Lyon had the tongs in hand Griswold lunged at him, 
and both tumbled to the floor. Finally, after watching them wrestle on the floor for 
some time, a number of Congressmen yelled loudly enough for them to act together as
a group to get the wrestling congressmen separated. “Thus, while some gentlemen 
were disentangling their hands, others had Mr. Griswold by the legs, and were pulling 
him away.”109 According to the testimony of Richard Stanford, a North Carolina 
Republican, after the members had manage to pull Griswold off of Lyon by pulling at 
his legs, Dayton said that it was unfair and ungentlemanly of them to take a man by 
his legs.110 It is obvious that Speaker Dayton, a devout Federalist, supported 
Griswold in this latest fracas.
After reviewing the eye-witnesses testimony, the House proceeded to debate 
the resolution to expel Griswold and Lyon. Many of the same arguments heard during 
Lyon’s solo expulsion proceedings were recycled for the current dual expulsion 
proceeding. Many congressmen believed that the House could not and would not 
return to normal until Griswold and Lyon were removed. The dignity of the House 
again had been insulted, and only by removing the aggressors would dignity and 
civility return. “Such a transaction would certainly lower that House in the estimation 
of their constituents.”111 Other congressmen drew a distinction between the two 
actors in the violent altercation. The Republican minority attempted to characterize 
Matthew Lyon as an innocent, passive victim, and Roger Griswold as the vengeful, 
violent aggressor. “He [Lyon] certainly received a severe beating,” said 
Congressman George Thacher, “but he appeared to be passive from the beginning to 
the end.”112
No matter which side congressmen found themselves on, the violence within 
the walls of the House was extremely embarrassing. Josiah Parker, a Virginia 
Federalist, went so far as to suggest that if the resolution passed and the two 
members were expelled, he would have the House Journals expunged of any entries 
pertaining to the latest outbreak of violence. Again the congressmen were in a very 
difficult position. They did not approve of the behavior of their colleagues, yet both
Griswold and Lyon were vital members of their respective parties. Since the 
resolution contained a request that both Griswold and Lyon be expelled, instead of 
two separate resolutions individually asking for their expulsions, the congressmen 
needed to decide if it was worth getting rid of one of their own in the process of ridding 
themselves of an enemy. Had two resolutions been made, one for the expulsion of 
Griswold, and another calling for the expulsion of Lyon, their jobs would have been 
easier. Yet some “Federalists were so bent on getting Lyon out of Congress that 
some of them were willing to expel their own Griswold along with Lyon, if, by so 
doing, they could get rid of Lyon.”113
It is too easy to chalk the expulsion debates up to partisan politics. There 
were, after all, other minor factors which helped congressmen make up their minds. 
The most important contributing factor after party affiliation was class affiliation. The 
caning incident had much to do with class conflict. The second act of violence would 
not have occurred had not the elitist Griswold considered Lyon to be a second-class 
citizen and sought revenge upon the Irish immigrant who insulted the upright New 
England gentleman. This was not only an expulsion proceeding based upon political 
realities alone; it was also an exercise in class warfare. One piece of evidence in both 
testimony and debate was a double standard imposed by the Federalists. When 
Lyon, a Republican, had spat in the face of Griswold, a Federalist, the Federalists 
could not have expressed more strongly their offense at the act. However when the 
tables were turned and a Federalist was accused of initiating the offensive act, the 
Federalists did not react with horror as consistent with their earlier reaction. When 
Griswold attacked Lyon many Federalists were particularly not offended. Perhaps 
they thought that Griswold was only getting even with Lyon. There is no doubt that 
the Republicans too had at one time or another acted with a double standard, but this 
situation smacked of hypocrisy.
In order to save his fellow Federalist from expulsion, Samuel Sitgreaves, a 
Pennsylvania Federalist, recommended that consideration of the expulsion resolution 
be postponed until March 4, 1799. The upcoming vote on Sitgreaves’ postponement 
motion constitutes the sixth relevant roll-call vote of this study, and the first roll-call 
vote on the expulsion proceedings against Griswold and Lyon. After a short debate, 
Sitgreaves’ motion to postpone any further discussion of expulsion was defeated by a 
vote of 38 votes in favor to 53 votes opposed.114 Discussion on the matter would 
continue.
The next pertinent roll-call vote included in the study is roll-call vote number 
seven. By the time of the actual vote the Breach of Privilege Committee had 
recommended, after reviewing the testimonies of the eye-witnesses, that the 
expulsion of Lyon and Griswold ought to be opposed. The Committee arrived at this 
conclusion because it could not agree that both members deserved to be expelled. 
Since the resolution required that both Lyon and Griswold be expelled, the Committee 
members who did not support both expulsions were opposed to the entire resolution. 
Roll-call seven revolved around the question of agreeing to the report of the 
Committee which contained a disagreement with the resolution of expulsion. When 
the yeas and nays were taken, 73 Congressmen voted in agreement with the report, 
and 21 were opposed to the report.115 It appeared at that point that neither Griswold 
nor Lyon would be expelled.
As a result the the expulsion resolution’s failure to gain support in the House, 
Robert Williams, Republican of North Carolina, proposed the following resolution:
“Resolved, That Roger Griswold and Matthew Lyon, for riotous and disorderly 
behaviour in this House, are highly censurable, and that they be reprimanded by the 
Speaker in the presence of this House.” 116 Although Lyon and Griswold had 
managed to avoid expulsion, they still faced a vote on their reprimand. The
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congressmen of the Fifth Congress again had to make an important decision: does a 
reprimand constitute proper punishment for the behaviors of Lyon and Griswold?
Some congressmen believed that by failing to expel both members from Congress, the 
esteem and the will of the House might forever be lost. A reprimand would only 
embarrass the House further.117 Despite these fears the House proceeded to vote on 
roll-call eight, which was whether the main question of putting the reprimand 
resolution to a vote should go forward. By a vote of 47 in favor and 48 opposed, the 
resolution failed.118 Lyon and Griswold would neither be expelled nor reprimanded for 
their behavior.
In the end Matthew Lyon again succeeded in avoiding expulsion from 
Congress. The reasons for this outcome vary. For the most part the fact that both 
Lyon and Griswold were a part of the same expulsion resolution acted in favor of 
Lyon. Had Lyon and Griswold’s behavior been the focus of two separate resolutions, 
Lyon’s chances of expulsion would have been greater. However, it is debatable 
whether the Federalists would have been able to garner the necessary two-thirds 
vote of the House members needed for expulsion. More than likely if Lyon had been 
the sole accused member on one resolution he at least would have been reprimanded. 
In the end the Federalists were not willing to sacrifice Griswold just to rid themselves 
of Lyon’s presence, although it did come perilously close for Griswold.
The final votes also demonstrated the difficult nature of expelling a member 
from Congress. Gaining the necessary two-thirds majority demanded by the 
Constitution is not a simple task, no matter what numerical advantage one party has 
over the other. Had the Federalists controlled more seats perhaps they could have 
mustered enough votes. But since the ranks of Federalists and Republicans were 
nearly even, attaining the two-thirds majority was nearly impossible. The final 
outcome of the two Lyon-Griswold affairs demonstrated the partisan atmosphere that
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prevailed during the Federalist Era. Whether or not such extreme instances of party 
competition prevailed during other congresses is not the focus of this study; however 
it is difficult to believe that party animosities would be inflamed only in the Lyon- 
Griswold affairs. In the end the Federalists saved one of their own and the 
Republicans managed to do the same. Lyon and Griswold survived to fight another 
day.
The final vote on Lyon and Griswold also demonstrated the belief of many 
congressmen that the voters would have an opportunity to expel both men at the next 
election. Throughout the debates, first concerning only Matthew Lyon, and then 
involving both Lyon and Griswold, countless references were made to voter 
accountability. The general belief was that if their constituents disapproved of Lyon 
and Griswold’s behavior while members of the House, they could choose not to 
reelect them. If voters believed that their behavior was unnecessary and even a bit 
embarrassing, yet still considered them competent enough to make intelligent 
governmental decisions, the voters could choose to retain their services, despite the 
provocative behavior.
The final outcome of the Lyon-Griswold affairs shows that expulsion was 
perhaps too extreme a punishment for their behavior. Was the House really a “pure’’ 
institution untouched by the hands of impure legislators? Probably not. The final 
votes demonstrated that most congressmen believed that although the spitting and 
caning incidents were avoidable and embarrassing, they did not constitute a high 
enough crime to warrant an expulsion. Although each House of Congress is free to 
make all rules and regulations for the behavior of its members, expulsion was viewed 
as a punishment reserved for instances of more extreme concern.
The testimony given by the witnesses provided an enlightening avenue of 
investigation. Through the eye-witness accounts the researcher is able to utilize the
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exact words of the congressmen. One does not need to rely upon secondary materials 
which may prove to be inaccurate. The testimony also leads to a thorough 
understanding of the congressmen's intent and political philosophy without relying on 
secondary sources. It is interesting to note, however, that like the debates on the 
House floor, so too the testimony exhibited numerous instances of partisan bias. For 
example, concerning the first two expulsion proceedings against Lyon, the Republican 
congressmen who supported him tended to overlook the fact that the House was 
actually officially called to order when he spat in the face of Griswold. The Federalists 
made certain to emphasize this point in their testimony. Another example of partisan 
bias involves Lyon’s role in the caning incident. Was Lyon a passive victim or an 
active participant? The testimony of the Republicans tried to paint Lyon as the 
passive victim, while the Federalists attempted to present Lyon as a co-aggressor.
Finally, after all of the votes had been counted Lyon remained. Perhaps one 
could argue that Lyon was simply lucky, lucky that his Republican colleagues were not 
further outnumbered than they were by their Federalist foes. Lucky that his 
constituents, after hearing of his behavior in the House, did not call for his resignation. 
Lucky that his second round of expulsion proceedings found himself in the same 
resolution as Griswold. Yet perhaps Matthew Lyon was not the passive player that 
luck presumed him to be. Maybe his pro-active approach in defending his honor 
proved to be the most important contributing factor? Perhaps the letter of apology he 
wrote to Speaker Dayton, or the testimony he provided for the Breach of Privileges 
Committee resulted in a more thorough understanding of the man by his peers. These 
questions will probably never be fully answered, but for now it seems that Lyon’s 
defense of his actions played little part in his avoiding expulsion on two separate 
occasions. From the time Lyon spat in the face of Griswold to the final roll-call vote 
on his expulsion, it is as if Lyon had set in motion a legislative machine, that once put
_
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in motion, would not stop until the situation was resolved. Lyon really became a non­
player in determining his fate, for even Republicans who did not like him were acutely 
conscious of the need to retain his vote in the House. Yet Lyon’s continued presence 
in the House also demonstrated his resilient nature.119 He continually rose to meet 
any challenge which faced him. He would need all of the resiliency he could get, for in 
the next few months Matthew Lyon would again be the subject of controversy, and 
again face expulsion from the U.S. House of Representatives.
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FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICY DURING THE FEDERALIST ERA
Before proceeding immediately into the discussion of Matthew Lyon’s trial as 
a result of his alleged violation of the Sedition Act of 1798, it is necessary to provide 
some background concerning United States foreign policy, which was very uncertain. 
There was no definite policy foundation upon which to build. In our own time 
government officials and ordinary citizens regularly criticize the current administration 
for not possessing a firm policy on a given subject. Although the foreign situation of 
the new nation changed dramatically during the Federalist Era, it is still possible to 
appreciate the basic direction of United States foreign relations at the time of the Lyon 
affair and the Alien and Sedition Acts. This discussion of the status of U.S. foreign 
policy will become relevant to Matthew Lyon’s expulsion proceedings and his trial 
under the Sedition Act. Since Lyon was pro-French, foreign policy became a hot issue 
in his political fate.
To simplify the discussion bear in mind the two major world powers, England 
and France, during the late eighteenth century. The United States was not a strong 
military power, although economically it was slowly becoming an important participant 
on the world stage because of its domestic market for British goods and its large 
merchant marine. France and England were in the middle of one of their seemingly 
endless procession of wars. The United States was in the position of having to make 
a fundamental foreign policy decision: either to ally itself with England, with France, 
or neither. The most important person to attempt to answer this question was George 
Washington, who issued a “Proclamation of Neutrality” in April of 1793.
Washington’s basic point was that the United States ought to treat England and 
France equally. “The duty and interest of the United States require that they should 
with sincerity and good faith adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and impartial toward 
the belligerent powers.” 1 Washington warned citizens of the United States against 
acting in such a manner that might disturb the neutrality of their country. What 
Washington meant was that United States citizens ought to display no favoritism 
towards England or France; both should be dealt with fairly and equally. How did U.S. 
citizens know if they were acting in good faith towards both belligerents, and that they 
were not in fact favoring one country at the expense of the other? Washington’s 
neutrality proclamation made it clear that anyone found “aiding” or “abetting” 
hostilities between England and France would be found in violation of the 
proclamation. Also, if any citizen was found to be trading in contraband goods with 
either of the countries, they too would would be guilty of violating his proclamation and 
would not receive the protection of the U.S. government if either France or England 
attempted to seize their property.
Discussion of Washington’s neutrality proclamation has led some scholars to 
believe that it was a proclamation embracing absolute isolation. This assertion must 
be presumed erroneous, since any sound reading of the document demonstrates that 
Washington was not advocating total isolation, but a genuinely independent course of 
U.S. foreign policy, free from European standards. As Samuel Flagg Bemis asserted, 
“The proclamation of neutrality was a tangible expression of a sane American policy, 
not of isolation but of diplomatic independence.”2 Although wary of the entangling 
nature of foreign involvement, Washington realized that the United States could not, 
and ought not, isolate itself from the rest of the world. In realizing this Washington 
decided to make his own rules of foreign involvement, choosing not to act according to 
European tradition.
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The second important statement concerning the proper role of the United 
States in world politics is found in George Washington’s “Farewell Address” of 
September of 1796, issued toward the end of his second term as president.3 
Washington’s Farewell Address included a well-formulated, articulate explanation of 
the political affairs of other nations, and the best course the United States should take 
in accordance with those political realities. The Farewell Address was really a plea to 
the nation to not allow itself to become either pro-French or pro-British. In 1796 
Washington believed as he had in his 1793 neutrality proclamation that the U.S. 
should not pick one country over the other, but should act amicably toward both. 
Washington claimed that “a passionate attachment of one nation for another produces 
a variety of evils,” and warned against the negative effects of foreign influence in the 
affairs of the United States’ own republican government. If the citizens were not 
careful, these outside influences could destroy their experiment.4 Above all, 
Washington called for very limited political connection with foreign nations, but strong 
commercial relations with as many countries as possible. Ironically, those economic 
ties would draw the United States into the political affairs of Europe.
Washington’s Farewell Address expounded the belief that in terms of politics 
the United States was fundamentally different, and that “Europe has a set of primary 
interests to which we have only a remote relation.”5 Samuel Flag Bemis, an authority 
on early U.S. foreign policy, said of Washington’s Farewell Address, “It was to 
remove foreign interference in our domestic affairs, to preserve the nation and the 
people from Europe’s distresses.”6 However, the Farewell Address did not 
specifically abrogate the obligations of the United States under the French alliance. It 
simply cautioned the French that the United States was an independent country, free 
to make its own foreign policy decisions, and would not allow itself to become a pawn 
of the French republic.
Washington’s Farewell Address is important to include in this study because
it also touched upon domestic concerns, especially the rise of the party system.
Washington believed that international relations and domestic concerns were
interrelated, with domestic issues the more important.7 Commenting upon the
potential hazards of faction, Washington contended that:
It serves always to distract the public councils and enfeeble the public 
administration. It agitates the community with ill-founded jealousies 
and false alarms; kindles the animosity of one part against another.
It opens the door to foreign influence and corruption, which find a 
facilitated access to the government through the channels of party 
passion. Thus the policy and the will of the country are subjected to 
the policy and will of the other.8
Washington’s views on the problems associated with party passions were 
demonstrated well during the debates on the expulsion of Matthew Lyon, as well as 
during his sedition trial. Washington, however, said “This spirit, unfortunately, is 
inseparable from our nature, having its root in the strongest passions of the human 
mind. It exists under different shapes in all governments, more or less stifled, 
controlled, or repressed; but in those of the popular form it is seen in its greatest 
rankness and truly their worst enemy.”9 This intense spirit of faction certainly was a 
great enemy of Matthew Lyon. The Farewell Address summed up Washington’s 
foreign policy agenda, and since it bore his name, it was his policy, even though some 
historians have questioned the authorship. In the words of Arthur Markowitz, “The 
Address was probably a product of the combined powers of Washington, Hamilton, 
and to a lesser extent, Madison, with the President serving as the editor-in-chief.” 10 
George Washington provided the nation with a general course of foreign policy, 
a foreign policy of what ought to be. But in reality the United States had not managed 
to steer clear of entangling alliances and the political affairs of Europe. In terms of 
relations between England and the United States anything that had to do with 
maritime trade was bound to be an area of friction. The United States was becoming a
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significant and powerful maritime power, worrying the English to a certain degree. 
Since losing her American colonies, England had never stopped her attempts at 
remaining a major player in her former possessions’ political affairs.11 England 
continued to insist upon maritime laws conforming to her needs.
International law at this time was not clearly established.12 Disagreements 
over what constituted contraband, for example, continued to plague the United States, 
England and France. The United States insisted on a short list of contraband goods, 
whereas England and France insisted on a more exhaustive list. Search and seizure 
practices too were in a state of flux. The sometimes forceful search and seizure of 
American ships was perhaps the most serious issue between the United States and 
its belligerent trading partners. U.S.-British relations became further defined with the 
signing of Jay’s Treaty on November 19, 1794.13 Among other points Jay’s Treaty 
included reciprocity and liberty of commerce between the two nations, British 
hospitality in receiving U.S. vessels, a recognition of contraband as the only legitimate 
seizable goods, and no acts of reprisals by either country. Jay’s Treaty was thought 
to contain the idea that free ships make free goods, a definite plus for U.S. shippers. 
Yet Jay’s Treaty increased the list of contraband goods as well as allowing paper 
blockades, two aspects which would eventually frustrate the U.S.14 The United 
States soon found that England was not willing to respect the neutral rights of its 
sailors, causing tension between the two countries. However the Federalists 
supported the Jay Treaty as well as continued good relations with England, because 
they believed that England provided the nation’s best hope in support of its economic 
development.
The relationship the United States had with France was not any better. Many 
Frenchmen thought Jay’s Treaty was favorable to England at the expense of France, 
thus worsening relations between the U.S. and France. During the Federalist Era
France had become ruled by the Directory, and the relationship between the United 
States and the Directory was at times very tense.15 As with England, so too with 
France; there were major problems over neutral rights. The U.S. and France also 
disagreed over the Franco-American Alliance of 1778. The French Revolution soured 
relations between the French and the Americans, and one result was that two sides 
emerged in the United States over the issue of whether or not the U.S. ought to 
abrogate the Treaty of Alliance. Alexander Hamilton and other influential Federalists 
believed that the United States ought not, and need not respect the Treaty of 1778 
because France had been fundamentally altered and now posed a danger to the 
country. On the other side of the issue were Thomas Jefferson and Matthew Lyon, 
who believed that the U.S. should not abrogate the treaty, because it was made 
between the people of the two countries, not the governments.16 Vice-President 
Jefferson, however, did believe that the United States could remove itself from the 
treaty if France became dangerous to the safety of Americans. But Jefferson and Lyon 
did not believe France posed a threat to the U.S. and believed that the U.S. was 
obligated to uphold its treaty obligations. Referring to the debate over abrogation 
Jefferson wrote:
The people who constitute a society or nation as the source of 
all authority in that nation; as free to transact their common concerns by 
agents they think proper; to change those agents individually or the 
organization of them in form or function whenever they please; that all the acts 
done by the agents under the authority of the nation, are obligatory on them 
and ensure to their use, and in no wise be annulled or affected by any change 
in the form of the government, or of the persons administering it.
Jefferson believed that if a nation changed the form of its government, as had been the
case with the American Revolution, it was not prevented from conducting its treaty
obligations, nor were its partners precluded from performing their duties.
Until 1798 the French supported the Republican party in the United States.
Thomas Jefferson and Matthew Lyon were both accused of extremely pro-French
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sympathies. Lyon did not embrace the union between France and the U.S. as 
wholeheartedly as Jefferson did. but it was nonetheless very important to him. The 
French Directory believed that the Federalist party was too pro-British to waste its 
time on and accordingly opposed the presidencies of both George Washington and 
John Adams. The Federalists possessed a valid fear that the French party in the 
United States would effect a revolution within its borders similar to the one that had 
taken place in France, and as a result destroy its republican institutions. Historian E. 
Wilson Lyon feared that “the Directory proposed to win its point in America by 
dividing the nation and seeking to separate the people from their government.”18
France was quite upset over the main points of Jay’s Treaty. It did not like the 
fact that the United States agreed to the British denial of the principle that free ships 
make free goods, and the larger list of contraband goods.19 Yet French privateering 
against U.S. ships was often more frequent and more outrageous than that of Britain. 
In short, both countries violated the neutral rights of American vessels with impunity. 
By 1796 French hostility took the form of seizure of American seamen and opposition 
to the principle that free ships make free goods. The Quasi-War was well underway. 
The XYZ Affair helped to inflame an already intense situation. After revelations that 
the French Directory had asked for a bribe from U.S. envoys in France, the American 
public was infuriated and began to view England as the proper ally for the United 
States. The XYZ Affair provided the Federalists with a political weapon to wield 
against the Republicans. One Federalist newspaper wrote after the affair became 
public that Frenchmen threaten “your houses and farms with fire, plunder and pillage! 
and your wives and sweethearts with ravishment and assassination.”211 Clearly 
Matthew Lyon and Thomas Jefferson had some damage control to do, as well as to 
justify their continued support of France.
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Yet many Americans during the Quasi-War sympathized with the French.
America had just gone through a revolution of its own, and many of the same political
ideologies were present in both countries. In addition, the French supplied valuable
assistance during the American Revolution, both in terms of military advice and the
blood of its soldiers. Some Americans believed that the United States owed the
French nation its support. However many other Americans eventually came to the
conclusion that the French Revolution, although having some similarities with the
American Revolution, went wrong somewhere along its path to freedom. One of the
reasons for this change of opinion was the awareness of the growing influence of the
Jacobin Societies in the United States.
Although the Jacobin Societies present in the United States enjoyed only a
small following from the citizenry, they did manage to attract the attention of some
politicians.21 For the most part Jacobin ideology attracted the lower echelons of
politicians, those at the most local level. American society generally condemned the
politicians who participated in the French party, as well as the political ideology it
upheld. The Jacobin ideology is difficult to explain, yet some historians have been able
to construct a basic framework. Marc Bouloiseau worded it most succinctly:
There was an element of mysticism in the Jacobin ideology, a 
religious character that manifested itself in its tenets and practice. It 
borrowed from Christianity its faith in the future and its striving for 
moral regeneration. Its dogmatism stemmed not from a rigid system, but 
from a handful of simple ideas that were commonly accepted and were 
capable of inspiring mass action. A careful nurtured hatred of aristocracy 
and despotism constituted the key argument and favourite theme of 
Jacobinism.22
This attitude played into the hands of the Federalists and provided a weapon against 
the Republicans in general, and Matthew Lyon in particular. James Madison’s modem 
biographer concludes, “The game was to connect the Societies with the odium of the 
insurrection, to connect the Republicans in Congress with those Societies.”23 After
learning with revulsion about the brutal September massacres in France and the 
execution of Louis XVI, the Federalists resolved to link the Jacobin Societies and their 
alleged penchant for violence with the Republicans in Congress. This linkage 
succeeded only to a small extent. Although the American people were increasingly 
worried over the French situation both at home and abroad, they also realized that the 
same political conditions that caused the French Revolution had not surfaced in the 
United States, and the power of the French party was exagerrated.24 Still, there was 
a strong division between Federalists and Republicans over whether France or Great 
Britain was the greater danger. This difference of opinion affected Lyon’s political 
career, as the Federalists proposed the infamous Sedition Act of 1798 as a war 
measure to be used in case of hostilities with France.
We will discuss the controversial passages of the Sedition Act and its specific 
contents below, but first it is necessary to discuss the arguments used to place it atop 
the political agenda. Some congressmen justified the need for a sedition act by the 
threat of the French faction in the United States. They had been horrified at the 
seditious violent nature of the French party and wanted to find a way to suppress their 
activities. The Sedition Act was propelled along its political track largely due to 
intense paranoia and the significant intolerance during the Federalist Era. Many 
American people were afraid for the future of their country. John Allen, Federalist 
congressman of Connecticut, demonstrated this fear well during the debate in the 
House on the Sedition Act:
The hours of the most unsuspecting confidence, the intimacies of 
friendship, or the recesses of domestic retirement, afford no security.
The companion you most trust, the friend in whom you most 
confide, the domestic who waits in your chamber, are all tempted to 
betray your imprudence or gaurdless follies, to misrepresent your 
words, to convey them, distorted by calumny, and suspicion is the 
only evidence that is heard.25
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Allen’s remarks were indicative of the fear and distrust in American society during the 
late eighteenth century. With attitudes like this, many people viewed the Sedition Act 
as essential.
The Federalists, who were responsible for pushing the Sedition Act through 
Congress despite opposition from the Republicans, pointed to political affairs in 
Europe as justification enough for the Sedition Act. Switzerland and Holland had just 
experienced their own revolutions, and the Federalists based their opinions upon the 
activities of numerous French aliens living there. They feared that the French 
presence could create another revolution in the United States. The Federalists 
believed that the United States was literally at war with the French, although no 
formal declaration had been forthcoming. They utilized this war-like mentality in order 
to defeat the French presence, with the Sedition Act serving as one of the most 
formidable weapons. The Sedition Act was largely the result of Federalist desires to 
prepare for war against France.26
Other Federalists maintained that the French had managed to infiltrate not 
only New England, but the South as well. They believed the French were active in 
winning the loyalties of the large black slave population in the South in order to create 
an insurrection.27 Clearly the French, if at war with the United States, would have 
benefited from a slave uprising; however there is no definitive proof to demonstrate 
French meddling in slavery. On a more philosophic note, some Federalists believed 
that the United States needed the Sedition Act because the French were instrumental 
in lowering the moral code of Americans. Their Anglo bias inspired some Federalists 
to believe that the French and their supporters were somehow corrupting the morals 
of the young nation.
Still, the main justification, and perhaps the most legitimate one, was the 
seemingly certain conviction of many Federalists that the United States was about to
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go to war with France.28 After a substantial effort the Federalists lost their fight to 
achieve a declaration of war against the French. They saw the Sedition Act as the 
next best alternative in order to limit the effects of the French party in the United 
States. The Federalists were divided, and the so-called high Federalists wanted war 
with France because they thought that England would come to the aid of the United 
States, thus alienating the Republicans even more.29 The Federalists did indeed look 
to England as their savior, as well as a vital source of information. The information 
they sought helped their cause for a sedition act. They realized that England had 
enacted some laws of their own limiting the activities of the numerous French agents 
in England. “Unless we follow their example,” declared Federalist Congressman 
Robert Gooloe Harper, “ and crush the viper in our breast, we shall not, like them, 
escape the scourge which awaits us.”30 To many Federalists the passage of the 
Sedition Act was necessary for their own preservation.31
Although the Federalists did not come forward and announce it directly, one of 
their justifications for the Sedition Act was their fear over the growing popularity of 
the Republican party.32 They knew that the Republicans were making political inroads 
throughout the country. At the end of the eighteenth century the South was almost 
completely in the hands of the Republican party, and New England (although still 
solidly Federalist) was concerned that the Federalists’ political grasp was beginning 
to loosen. Northern Federalists believed that the proposed Sedition Act would 
become a tool to use against their Republican enemies. They could label them as 
disloyal, un-American, or untrustworthy Americans who failed to respect the 
sovereignty of the nation. In many ways the Federalists were a nervous party, 
resorting to repressive legislation in order to defeat their political rivals and remain 
the dominant political party.
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The Federalists believed that without the Sedition Act not only would their 
political careers potentially be in jeopardy, but that Federalist society too might very 
well be ruined. They had worked too hard for too many years creating what, in their 
estimation, was an ideal society. They viewed Republicans as people who would 
enjoy nothing more than upsetting their established way of life, if not destroying it all 
together. The Sedition Act was justifiable to them because it would help maintain 
their current dominance. It is difficult to determine how valid the Federalist worries 
actually were. Were they acting out of desperation, devoid of logic and reason, or 
were they genuinely unaware that they had lost touch with the country and that their 
days were numbered? Was the Sedition Act just a legislative remedy for their 
political woes? More than likely the Federalist fears of rebellion and revolution at the 
hands of the Republicans were without merit, but that does not mean that their fears 
were not real. Republicans, although valuing the nation’s relationship with France, 
valued their independence and liberties as much as their Federalist counterparts. But 
Federalists were willing to salvage their future by persecuting their loyal opposition.
The roll-call analysis will demonstrate the level of support the Sedition Act of 
1798 enjoyed among the Federalists, but a brief remark is necessary at this point to 
explain where most of its support originated. The Sedition Act was initiated, and 
mainly propelled through Congress, by the high Federalists, individuals like Robert 
Goodloe Harper and Thomas Pinckney, both of South Carolina, as well as Roger 
Griswold of Connecticut. The rest of the Federalist party, most of it moderate in 
temperament, caved in to the high Federalists and supported their efforts. Yet the 
atmosphere of nervousness and fright the Federalists exhibited would not be enough 
to solve the nation’s problems. The Sedition Act, no matter how stringent and all- 
encompassing, could not have been sufficient enough to quiet its various critics.
The Federalists had the Republican-controlled newspapers in mind when they 
first proposed the Sedition Act. All of their preceding fears and complaints were due 
in large part to the actions of the unbridled free, and sometimes irresponsible 
Republican presses. The Federalists maintained that the Republican newspapers 
were active in spreading dishonest and disloyal propaganda. Although the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution guaranteed that “Congress shall make 
no law. . . abridging the freedom of speech,” Federalists maintained that their worries 
over the libelous nature of the Republican presses warranted the Act.33 In an indirect 
manner the Republican newspapers did, on more than one occasion, question the 
loyalty of President Adams and his ability to govern. In fact, Benjamin Bache, the 
editor of a rabid Republican newspaper, had just been charged with having libeled 
President Adams and the Federalist-controlled government. Bache had accused 
President Adams of altering the correspondence between Adams and Elbridge Gerry, 
one of the U.S. representatives sent to make peace with France, to improve the 
standing of the Adams administration. John Adams denied the accusations and 
demanded that Bache be convicted for his libelous remarks. In truth, Bache and other 
Republican editors did make questionable personal criticisms of President Adams and 
his administration. In the same newspaper President Adams was called “the blind, 
bald, toothless, querulous ADAMS,” and “the blasted tyrant of America.” In another 
Republican newspaper President Adams was characterized as a “ruffian deserving of 
the curses of mankind,” and “foremost in whatever is detestable.”34 Clearly the 
Republican presses were actively participating in questionable journalism. The 
partisan nature of many of the Republican-controlled newspapers helped to justify the 
need for the Sedition Act in the minds of the Federalists.
During the Federalist Era most of the papers exhibiting this partisan nature 
were produced in New England and the mid-Atlantic states, like New York,
Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania. Of course Matthew Lyon based his “Scourge of 
Aristocracy” in New England, which served as another Federalist target of the 
Sedition Act. The Federalists did not consider the publication of the newspapers in 
question to be the work of independent editors seeking to make a literary splash. 
Instead they believed strongly that they were the product of the Republican party bent 
on destroying their existence.35 Referring to the Gazette of the United States. 
Representative John Allen, a Connecticut Federalist, said, “This is the work of a 
party; this paper is devoted to party; it is assiduously disseminated through the 
country by a party; to that party all the credit is due; to that party it owes its 
existence.” Since the newspapers were considered traitorous and the Republican 
party was believed to be behind them, those members of the Republican party were to 
be considered as disloyal as well.36 Whether or not the above statements from 
Republican newspapers should have been considered as seditious libel was the 
fundamental question during the congressional debate over the proposed Sedition Act 
of 1798. Those who believed the statements by newspapers like the Gazette of the 
United States and the Columbia Centinel were seditious would likely be in favor of 
the Act. Those who did not think the newspapers engaged in seditious journalism 
would likely vote against the Sedition Act.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE PASSAGE OF THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798
The Sedition Act was not the only example of the distrust many people had of 
the French, the pro-French sympathizers, and aliens in general. The Sedition Act was 
one of four repressive laws enacted with the support of the Federalists in the Summer 
of 1798, which were known collectively as the Alien and Sedition Acts. The first of 
these, the Naturalization Act, was passed on June 18, 1798. It required an alien in the 
United States to reside in the United States for fourteen years to become eligible for 
U.S. citizenship. Previously, an alien needed to wait only five years. The 
Naturalization Act also required that five of the fourteen years must be spent in the 
state or territory in which an applicant planned to live, that the alien declare intent to 
apply for U.S. citizenship five years in advance, and that all aliens register with the 
clerk of a district court.1 The requirements of the Naturalization Act were designed to 
slow the immigration of aliens and slow the growth of the Republican party. (The Law 
was repealed in 1802 through the efforts of the Republicans).
The second act, known as the Alien Friends Act, was passed on June 25, 1798. 
This law gave the president the power to deport any alien or group of aliens whom he 
deemed “dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States.”2 The Alien 
Friends Act. despite its hospitable title, placed almost all control in the hands of the 
executive. The Alien Enemies Act, the third repressive measure of 1798, was passed 
on July 6th. The Alien Enemies Act was the only one of the laws that received 
Republican support, due in part to its defensive nature, and the fact that it was not 
specifically aimed at any one country. It gave the president the power to restrain,
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arrest, and deport male citizens or subjects of hostile nations.3 The Alien Enemies 
Act was viewed by the Republicans as a defensive measure.
The Sedition Act, officially known as. the “Act in Addition to the Act for the 
Punishment of Certain Crimes,” or SR. 31, was passed by the House on July 14, 1798. 
This act was the first sedition act in U.S. history. It consisted of two sections. The 
first section met with little resistance. According to the law, anyone who unlawfully 
combined or conspired to oppose the government of the United States, or who 
interfered in the duty of a government officer, or took part in a riot or insurrection, 
would be guilty of a high misdemeanor and faced up to a $5,000 fine and/or five years 
in prison. The second section declared illegal any writing or printing of “false, 
scandalous and malicious writing” with the intent to bring the government, Congress, 
or the president “into contempt or disrepute, or to excite against them . . .  the hatred 
of the good people of the United States.”4 Anyone found guilty of violating the second 
section was subject to a fine of up to $2,000 and/or a prison sentence of up to two 
years. The Sedition Act, specifically the second section, enabled the Federalists to 
trap their political opponents by making it illegal for them to criticize the government 
and the majority party. Matthew Lyon would be one of the primary targets of the 
Sedition Act.
Despite the Sedition Act’s repressive measures, it was actually a scaled-down 
version of the original Senate proposal. If the second section of the Sedition Act 
seems repressive to twentieth century readers, note that the original draft included 
the death penalty for anyone convicted of aiding the French. As finally enacted, the 
Sedition Act provided that the prosecution bore the responsibility of proving that 
defendant(s) acted with malice and intent. This provision was in stark contrast to the 
common law which did not require the prosecution to prove malice or intent. The 
Federalists pointed this out to their opponents, characterizing it as a more responsible
and just law. one that included some semblance of due process. The Sedition Act 
required the prosecution to prove the defendant(s) intended “to bring them 
[government officials] into contempt or disrepute, or to excite against them the hatred 
of the American people.”5 Matthew Lyon would soon be charged with intending to 
bring President Adams into disrepute, and a sedition trial was undertaken to ascertain 
whether or not he in fact had intended to do so. The Sedition Act also allowed the 
truth of the statements as a defense, which was previously not allowed under the 
common law. If anyone was charged under the Sedition Act with libeling a 
government official, and could prove what he had said was true, the statements could 
then be used as a defense. In addition, the Sedition Act allowed the president to 
judge what constituted libel. Since the Act was designed to halt criticisms of the 
president, the Act allowed the president to bring charges. Usually a court decided 
what was considered libel, and whether or not charges and trial were warranted. 
Ironically, the Sedition Act was signed on Matthew Lyon’s birthday. He would soon 
find out that many of the safeguards within the Sedition Act, such as truth as a 
defense, did not ensure him a fair trial.
The Alien and Sedition laws were not created in a vacuum. There were in fact 
numerous English precedents which the Federalists supporters utilized to justify and 
create their own repressive measures. For example, England began listing aliens 
arriving in the country in 1793.6 This was intended to establish the number of aliens in 
the country and to provide a way of monitoring them. This English practice was not 
much different from the American Naturalization Act, which required the alien to 
register with the clerk of court. In 1794 Britain passed a statute which, among other 
things, allowed the British government to imprison anyone suspected of treasonous 
activities. This statute was very similar to the first section of the Sedition Act, which
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made it illegal to oppose the government. In fact, the Alien Friends Act was merely 
copied from previous British legislation.
The Alien and Sedition laws were federal laws aimed specifically at those who 
threatened the nation’s safety; yet the common law of the various states already 
contained regulations on seditious activity. Why did the national government feel the 
need to enact federal legislation on the subject of sedition? It resulted from the war 
psychosis that had gripped the nation; the national government was not exempt from 
this hysteria. Those advocating the Sedition Act wanted one uniform national law for 
prosecution of seditious activity. The supporters of the federal Sedition Act also 
believed that the common law of the various states needed to be strengthened on the 
subject of sedition. In the federal government’s estimation the laws of the states did 
not go far enough to ensure the safety of the national government.
Despite the fact that most citizens believed the proposed Sedition Act 
unconstitutional, they too were gripped with the same war hysteria that had gripped 
the nation’s legislators. American citizens realized that the seditious nature of the 
nation’s newspapers, mostly pro-French in ideology, were blown out of proportion. 
However, they did fear the presence of many French sympathizers in their midst. The 
national government, taking a cue from its citizens, proceeded to debate the Sedition 
Act of 1798. This study will only follow the debates as they occurred in the House. 
The Senate had already passed the Sedition Act, and by the summer of 1798 it was in 
the House, waiting to be accepted or rejected. The tone of the debates within the 
House chamber were again very partisan. Both parties supported distinct theories on 
either the acceptance or the rejection of the bill. This partisan atmosphere created a 
very disorderly process of debate, with each side attempting to present its opinion at 
the expense of the other.7 Since section I of the Sedition Act was not seriously 
challenged in the House, the numerous instances of partisan bickering, which some
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congressmen and historians have called childish bickering, occurred during debate on 
Section II of the Act. Often times congressmen resorted to personal insults. Lyon 
biographer James F. McLaughlin had this to say concerning the behavior of the 
Federalists: “When the alien and sedition bills were under discussion in the House, 
the Federalists adopted their usual haughty tactics, and with insolent demeanor 
answered the constitutional arguments of the Democrats against the measures by 
coughs, laughter and personalities.”8
When debate commenced the first part of July, the Federalists wasted no time
in attacking the Republican presses. John Allen, a Federalist from Connecticut, said:
Let gentlemen look at certain newspapers printed in this city and 
elsewhere, and ask themselves whether an unwarrantable and 
dangerous combination does not exist to overturn and ruin the 
Government by publishing the most shameful falsehoods against 
the representatives of the people of all denominations, that they are 
hostile to free Government and genuine liberty, and of course to the 
welfare of this country; that they ought, therefore, to be displaced, and 
that the people ought to raise an insurrection against the Government.9
Allen’s statement was in direct response to a passage he had read in the Aurora.
which he considered seditious. The passage, discussing the talks between the United
States and France, stated, “It is a curious fact, America is making war with France for
not treating, at the very moment the Minister of Foreign Affairs fixes upon the very
day for opening a negotiation with Mr. Gerry. What you think of this, Americans!”10
Allen believed the Aurora to be guilty of sedition because, in his estimation, the
Aurora claimed the United States was unwilling to negotiate with France, and that
France was the only country which desired peace. He contended that the Aurora
expounded the belief that the Adams administration wanted nothing but war with
France, and that in turn reflected poorly upon the president and his administration.
According to Allen, this situation would breed distrust and resentment among the
American people, and perhaps lead to revolution. In order to prevent this from
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happening he believed the best course was to silence the Aurora,and other 
newspapers like it.
John Allen was probably the most articulate Federalist in his advocacy of the 
Sedition Act. Allen’s speeches embraced all of the Federalist arguments favoring the 
Act.11 First, Allen discussed the dangerous political climate. Mindful of the foreign 
espionage within the borders of the United States Allen said, “The country will swarm 
with informers, spies, delators, and all that odious reptile tribe that breed in the 
sunshine of despotic power.”12 Allen illustrated the war hysteria that had gripped his 
party and much of the nation. He attempted to link this hysteria with the need for the 
Sedition Act, which potentially could put the minds of many Americans at ease. If the 
Congress failed to pass the Sedition Act, Allen believed that the nation would be 
overrun with spies and foreign intrigue.
Allen contended that the proper measures had in fact not been taken in order to 
halt foreign intrigue, and that Congress needed to pass more stringent measures 
controlling the people of the United States. “If there is, then, any necessity for the 
system now proposed, it is more necessary to be enforced against our own citizens 
than against strangers; and I have no doubt, that either in this, or some other shape, 
this will be attempted.”13 Wary of Congress’ constitutional limits, Allen moderated 
his latest remark by saying that if Congress did overstep its constitutional bounds, the 
people of the United States would not stand for it, and would return to their 
revolutionary principles and rebel against their repressive government. But Allen 
knew that the people of the young nation had no desire to return to the days of war 
and bloodshed. Since the Sedition Act would be applied mostly to aliens and disloyal 
Americans, its passage would negate the need for even more universal, repressive 
measures sometime in the future. Allen played upon the fear and uncertainty of the 
times to prove the Sedition Act’s necessity.
John Allen and his colleagues were fearful that the nation might again plunge 
into revolution. Referring to the perceived rise in revolutionary tendencies, the Aurora 
on June 22, 1798, stated, “The period is now at hand when it will be a question difficult 
to determine, whether there is more safety and liberty to be enjoyed at Constantinople 
or Philadelphia."14 He pointed to two passage as proof that there were individuals 
and combinations who wished to effect a revolution. “Who can doubt the existence of 
a combination against the real liberty, the real safety of the United States?” asked 
Allen. “I say, sir, a combination, a conspiracy against the Constitution, the 
Government, the peace and safety of this country, is formed, and is in full 
operation.” 15
John Allen’s speech in the House posed the question whether the press had 
the liberty to mock the president and knowingly print falsehoods about the 
government. The Aurora certainly resorted to extreme journalistic practices when it 
questioned the allegiance of President Adams, but did such writings increase the 
likelihood of revolution? Allen and many other Federalists believed so. During the 
debates on the Sedition Act Allen pointed out more examples of what he considered 
disloyal, seditious journalism. Again the Aurora was Allen’s main target. On June 
22, 1798, the Aurora stated, in reference to the Alien and Sedition laws: “Where a 
law shall shall have been passed in violation of the Constitution, making it criminal to 
expose the crimes, the official vices or abuses, or the attempts of men in power to 
usurp a despotic authority, is there any alternative between an abandonment of the 
Constitution and resistance?” 16 Allen attempted to draw a parallel between the 
Aurora passage and the dissolution of the tenuous bonds of union between the 
government and the people. Allen believed that the Jacobin sympathizers who 
controlled the presses held immense power and would not find it difficult to effect a
revolution. With the Sedition Act the Federalists believed that they could gain the 
upper hand and, in the process, preserve the union.
John Allen's remarks in June of 1798 on seditious activity were not his first.
He had also spoken on the subject in April of the same year. When Allen advocated 
the necessity of the Alien and Sedition laws, he did not stop short of singling out his 
Republican colleagues. Although he did not mention anyone by name, Allen’s remarks 
were aimed at the Republicans, especially Matthew Lyon, as potential 
revolutionaries. In reference to the French Revolution Allen stated, “I believe there 
are men in this country, in this House, whose hatred and abhorrence of our 
Government leads them to prefer another, profligate and ferocious as it is.”17 The 
Republicans were definitely on the defensive, as the Federalists were actively 
questioning the allegiance of the opposition.
Other Federalists, while supporting Allen, emphasized other reasons why the 
Sedition Act was necessary. They too believed that the United States government 
had a perfect right to protect itself from the evils of society, especially the Jacobin 
press. Robert Goodloe Harper, Federalist of South Carolina, declared that “it must be 
allowed that every independent Government has a right to preserve and defend itself 
against injuries and outrages which endangers its existence; for, unless it has this 
power, it is unworthy the name of a free Government, and must either fall or be 
subordinate to some other protection.”18 This statement brings out the important 
points the Federalists used to justify their proposals. First, the national government 
had a perfect right to defend itself. Second, the national government could not, and 
would not, depend upon the states to protect the nation from its evils. The national 
government was attempting to assert its rights not only over its citizens but also over 
the individual states as well. Again, the issue of federalism emerged. Who had the 
right to prosecute sedition? The federal government? The states?
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The Federalists claimed that the Sedition Act was merely an attempt to make 
the perpetrator of untruth answerable to the injured party.19 The Federalists asked 
why speech, like many other daily activities, should not be questioned as to its 
validity. They pointed out that merchants and other businessmen experienced 
pressure to prove that the assertions they made about their products were true. Why 
should people’s remarks about their government be any different? Should not the 
citizenry be held just as accountable for their statements as merchants are for their 
wares? The Federalists maintained that if people were speaking truthfully they had 
nothing to fear. But. if they had been active in spreading falsehoods, then the Sedition 
Act would be the ideal tool for prosecution. The Federalists understood that a man’s 
reputation could be destroyed by false accusations. By design, the Sedition Act would 
identify the falsehood, identify the perpetrator, and provide an avenue of punishment. 
Federalists maintained that they simply wanted people to bear responsibility for their 
remarks.
The Federalists believed that the punishment of seditious speech or writing did 
not constitute an abridgement of the freedom of speech clause of the First 
Amendment. They supported their position with precedents in both English law and 
the common law of the various states. They pointed to the sedition laws that England 
had adopted, as well as to an existing Virginia statute, to prove that sedition was not 
protected under the First Amendment. In both England and in the United States, the 
rights of the people to speak seditiously were never intended to be protected.
Harrison Gray Otis, a Federalist from Massachusetts, used the sedition statute of 
Virginia to point out that if the U.S. government was guilty of abridging the freedom of 
the press, so too was Virginia. Otis referred to a 1792 Virginia law which made it 
illegal for anyone through writing or speaking to advocate the overthrow of the 
existing state government, punishable by life imprisonment. Federalists pointed out
that if the various states could pass laws on sedition without infringing freedom of 
speech, so too could the national government.20 The national government, just like 
the states, desired to hold people accountable for their remarks. In debate, Otis 
asked, “How is society aided by the gross and monstrous outrages upon truth and 
honor, and public character and private peace which inundate the country? Can there 
be any necessity of allowing anonymous and irresponsible accusers to drag before the 
tribunal of public opinion, magistrates, and men in office, upon false and groundless 
charges?”21
In order to prove the necessity of the Sedition Act, Federalists needed to 
demonstrate that the political climates in the United States and Europe had changed 
for the worse. The United States had survived up to that point without a sedition law. 
Again the Federalists pointed to France as their answer to the necessity of the 
Sedition Act. Federalist Robert Goodloe Harper best expressed the threat the United 
States faced from France, believing that an inevitable war with France necessitated 
the Sedition Act: “Heretofore we had been at peace, and were now on the point of 
being driven into a war with a nation which openly boasts of its party among us, and 
its diplomatic skill, as the most effectual means of paralyzing our efforts, and bring us 
to its own terms.”22 Harper went on to explain his remarks more fully. In terms of 
“diplomatic skill,” Harper maintained that all Jacobin presses were instruments of the 
French government, twisting its way into the American psyche. Harper believed that 
the power of the press was in many ways more powerful than the power of the 
military, because one could at least see an army advancing, whereas the political 
ideologies spread by the newspapers were inanimate, and could not be seen or 
touched. They were subversive and hidden in nature, and could only be brought out 
into the open via the Sedition Act.
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Some Federalists argued that if the national government did not possess the
power to punish seditious libel, then it did not merit its title as a true government.23
The Constitution gave Congress the power “To make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing powers, and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof.”24 The Federalists claimed that the Sedition Act was
a “necessary and proper” device for the preservation and protection of the national
government, while Republicans maintained a different opinion of the necessary and
proper clause. It is interesting to note that the newspapers during the debate on the
Sedition Act increasingly became almost silent, more moderate in tone, wishing not to
antagonize the Federalists any further. “We do not wish to divide our property with
idlers, nor daily to tremble at the guillotine.”25 The Republican presses, wary of the
Sedition Act’s passage, remained tight-lipped throughout the debates.
Republicans in Congress, however, did not remain quiet during the debate over
the Sedition Act, and overwhelmingly opposed it. Just as the Federalists had a wide
range of justifications in support of the Act, so too did the Republicans have numerous
reasons for opposing it. Touching on all of the main Republican opposition points,
Gallatin spoke the most energetically on the role of the party.26 Gallatin believed that
the Sedition Act was meant to be a tool for the Federalists to destroy the
Republicans. Republicans believed that the Sedition Act was intended to equate the
party in power with the government and the Constitution, thus making the minority
party the enemy of the government. In short, Gallatin and his colleagues believed that
the Sedition Act was not proposed due to some urgent need, but resulted from the
intense partisan nature of the Federalist party. As Gallatin stated:
This bill and its supporters suppose, in fact, that whoever dislikes the 
measures of the Administration and of the temporary majority in 
Congress, shall, either by speaking or writing, express his
disapprobation and his want of confidence in the men now in 
power, is seditious, is an enemy, not of Administration, but of the 
Constitution and is liable to punishment. That principle is subversive 
of the principles of the Constitution itself. If you put the press under 
any restraint in respect to the measures of members of Government; if 
you thus deprive the people of the means of obtaining information of 
their conduct, you in fact render the right of electing nugatory; and this 
bill must be considered only as a weapon used by a party now in power 
in order to perpetuate their authority and preserve their present places.27
The Republicans believed the Federalists were trying to suffocate their
freedom of expression not only in the newspapers, but in the House as well. Since
debate often occurred on highly divisive issues, some legislators would inevitably
oppose administration. Those unfortunate congressmen, invariably Republicans, were
deemed enemies of the administration. Republicans made remarks in opposition to
the administration before the proposed Sedition Act went into effect, and the majority
party had little recourse. With the passage of the Sedition Act the Republicans would
have to be more careful about what they said about the administration, not only in
their newspapers, but during debate on the House floor. In the future the Federalists
would be looking for any example of seditious speech from the Republicans during
debate.
The Republicans also took a constitutional approach in their opposition to the 
Sedition Act. Gallatin again referred to the necessary and proper clause of the 
Constitution, denying its general phrases were intended to be utilized recklessly. “In 
order to claim any authority under this clause,” Gallatin stated, “the supporters of 
this bill must show the specific power given to Congress or to the President, by some 
other part of the Constitution, which would be carried into effect by a law against 
libels. They must go further, they must show which of those Constitutional powers it 
was which could not be carried into effect, unless this law was passed.”28 The 
Republicans insisted upon the Federalists’ providing the nation with an explanation of 
the specific constitutional powers they relied upon to initiate such legislation. They
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believed that the Federalists were not taking the Constitution’s system of checks and 
balances seriously. To the Republicans the use of the necessary and proper clause, in 
order to pass a law which would abridge the freedom of speech, was unconstitutional.
Numerous Republicans opposed the Sedition Act because freedom of speech 
and of the press was considered sacred. According to the wording of the First 
Amendment, no one, no matter what size majority, is allowed to limit freedom of 
speech. The Republicans were truly speaking out of a genuine fear of any repressive 
measures that might follow the Sedition Act. They believed that the Sedition Act 
might possibly be only the First of a string of repressive measures limiting freedom of 
the press and speech. Republican Nathaniel Macon expressed the fear that the 
Sedition Act was “beginning to act upon forbidden ground, and no one can say to what 
extent it may hereafter be carried.”29 Republicans believed that the Sedition Act 
signaled a period of repression in America, a period which would result in “a total 
annihilation of the press.”30 Other Republicans were less alarmed. John Nicholas 
contended that the press should be left alone, not only because the Congress was 
forbidden to legislate on the subject, but also because if the newspapers were active 
in spreading falsehoods, the public would soon realize it and would cease to read the 
publications. Nicholas believed that the only people the falsehoods of the press hurt 
were those who ran the newspapers themselves. Nicholas took a more casual 
approach in his argument, playing down the effects of the alleged falsehoods printed in 
the nation’s newspapers when he said, “Falsehoods issued from a press, are not 
calculated to do any lasting mischief. Falsehoods will always depreciate the press 
from whence they proceed.”31
Nicholas questioned the abilities of his colleagues to determine what was and 
was not sedition. Nicholas believed that seditious speech and writing was an ever- 
changing form of expression, and nearly impossible to label. If the Federalists did try
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to label seditious speech. Nicholas believed that it might some day come back to 
haunt them. That situation would result if the Republicans became the majority party, 
with the Federalists in the minority. Federalists would then be in the position of 
opposing the Republican majority, opening themselves up to criticism of the legality of 
their speech. The Federalists would then be the target of their own legislation, to 
Nicholas was opposed to the Sedition Act not only on constitutional grounds, but also 
from fear that the nation's information sources would be controlled by despotic hands. 
As Nicholas stated, “What was deemed licentiousness today by one set of men, 
might, by another set, tomorrow, be enlarged, and thus the propriety of the information 
to be given to the public would be arbitrarily controlled.”32
The Republicans countered the Federalists by attacking what they felt were 
the true motivations behind the legislation. Republicans believed that Federalists 
were not trying to stop malicious lies about the administration and the majority party, 
but were attempting to stop those people whom they considered libelous. In other 
words, the Federalists desired to be the sole judge and jury as to what might properly 
be considered sedition. Albert Gallatin stated this position well when he stated, in 
reference to John Allen’s support of the Act, “His idea was to punish men for stating 
facts which he happened to disbelieve, or for enacting and avowing opinions, not 
criminal, but perhaps erroneous.”33 Gallatin and the other Republicans would not 
allow themselves to conduct their affairs according to Federalist opinions of what 
ought to be considered sedition. The Republicans did not deny the fact that some 
newspapers printed materials that were not totally factual; yet to consider them 
criminal was an entirely different matter. Republicans knew that once the Sedition Act 
passed they would be at the mercy of the Federalists and their broad notion of 
sedition. Unfortunately for the Republicans, as the minority party, nearly everything 
they said or supported could ultimately be labeled as seditious by the Federalists.
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Albert Gallatin and the Republicans also opposed the Sedition Act because 
they honestly believed that the political climate did not necessitate its adoption.34 
They repeatedly asked the Federalist supporters to identify events that necessitated 
the proposed legislation. Federalists responded to the question by expressing their 
opposition to the principles of the French Revolution, which they believed could worn 
their way into the United States and topple the government. The Republicans in this 
instance used a scare tactic of their own by perpetuating the fear that Federalists 
were using the war as an excuse to strengthen their grip upon the nation, while in the 
process eliminating the freedoms included within the Bill of Rights. According to 
Republicans, the Federalists would eventually enjoy total domination of a quasi-police 
state in which the people feared the possibility of being thrown into jail without due 
process of law and convicted for a crime they had not realized they had committed.
The Republicans utilized this scenario to build public support in opposition to the Act; 
yet the debate lasted only a short while. The Sedition Act bill moved through the 
House at a rapid pace.
Republicans did not accept the Federalist argument that the sedition laws of 
the states were not strong enough, and that the nation as a whole needed one uniform 
sedition law. Republicans believed that the states were the most appropriate level of 
government to punish sedition. They resented the national government’s effort to 
encroach upon powers reserved to the states. Edward Livingston summed up the 
Republican position best when he stated, “There is remedy for offenses of this kind in 
the laws of every state in the Union. Every man’s character is protected by law, and 
every man who shall publish a libel on any part of the Government, is liable to 
punishment.”35 Livingston believed that the proposed national Sedition Act was First 
of all unnecessary, because each state had already passed sedition laws of its own. 
Second, Livingston noted that just because they were state laws did not mean that
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the state would not offer the victim of seditious libel a legal remedy. Livingston
expressed the Republican belief that anyone who libeled the United States
government and its officers would not go unpunished. In short, Livingston and the
Republicans tried to assert that the states were just as interested as the national
government was in maintaining the stability of the national government.
Ironically, Matthew Lyon had very little to say during the House debates on
the proposed Sedition Act, but managed to vote in opposition on all of the roll-call
votes relating to the Act. Lyon did write a letter to the Spooner’s Vermont Journal in
which he expressed his dissatisfaction with the Federalist legislation. Lyon wrote:
A Sedition Bill is talked of in Congress. Its advocates say it is calculated 
to suppress the villainous falsehoods which men of base principles are 
circulating against the constituted authorities. However, it might tend 
to check the fulminations of such wretches as attack me. I do not 
propose to vote for it, as it will tend to prevent due investigation; nor 
shall I fear after it is passed, to expose the truth in my usual way to 
my constituents.36
This letter was published after the Sedition Act had passed the House, and Lyon 
ironically believed that it might be helpful to him if it passed, since it could be used 
against his most insulting enemies. Lyon also demonstrated his lack of confidence in 
the Act’s mechanics, believing that it would diminish the right of due process of those 
accused. Also, Lyon expressed his usual attitude in his letter, stating that he 
intended to proceed in his defiant manner, not allowing a new law to stand in the way 
of representing his constituents. In effect Lyon was thumbing his nose at his 
Federalist enemies. This letter is very important because Lyon would soon become 
the main target of the Federalists in bringing someone to trial for violation of the 
Sedition Act. Lyon himself thus prophesized that due to his controversial nature he 
would be convicted of violating the Sedition Act simply for actively representing his 
constituents. Also, Lyon’s belief that the Sedition Act would eliminate the due 
process of law for the accused became frighteningly true during his trial.
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Due process was definitely a major concern for the Republicans. They believed 
the proposed Sedition Act would not provide the accused with a fair trial.37 They 
feared most of all a biased jury, since most of the potential jurors involved in the 
sedition trials would be chosen by marshals who were appointed by Federalists.
They also feared the judges, who were mainly Federalists, and their potential inability 
to remain impartial. They feared that the judges’ party animosities would follow them 
into the courtroom. Of course the judges of the Federalist Era claimed to be 
nonpartisan; yet many of them were in fact involved in party politics.
One positive result of the Sedition Act for the Republicans was that it resulted 
in a more cohesive, unified party. The Republicans, alarmed at the repressive 
legislation of the Federalists, rallied their troops in opposition. Although the Sedition 
Act passed both Houses, and not all Republicans could agree on what constituted free 
speech, they became a more stable, more aggressive party. Thomas Jefferson and the 
rest of the Republican party took the high road during most of the debate on the 
Sedition Act. They portrayed themselves as the defenders of liberty.38 Many 
scholars have characterized the political climate in which the Alien and Sedition laws 
were passed as a period of witchcraft hysteria; yet the Republicans emerged as the 
more moderate, sensible party, the party that would lead America into the nineteenth 
century.
The Republicans still had to debate the often irrational, paranoid Federalists. 
During the proceedings on the expulsion of Matthew Lyon from Congress, for 
example, the Federalists proved a formidable foe. Just as Abigail Adams had spoken 
in support of the Federalist desire to rid Congress of Lyon, so too did she speak out in 
favor of the Sedition Act. Speaking on the need to halt the libelous and seditious 
activities of the Republicans, Abigail Adams wrote her sister:
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It was formerly considered as leveled against the Government, but now 
it is contrary to their declared sentiments daily manifested, so that it 
insults the Majesty of the Sovereign People. But nothing will have an 
Effect until congress pass a Sedition Bill, which I presume they will do 
before they rise- Not a paper from Bache press issues nor from Adams 
Chronical, but what might have been prosecuted as libels upon the 
President and Congress. For a long time they seem as if they were not 
desperate- The wrath of the public ought to fall upon their devoted heads.39
Abigail Adams believed that the Jacobin presses were diminishing the important work
being done by her husband and his administration. She believed that the Sedition Act
would prevent her husband’s enemies from destroying his accomplishments.
The debate in Congress over the passage of the Sedition Act provided a good
idea of the Federalist and Republican positions. More detailed investigation of the
party leaders is necessary, however, to gauge the support they received from their
party. The most important person to investigate is John Adams. Adams believed that
libelous and seditious speech had gone too far, and the need for a sedition law had
never been greater. In a letter to one of the nation’s newspapers. Adams wrote, “I
trust with you, that the spirit of disunion is much diminished; more however by an
event which no man could have foreseen, than by our own wisdom-but unless the
spirit of libeling and sedition shall be controlled by an execution of the laws, that spirit
will again increase.”40 In another letter John Adams wrote, “I ought not forget the
worst enemy we have-That obloquy, which you have deserved, is the worst enemy to
virtue, and the best friend to vice; it strives to destroy all distinction between right and
wrong, it leads to divisions, sedition, civil war, and military despotism.”41 Also, John
Adams provided the readers of the Gazette of the U.S. this dire warning;
Republics are always divided in opinion concerning forms of 
government, and plans and details of administration— these divisions 
are generally harmless, often salutary, and seldom very hurtful, except 
when foreign nations interfere and by their acts and agents excite and 
ferment them into parties and faction: Such interference and influence 
must be resisted and exterminated or it will end in America, as it did
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anciently in Greece, and in our own time in Europe, in our total 
destruction as a republican government and independent power.42
Although President Adams did not call for the Sedition Act, nor encourage its
course through Congress, he did, by his inaction, support the legislation. Judging by
the preceding statements, it becomes apparent that he believed that the situation of
libel and sedition had gotten out of hand. He himself had been the target of much of
the questionable journalism. Adams also believed that the proper way of dealing with
problems of libel was through national legislation. Adams never officially
corresponded with the House during the debate on the Sedition Act in order to rally
his troops. Adams was unsure as to the legality of the Act. and he did not desire to be
associated with an unconstitutional piece of repressive legislation.
John Adams, like many other Federalists, exaggerated the consequences of not
passing the Sedition Act. Adams claimed that if Congress did not pass the law the
spirit of libel and sedition might eventually lead to a civil war. John Adams’ concerns
for preserving the infant union from destruction were noble; however the reality of his
fears were unwarranted. It is true that many of the nation’s Republican-controlled
newspapers were active in spreading misinformation about the Adams administration,
and many of the same newspaper perhaps even wished that Adams be replaced by
someone more sympathetic to their ideas. Despite this reality, the Federalists did not
have to fear a Republican overthrow of the government and civil war. The response of
Adams and the Federalist party was exaggerated, alarmist, and demonstrative of
their weakened political position throughout the country.
The fears of Adams and the Federalists concerning a foreign threat were also
out of proportion to reality. It was true that the French party was active within the
United States, and for the most part conducted a successful battle in opposition to the
agenda of the Adams administration. Yet the Jacobin Societies, perhaps not
consisting of an entirely loyal opposition, should not have been viewed as such a 
considerable threat to the stability of the government. Again, Federalist fears over 
their waning political power fueled an agenda of exclusion, rejecting all those who did 
not support the Federalist agenda, especially Republicans. The Sedition Act was 
designed to allow the Federalists a few more years atop the political pyramid, by 
labeling their opposition as libelous, treacherous, and un-American.
John Adams was not the only well-known Federalist to support the Sedition 
Act; George Washington and Alexander Hamilton accepted its passage as well. Like 
Adams, Washington’s support of the Sedition Act may best be described as passive 
acceptance. Like Adams, Washington wrote very little on the controversial subject, 
neither supporting nor rejecting the legislation outright. Despite Washington’s 
relative silence, it is apparent that he did not oppose its passage.43 Because 
Washington did not actively work to defeat the measure and acquiesced in its 
passage, he may properly be labeled as a supporter of the Act.
Alexander Hamilton actually supported a strengthened Sedition Act.44 
Hamilton believed that the nation was in dire need of protection from the Republican 
newspapers who so freely disseminated falsehoods about the administration. He 
believed that the nation needed a Sedition Act in order to curb the devious activities of 
foreigners in the United States. Hamilton was the most supportive non-member of 
Congress of the Sedition Act. He believed that the United States ought to look to 
England for its legal precedents. The English laws at the time were much more 
restrictive in nature than the proposed Sedition Act, and Hamilton thought that 
English precedents ought to be incorporated into the Act. Of course Hamilton did not 
achieve his desire to make the Sedition Act more repressive yet he won by the fact 
that the Act, although more lenient than he had hoped, passed in 1798,
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Besides Adams, Washington, and Hamilton, one other influential politician’s
position on the Sedition Act needs to be investigated further, that of Thomas Jefferson.
Jefferson’s opposition to the Sedition Act took two forms. The first rested entirely
upon the question of constitutionality. Jefferson believed that the Act violated the
First Amendment right of freedom of speech. In a letter to James Madison, Jefferson
discussed the constitutionality of the Act:
They [Federalists] have brought into the lower house a sedition bill, which 
among other enormities, undertakes to make printing certain matters 
criminal, tho’ one of the amendments to the Constitution has so expressly 
taken religion, printing presses & c. out of their coercion. Indeed this 
bill and the alien bill both are so palpably in the teeth of the Constitution 
as to show they mean to pay no respect to it.45
The passage indicates clearly that Jefferson believed that freedom of the press was a
question expressly placed outside congressional jurisdiction. Jefferson accused the
Federalists of not respecting the Constitution, believing them to be taking
considerable liberty with its sacred provisions. Later it will become apparent that
Jefferson did not always believe in a literal construction of the Constitution; once in
power the Republicans took their own liberties where the Constitution was concerned,
amid calls of unconstitutionality by the Federalists.
Thomas Jefferson’s second prong of attack on the Sedition Act took the form of
a states’ rights argument. Jefferson believed that the states were the proper organs
of government for punishing libel and sedition. In a letter to John Taylor, Jefferson
wrote:
For the present, I should be for resolving the Alien and Sedition laws 
to be against the Constitution and namely void for addressing the 
other States to obtain similar declarations, and I would do anything 
at this moment which should commit us further but reserve 
ourselves to shape our future measures or no measures by the 
events which may happen. It is a singular phenomenon that, while 
our State governments are the very best in the world without 
exception or comparison, our General Government has, in the
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rapid course of nine or ten years, become more arbitrary and has 
swallowed more of the public liberty than ever that of England.46
This letter sums up Jefferson's opinion about which level of government was best
capable of punishing seditious activities. In his estimation the states were the most
capable of instituting the necessary measures, based of course upon each state’s
unique situation. Jefferson believed that the states were in the best position to
protect the civil rights of its citizens, and that the national government was actively
engaged in a process whereby the basic rights of its citizens were arbitrarily being
taken away.
The various positions of Adams, Jefferson, Hamilton, Madison, and 
Washington are necessary to understand because they were the leaders of their 
respective parties. Perhaps they were not active in the day-to-day activities on the 
House floor, but their influence was felt nonetheless. Perhaps each of these four 
influential politicians did less than they could have in either supporting or opposing the 
Sedition Act; yet it is important to realize that without their basic support or 
opposition, the Sedition Act would not have been such a controversial piece of 
legislation.
The first relevant roll-call vote on the Sedition Act occurred on July 5, 1798. 
Roll-call number one was submitted by Edward Livingston, a Republican of New York. 
It called for rejection of the Sedition Act Bill, or S.R. 31. Representative Livingston 
and his fellow Republican supporters moved to reject S.R. 31 because of the varied 
objections already expressed on the House floor. The motion failed, with 36 votes in 
favor of rejecting S.R. 31, and 47 votes opposed. As a result of this vote. Federalists 
managed with their numerical advantage to keep S.R. 31 on the table.48
Roll-call number two was submitted by William C.C. Claiborne, a Republican 
from Tennessee. The motion was made on July 9, 1798, calling for the general right of
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juries hearing cases brought about by the Sedition Act to be advised by the courts as 
to what properly constituted libel. The motion read as follows: “That the jury should 
have a right to determine the law and the fact, under the direction of the Court, as in 
other cases.”49 This motion was submitted by a Republican because the Sedition Act 
placed the decision as to what would properly be considered libel largely in the hands 
of the president. Believing that this power was too great for the Executive, Claiborne 
moved that the judges presiding over sedition trials should educate the jury on the 
proper understanding of libel, not the president. The motion was approved, 67 to 15.50 
After the motion passed, the Executive no longer was permitted to be the sole judge 
of defining libel, leaving the task instead in the hands of the judiciary. Federalists 
were willing to moderate the bill at this point, and Republicans won an important vote, 
ensuring a fair and impartial trial without meddling by the Executive.
The third relevant roll-call concerning the Sedition Act occurred on July 9, 1798. 
This was a motion submitted by Samuel Smith, a Republican of Maryland, which called 
for striking out the words in S.R. 31, “by any writing, printing, speaking, shall threaten 
such office or person in public trust, with any damage to his character, person, or 
estate, or shall.”51 This motion would effectively eliminate one section of the Sedition 
Act, with the result that most of the teeth of the Act would be taken out, because it 
would remove the actions of writing, printing, and speaking in a libelous manner about 
anyone in the public trust, whether it be the president or Congress. Since it is rather 
difficult to libel a governmental official other than through words or print, the motion 
would effectively allow people to question public officials through those mediums. The 
Federalists were opposed to this resolution because it would defeat their efforts at 
prosecuting libel. The Republicans supported it because, if eliminated from the bill, 
they could proceed with their criticisms of the government without having to worry 
about being prosecuted for libel. If the motion passed the Federalists would probably
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have to forfeit their attempts at passing the Act. The motion was defeated by a vote 
of 39 votes in favor of striking out this key section of S.R. 31, and 40 opposed.52 The 
Republicans lost their effort to limit the scope of the Sedition Act. As a result the 
Federalists became more confident that they could pass the Sedition Act without anv 
further amendments.
Roll-call four, a motion calling for the Final vote on the Sedition Act, was made 
on July 10, 1798. At that point the Federalists and Republicans had to make an 
important decision, of whether or not to pass the Sedition Act in its current form.
After the votes were taken the act of 1798 was narrowly passed by a vote of 44 to 
41.53 The Sedition Act of 1798 had become law.
Just like the votes on the political fate of Matthew Lyon, so too did the roll-call 
votes on the Sedition Act follow strict party lines, minus roll-call vote number two in 
which a number of Federalists crossed party lines. Despite the amendments 
proposed by the Republicans, the Federalists managed to muster enough votes to 
defeat attempts to water down the Act.54 In the end the Republicans held Firm to 
their convictions that the Sedition Act was not constitutional and was unfairly aimed 
at the Republicans. The Federalists, due largely to their numerical advantage, and 
belief that the nation had gotten out of hand due to the libelous and seditious speech of 
many of its citizens, managed to squeak one by the House. The high Federalists had 
succeeded in convincing the American people as well as the other Federalists in 
Congress that anyone other than Federalists ought to be feared. Referring to this 
Federalist mentality, historian Arthur A. Markowitz wrote that the Federalists were 
attempting to identify “the administration with the government, and the government 
with the Constitution, [and] the Federalists concluded that criticism of their 
administration was an attempt to subvert the Constitution and to overthrow the 
government.”55 Because the Federalists were successful, the American people
began to support the efforts at strengthening the stability of the national government, 
even through a possibly unconstitutional piece of legislation.
The reasons underlying the passage of the Sedition Act of 1798 are varied.
Five main reasons need to be identified and explained at this juncture. Like the votes 
on the expulsion of Matthew Lyon, the Federalist numbers helped keep the legislation 
alive. Had the Republicans controlled more seats in the House perhaps they would 
have been able to kill the Sedition Act. Also, the Republicans were lucky during the 
expulsion proceedings because the Federalists needed to garner a two-thirds majority 
to expel Lyon. The Federalists were not encumbered by this constitutional 
requirement on the votes concerning the Sedition Act. The Federalists only needed to 
muster the usual simple majority in order to pass the Act, a far simpler task than 
gaining a two-thirds majority voting block to expel Lyon.
The second reason for the passage of the Sedition Act concerns the lack of 
agreement among Republicans as to what constituted free speech. Republicans were 
not entirely speaking from the same page. They had varying beliefs as to what 
constituted free speech, and how far the the national government might proceed before 
it unconstitutionally restricted freedom of expression. This problem of agreeing on 
what was considered libel, and what was merely a freedom to speak one’s mind, 
continues to this day. Still, even if all of the Republicans of the Fifth Congress had 
been able to agree on this question, the Federalists would still have outnumbered 
them. Yet if they had constituted a cohesive, unified front, perhaps they would have 
been able to win the public over to their side, and perhaps even have succeeded in 
eliminating the most highly objectionable potions of the Act. All of this is simply 
conjecture, an effort at playing “what if?”
The third reason why the Sedition Act of 1798 was eventually passed was 
because much of the nation was in the throes of war hysteria. Many American
citizens saw the French party lurking around every corner, plotting the overthrow of 
the American government. The Federalists emerged as the party with a weapon, an 
entirely necessary weapon, which could be used to stop the progress of the 
treacherous people in their midst. The Republican party, opposed to the Sedition Act, 
was viewed as sympathetic to the cause of disunion and revolution. The Federalists 
were able to win enough popular support among the citizens of the United States to 
pass the Sedition Act.
The fourth reason why the Sedition Act was passed included the widespread 
belief that the national government had a perfect right and responsibility to pass the 
legislation. For most Federalists the power to pass the Sedition Act was a logical 
extension of the growing powers of the national government. Since the adoption of the 
U.S. Constitution after the Articles of Confederation failed to create a strong national 
government, the powers of the national government had slowly been increasing at the 
expense of the states. Those congressmen who voted in favor of the Sedition Act did 
so because they believed that the national government ought to reign supreme over 
the state governments. The passageof the national Sedition Act was a result of the 
growing supremacy of the national government.
The final significant reason involves the role of England as a precedent-setter. 
Because the United States had emerged from the British empire it had retained many 
English social, cultural, and intellectual ideas. For example, the United States’ legal 
system was borrowed almost completely from England, along with many of its 
underlying principles. Because England served as a model for so much that had 
become known as American, the Sedition Act was a piece of legislation that had 
largely been copied from English law. Those who supported the Sedition Act looked 
to those English laws as legal precedents for their own legislation in the United 
States. England had suffered many challenges throughout its history and had
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managed to survive, due in part to its legislative precautions. The United States, in
order to survive, followed the lead of England and passed legislation of its own.
The Republicans had been defeated by a Federalist majority with the passage
of the Sedition Act. Although they disagreed over the true meaning of free speech and
the question of what speech should be protected, they did agree that the passage of
the Sedition Act was unconstitutional. They questioned the right of government
officials to label the speech of American citizens as libelous and seditious.
Constitutional scholar Lamar T. Beman summed up the opposition arguments: “To
give any set of officials-legislative, executive, or judicial—the power of censoring,
controlling, or suppressing the opinions of the people would be to place the servants
above the masters, defeat the first principles of the government, and restore a regime
of special privilege.”56 Its passage left a bad taste in Republican mouths, a taste that
would not go away unless the repressive legislation was either challenged in the
United States Supreme Court, or repealed by an act of Congress.
Despite repeated accusations of unconstitutionality the Sedition Act was never
brought before the Supreme Court, mainly because no appeals had been able to
progress that far.57 This fact however did not dampen the spirits of those who sought
its repeal. The attempt at its repeal will be covered in chapter six, but it is relevant to
provide an example of the calls for repeal. John Dawson, a Virginia Republican and an
opponent of the Sedition Act, wrote to his constituents about the unconstitutional
nature of the Act and a possible repeal effort:
Many laws have been passed, a list of which I enclose to you. and send a 
copy of those which are printed to your court for the use of the country—Some 
of these are highly important, and claim your particular attention: especially 
the law entitled ‘an act in addition to the act for the punishment of 
certain crimes against the United States’. This law, in my 
judgment, is an open violation of that amendment, now a part of the 
Constitution, which declares, That ‘Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
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exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or 
the right of the people to peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
government for a redress of grievances;’ And this, I trust, will be the 
opinion of the Courts. Should it not, it behooves you and every citizen to 
endeavour, in the mode prescribed by the Constitution, to obtain its 
repeal, as it will have a tendency to curtail one of the first and dearest 
privileges which we enjoy; that of freely expressing our sentiments on 
all public men and measures.58
The repeal effort in the U.S. House failed during the third session of the Fifth 
Congress. The specific details of its failure will be discussed in chapter six. The 
Sedition Act eventually expired after the conclusion of the Sixth Congress.
Before moving to chapter five and the sedition trial of Matthew Lyon, a couple 
points must be clarified. First of all, the Sedition Act did not make a clear distinction 
between a person’s stating his own personal opinions and someone’s blatantly 
engaging in malicious libel. The fact that many of the newspapers of the day came 
perilously close to malicious libel must be recognized. However most people, 
including Matthew Lyon, were only expressing their opinions. Those who were 
prosecuted for violating the Sedition Act were prosecuted merely for expressing their 
personal opinions, opinions that did not support the national government. Also, the 
legal foundation upon which the Sedition Act was passed was fragile. The Sedition 
Act, along with the other acts which composed the Alien and Sedition laws, was an 
exercise by Congress of its implied powers.59 The power to restrict speech and the 
press is expressly prohibited by the Constitution; yet the Federalists relied upon 
implied powers, because in their estimation the nation was in considerable jeopardy. 
The supporters of the Sedition Act stretched the principles of the Constitution to 
embrace their political agenda.
110
1. Peters, Richard, ed. The Statures at Large of the United States. 1789-1873. 
v. 1 (Boston: Charles C. Little and James Brown, 1845-1873), 566.
2. Ibid., 570.
3. Ibid., 577.
4. Annals of Congress. 5:2093.
5. Brown, 123.
6. Dauer, 159.
7. Bowers, Jefferson and Hamilton. 378.
8. McLaughlin, 320.
9. Annals of Congress. 5:2094.
10. Ibid. See also Aurora (Philadelphia), 22 June 1798.
11. See John Allen's speech concerning the Sedition Act, Annals of Congress. 
5:2093-2100, 2107-2109, 2161-2162.




16. Ibid., 2097. See also Aurora (Philadelphia), 22 June 1798.









24. Constitution, art. I, sec. 8.
25. Porcupine’s Gazette (Philadelphia), 27 July 1798.











36. Spooner’s Vermont Journal (Windsor), 31 July 1798.
37. Annals of Congress. 5:2164.
38. DeConde, 194.
39. Abigail Adams to her sister, July 3, 1798, in Mitchell, 165.
40. Boston Centinel (Boston), 26 May 1798.
41. Ibid., 30 May 1798.
42. Gazette of the United States (Philadelphia), 3 July 1798.
43. DeConde, 99.
44. Stephen G. Kurtz, The Presidency of John Adams: The Collapse of 
Federalism. 1795-1800 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957), 355.
112
45. Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, June 7, 1798, found in Adrienne Koch 
and Henry Ammon, “The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions,” William and Mary 
Quarterly. 3rd ser., v. 5, 151.
46. Thomas Jefferson to John Taylor, November 26, 1798, found in Edward 
Dumbauld, The Political Writings of Thomas Jefferson (New York: The Liberal Arts 
Press, 1955), 155.
47. For detail concerning these roll-call votes, see Appendix D.




52. Ibid. The Annals are confusing at this point. The recorded numbers and 
individuals were incorrectly tabulated. The vote was actually tied, 39-39, and the 
Speaker cast his vote nay, thereby killing Representative Smith’s limitation clause by 
a vote of 39-40. The Annals clearly states that the motion was “negatived.”
53. Annals of Congress. 5:2171.
54. Ibid., 5:2134.
55. Arthur A. Markowitz, “The Sedition Law,” William and Mary Quarterly. 
3rd ser., v. 9, 500.
56. Lamar T. Beman, Censorship of Speech and Press, ser III, v. 5, (New 
York: The H.W. Wilson Company, 1930), 30.
57. M. Glenn Abernathy, Civil Liberties Under the Constitution (New York: 
Dodd, Mead, & Company, 1968), 373.
58. John Dawson to Virginia constituents, July 19, 1798, in Noble E. 
Cunningham, Jr., Circular Letters of Congressmen to Their Constituents. 1789-1829. v. 
1, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1978), 125-126.
59. Thomas M. Cooley, The General Principles of Constitutional Law in the 
United States of America (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1898), 108.
CHAPTER 5
TRIED, CONVICTED, AND SENTENCED
Chapter five deals with the effects of the passage of the Sedition Act of 1798,
specifically as it affected Matthew Lyon, who will serve as a case study. Although
Lyon is the primary focus of this study, he was not the only citizen to be charged with
violating the Act. In total, 17 people were tried, with 14 being found guilty and
sentenced.1 The idea that the Sedition Act might someday be applied to one of the
members of Congress was anathema to most congressmen, and Matthew Lyon was
the only member charged with violating the Act.
Matthew Lyon became a target for the Federalists because he appeared to be
so pro-French that his loyalty to the United States became questionable. To the
Federalists Lyon was a complete Jacobin, lacking any semblance of allegiance to
President Adams or his country. The indictment of Lyon included three charges. The
first count charged Lyon with writing and publishing a seditious letter in Spooner’s
Vermont Journal. The second count charged Lyon with publishing a letter written by
Joel Barlow, a known Jacobin and foe of the Adams administration. The final count
charged Lyon with “assisting, aiding, and abetting of the publication of Barlow’s
letter.”2 The first count involved a letter written by Lyon discussing Adams’
supposed “continual grasp of power.” The letter read as follows:
As to the Executive, when I shall see the efforts of that power bent on 
the promotion of the comfort, the happiness, and accommodation of the 
people, that Executive shall have my zealous uniform support. But when 
I see every consideration of the public welfare swallowed up in a 
continual grasp for power, in an unbounded thirst for ridiculous pomp, 
foolish adulation, or selfish avarice; when I shall behold men of real merit 
daily turned out of office for no other cause but independence of sentiment; 
when I shall see men of firmness, merit, years, abilities and experience,
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discarded on their application for office, for fear they possess that 
independence; and men of meanness preferred for the ease with which 
they take up and advocate opinions, the consequence of which they know 
but little of; when I shall see the sacred name of religion employed as a 
state engine to make mankind hate and persecute one another, I shall not 
be their humble advocate.3
This letter touched on many different subjects. First, Lyon pledged his support to the 
administration of John Adams, as long as it conducted its business for the sole benefit 
of the American people. Lyon, believing that the Federalists were elitist, demanded 
that they promote the interests of the whole of American society. Lyon also 
discussed his belief that the Adams administration was involved in a power struggle 
with the Republican party, and that the Federalists would stop at nothing to retain as 
much power for themselves as possible. Lyon also attacked the ceremonial and 
traditional nature of the Adams presidency. He opposed the practice of continuing the 
many outmoded English traditions America had adopted, such as delivering a reply to 
the president’s speech to congress. In Lyon's estimation America needed to start 
anew, discarding the monarchal traditions of Europe. Lyon indirectly discussed the 
state of affairs between the Federalists and Republicans by accusing the Adams 
administration of purposely excluding qualified Republicans from participation in the 
national government. This last assertion was a bit ironic, because once the 
Republicans gained the presidency with the election of Thomas Jefferson, the 
Federalists were largely excluded from participation in the national government by the 
Republicans.
Count one of Lyon’s indictment was the least controversial of the three 
charges. The Federalists believed that the letter was seditious because it accused 
President Adams of grasping for power, as if he were a political despot consolidating 
all of the nation’s political powers into his own hands. Yet the first count was a hotly 
contested issue. Did Lyon’s letter contain elements of sedition as punishable by the
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Sedition Act? It did discuss President Adams and his administration, but did Lyon 
intentionally bring Adams and his government into disrepute? The answer to this 
question and others like it would not be answered until Lyon was brought to trial, with 
a jury providing the response.
The second and third counts, the most controversial of the indictment, included
a letter written by Joel Barlow, a Connecticut revolutionary. Barlow, among other
things, asserted that President Adams was insane and ought to be admitted into a
madhouse.4 Lyon was accused of publishing Barlow’s letter, which contained a
passage pertaining to Adams’ mental state, and then using the letter himself on the
campaign trail for the election of 1798. These activities constituted counts two and
three of the indictment. Barlow's letter declared:
This misunderstanding between the two Governments has become 
extremely alarming, confidence is completely destroyed, mistrusts, 
jealousy, and a disposition to a wrong attribution of motives, are so 
apparent as to require the utmost caution in every word and action 
that are to come before your Executive—I mean if your object is to 
avoid hostilities. Had this truth been understood with you before 
the recall of Monroe, before the coming and second coming of 
Pinckney; had it guided the pens that the bullying Speech of your 
President, and stupid answer of your Senate, at the opening of 
Congress in November last, I should probably have had no occasion 
to address you this letter. But when we found him borrowing the 
language of Edmund Burke, and telling the world that, although he 
should succeed in treating with the French, there was no dependence 
to be placed on any of their engagements; that their religion and 
morality were not an end; that they had turned pirates and plunderers; 
and it would be necessary to be perpetually armed against them, though 
they are at peace; we wondered that the answer of both Houses had 
not been an order to send him to a mad house. Instead of this, the 
Senate have echoed the speech with more servility than ever George III 
experienced [in the] elite Houses of Parliament.5
Barlow’s letter, like the letter written by Lyon, questioned Adams’s policy towards
France. Barlow believed that Adams was not sincerely interested in peace with
France, but desired hostility instead. Barlow blamed the mistrust and tensions
between the two countries on Adams’s failure to negotiate with France, and his
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continued support of England. Barlow also accused President Adams of not 
respecting the Treaty of Alliance, and of believing that the French were nothing but 
thieves, about to collapse into ruin. Barlow accused President Adams of advocating 
that the United States ought to remain permanently armed against France. Because 
of this, Barlow believed that Adams ought to be committed to a madhouse. In the end, 
Barlow hyperbolically likened the administration of John Adams and the Federalist 
dominated Congress to the English Parliament and the reign of George III.
Again the question is posed, did the letter of Joel Barlow, like the letter written 
by Lyon, warrant prosecution under the Sedition Act? The reason Barlow was not 
indicted was because he had left the country and established residence in France. The 
reason Lyon was involved in Barlow’s letter was because he had it published, and had 
read it on numerous occasions on various campaign stops. Apparently Lyon embraced 
the contents of Barlow's letter, or else he would not have read it during his campaign. 
Without a doubt Barlow’s letter did question the foreign policy of the Adams 
administration, especially as it pertained to its relations with France. Barlow directly, 
and Lyon indirectly, questioned President Adams’ decisions to recall minister James 
Monroe from negotiating with France, and replacing him with Charles Cotesworth 
Pinckney. Certainly American citizens and members of Congress ought to have a right 
to question the foreign policy of the current administration. Nothing in Barlow’s letter, 
and subsequently repeated by Lyon, should have been considered seditious under the 
Sedition Act of 1798. The only questionable portion of Barlow’s letter was his 
statement that President Adams ought to be sent to a madhouse. The Sedition Act 
did state that if anyone shall “defame the President of the United States . . by 
declarations tending to criminate their motives in any official transaction, the persons 
so offending, being convicted, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $2,000, and
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imprisonment not exceeding two years.” Perhaps this statement constituted sedition 
in the minds of the Federalists; yet the indictment of Lyon was a complete farce.
In defense of Lyon it is apparent that he was only conducting loyal (if extreme) 
opposition to the Adams administration. Lyon had, after all, pledged his support to 
President Adams on more than one occasion. Lyon was in no way advocating a 
general opposition to the Adams administration. He was simply questioning the 
foreign policy of his country, and offering an alternative in its place. Lyon was 
definitely not happy with the status quo and wished to shake things up a bit at the 
expense of the current administration. Lyon’s own words explain it best when he 
said, “Everyone who is not in favor of this mad war is branded with the epithet of 
Opposers of Government, Disorganizers, Jacobins, It is quite a new kind of
jargon to call a Representative of the People an opposer of Government, because he 
does not, as a Legislator, advocate and acquiesce in every proposition that comes 
from the Executive.”6 Despite Lyon’s attempts to defend his opinion of U.S. foreign 
policy, many people believed that his letter, and the letter he adopted from Joel 
Barlow, constituted a violation of the second section of the Sedition Act of 1798. The 
trial that followed Lyon’s indictment would determine whether or not Lyon’s 
publication of the letters amounted to sedition.
Lyon’s trial took place in Rutland, Vermont. Unfortunately for Lyon the town of 
Rutland was a Federalist stronghold, opposed to the various policies of the 
Republicans.7 Before the actual trial began Lyon had pled not guilty to the three 
charges contained in the indictment. Lyon was able to post bond, but was forced to 
sell portions of his property to garner the required $1,000.8 After posting his bond 
Lyon's first task was to seek legal counsel. For reasons that are not entirely known, 
Lyon found it difficult to find a lawyer willing to defend him. Lyon was simply too 
controversial, and excepting his home district, had suffered from very low public
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approval throughout the rest of Vermont. A lawyer deciding to take the case ran the 
risk of being associated with the likes of Lyon. Perhaps no lawyers were willing to 
take the risk of negative publicity. The issue may also have been too explosive for the 
lawyers to handle. Perhaps the idea of defending a United States Representative 
against charges of sedition did not appeal to lawyers in New England. After a futile 
effort at finding a lawyer, Lyon decided to defend himself.9
Because of the Federalist nature of the community of Rutland, it is not 
surprising that Lyon expressed deep concern over the possibility of receiving a fair 
trial. Since John Adams was president he had the opportunity to appoint many judges, 
and naturally chose those men whom he believed shared his political ideology. Adams 
appointed Federalists to all of the open districts during his presidency. The judge who 
presided over Lyon’s trial was Federalist Samuel Chase, Associate Justice of the 
United States Supreme Court. Judge Chase was the primary judge in most of the 
cases arising under the Sedition Act.10 The conduct of Chase during the sedition trials 
has frequently come under attack by many historians and legal scholars who have 
cited him for acting in an unprofessional manner and demonstrating a bias in favor of 
the Federalist position; at various sedition trials Chase has been accused of allowing 
“court-packing” and providing misleading instructions to the jury.11 Lyon would come 
face to face with these questionable legal procedures during his trial in Judge Chase’s 
courtroom. It was such behavior that eventually led to Chase’s impeachment during 
the Jefferson administration, though he was not convicted.
The jurors who served at the trial of Lyon, and of other individuals charged with 
violating the Sedition Act, were chosen by federal marshals. The marshals too were 
appointed by John Adams, who again attempted to fill the positions with as many 
Federalists as possible. The result was a highly partisan courtroom. Lyon would not 
only have to face a Federalist judge, but a jury too, composed primarily of Federalists.
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Although the practice of court-packing was highly questionable, it was not illegal. 
During the Federalist Era no national law existed which provided the proper 
guidelines for selecting an impartial jury.12 The defendant was literally at the mercy of 
the judge and jury, hoping that they possessed the ability to act in an impartial 
manner. But Lyon did not have faith in the ability of his jurors to remain impartial. In 
fact, Lyon claimed that many of the jurors were his political adversaries. Under the 
direction of Judge Chase, however, Lyon was not allowed to challenge any of the 
jurors during the selection process. The practice of challenging potential jurors was 
intended to ensure a fair trial.13 The result of Judge Chase’s order prohibiting 
challenges was a jury composed mainly of Federalists entirely unsympathetic to 
Lyon’s plight. Referring to Lyon’s “packed court,” Lyon biographer Aleine Austin 
noted, “Twelve of the fourteen selected had opposed Lyon in the last election.”14 The 
question whether or not Lyon could achieve a fair trial was quite clear. According to 
the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, “In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed; . . . and to have the 
assistance of counsel for his defense.”15 Whether or not due process was achieved in 
the sedition trial of Matthew Lyon depended upon these questions: Was Lyon’s jury 
composed of impartial members? Did Lyon’s inability to retain legal counsel result in 
an unfair trial? The full answers to these question remain to be seen.
Another, perhaps more important, question confronting the jury in Lyon’s trial 
was whether Lyon intentionally defamed the president and his administration and 
stirred up sedition.16 The jury would base its decisions on this question upon the 
issues and evidence brought out during the trial. The most important issue during the 
trial revolved around the date Lyon published hrs letter in Spooner’s Vermont Journal. 
The letter was published in the July 31st issue, seventeen days after the Sedition Act
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became law. Lyon claimed that the letter was dated June 20th, 1798, and postmarked 
July 7th, one week before the Sedition Act was passed. Lyon tried to claim that he 
was being unfairly prosecuted for a letter he had written twenty days before the 
Sedition Act became law. The District Attorney prosecuting Lyon needed to prove 
that, first of all, Lyon had published the letter, and second, that he had done so after 
the 14th of July.17 The question for the jury to decide was whether the fact that Lyon 
had written the letter before the Sedition Act was passed was more important than 
the fact that the letter was published after the Act became law.
Lyon attempted to defend himself on a number of pertinent issues. According 
to Aleine Austin:
The defendant stated his defense to consist of three points: first, that 
the Court had no jurisdiction to the offense, the act of Congress being 
unconstitutional and void, if not so generally, at least as to writings 
composed before its passage; second, that the publication was 
innocent; and third, that the contents were true. The defendant 
addressed the jury at great length, insisting on the unconstitutionality 
of the law, and the insufficiency of the evidence to show anything 
more than legitimate opposition.18
Lyon’s claim that the Sedition Act was unconstitutional provided him with little 
defense. Its passage was a controversial piece of legislation; yet it had not been 
challenged in a court of law. Unfortunately for Lyon no case had yet been accepted for 
review by the Supreme Court, the least powerful branch of government. In fact no 
laws passed by Congress had yet been declared unconstitutional by the courts, and 
there was considerable doubt whether the courts had the power to do so. Thus he did 
not have any legal precedents upon which to bolster his claim of unconstitutionality.19 
It was simply Lyon’s personal opinion that the Sedition Act was unconstitutional.
The only bright spot within Lyon’s claim of unconstitutionality was when his letter in 
Spooner’s Vermont Journal had been written. According to Lyon he had written the 
letter before the Sedition Act had become law. The Sedition Act, in effect, made
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people retroactively accountable for their actions, a highly questionable practice 
throughout American legislative history. Still, despite the fact that the letter had been 
composed before the passage of the Sedition Act, the publication occurred after the 
Act became law, a direct violation of the second section.
Lyon also believed that the Sedition Act was unconstitutional because the 
prosecution of seditious libel was best handled by the individual states, not the 
national government.20 Lyon was following the official position of the Republican 
party on the issue of federalism. Lyon claimed that the court did not have any 
jurisdiction in the case because the national government had no right to legislate on 
the subject of sedition in the first place. Had it been a state charge, Lyon perhaps 
would not have challenged the court’s jurisdiction. Lyon also towed the Republican 
line with his claims of unconstitutionality, by asserting that the Act infringed upon the 
First Amendment rights of American citizens. Lyon believed that he had a perfect 
right to state his opinions of President Adams and his administration. He did not 
believe that the national government had a right to punish speech consisting of opinion 
and speculation.21
Although Lyon based his defense on a number of issues, including the 
unconstitutionality of the Sedition Act, in his instructions Judge Chase told the jury 
that the real question they had to decide did not involve the constitutionality of the 
Act. Judge Chase’s instructions to the jury included this statement: “You have 
nothing whatever to do with the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of the Sedition 
law . . . .  The only question you are to determine,” instructed Chase, is whether “Mr. 
Lyon published] the writings given in the indictment? Did he do so seditiously? On 
the first point the evidence is undisputed, and in fact, he himself concedes the fact of 
publication as to a large portion of libelous matter.”22 Chase’s remarks to the jury 
were highly questionable. He acted in an improper manner by not sticking to the legal
1 2 2
questions involved in the case. Instead he strayed into his own personal opinions. 
Judge Chase actually answered the questions he posed to the jury before it 
deliberated by stating that the letter published by Lyon did contain libelous passages. 
Judge Chase prejudiced the jury by inserting his own opinions of Lyon’s publication, a 
decision that should have been made by the jurors alone.
Judge Chase did improve at the end of his instructions to the jury when he 
expanded upon the question of whether or not Lyon had published and read the letter 
of Joel Barlow in a seditious manner, instructing the jury: “As to the second point you 
will have to consider whether language such as that here complained of could have 
been uttered with any other intent than that of making odious and contemptible the 
President and the government, and bringing them both into disrepute.”22 The jury 
was faced with the decision of whether Lyon intend to bring President Adams and the 
government into disrepute? If it decided that Lyon had indeed intended to bring 
contempt upon the president and government, he would be found guilty of violating the 
Sedition Act. If the jury did not find that Lyon had intended to bring the president and 
the government into disrepute, he would be found not guilty. In the end the jury was 
convinced that Lyon intended to bring contempt upon Adams and the national 
government.24 Accepting the jury’s findings, Judge Chase delivered its decision to 
Lyon and the rest of the courtroom, then pronounced sentence “that you stand 
imprisoned four months, pay the costs of prosecution, and a fine of one thousand 
dollars, and stand committed until this sentence be complied with.”25
Because of the vigor with which Lyon had been tried, convicted, and sentenced, 
he did not believe that he had deserved the jail sentence. Lyon questioned the validity 
of the court’s decision, asserting that members of Congress ought to be immune from 
being charged with certain crimes while undertaking their official duties.26 Despite his 
objections, Lyon was jailed in the town of Vergennes, placed in a crude jail usually
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reserved for horse thieves and escaped slaves.27 Lyon’s cell was very sparse and 
unsophisticated, with the toilet emitting a choking stench. During his four months in 
prison Lyon instructed his family to raffle off portions of his property in order to pay the 
$1,000 fine imposed by the court.28 Despite his many successful business ventures, 
however, he found it difficult to raise the amount required of him. In the end Lyon 
relied upon his fellow Republican supporters to help pay the large fine.29 Aware of the 
harsh decision handed down by Judge Chase and Lyon’s meager surroundings, many 
of his most loyal supporters signed a petition calling for his release and a remittance of 
the imposed fine, sending it to President Adams.30 Because Adams refused to pardon 
Lyon and remit his fine, the Green Mountain Boys threatened to tear down the jail, but 
after pleas from Lyon to respect his sentence the Green Mountain Boys desisted.
The Federalists enjoyed immensely the fact that one of their most ardent foes 
had been placed behind bars in violation of a law which they had sponsored. It 
provided them with great satisfaction to see Lyon, a Jacobin, and a publisher of 
outright lies, imprisoned for four months. According to the noted historian of the 
Federalist Era, John C. Miller, “Lyon’s conviction was seen as the destroyer of an 
unbridled, seditious press, and a victory of the law.”31 Yet Lyon’s conviction must be 
seen for what it was, an exercise in political revenge on a Republican by the 
Federalists. Lyon’s publications were not seditious in nature, even by the standards 
of the Federalist Era. In reality Lyon was punished by the Federalists for acting as a 
roadblock, inhibiting the legislative agenda of the Federalists. Lyon’s conviction had 
little to do with the rule of law, and a lot to do with revenge.32
Lyon spent most of his time in prison writing articles about his situation and 
receiving considerable attention and sympathy throughout much of New England. In 
some ways Lyon was a martyred figure, persecuted for a belief in freedom of speech. 
“Contrary to Federalist opinion, Lyon’s most formidable weapon was not a pair of fire
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tongs but his pen,” commented John C. Miller.33 Lyon became such a hero to the 
Republican party that he was actually re-elected to his House seat in 1798 by a 
significant margin of 4576 to 2444 votes, the only candidate to be elected while in jail. 
After serving his time Lyon again became a free man in America, and planned to take 
his seat.34 Only one obstacle stood in Lyon’s way, state charges of violating a 
Vermont state sedition statute. Lyon made the claim of congressional immunity and 
utilized the sixth section of Article I of the United States Constitution, which states 
that members of Congress “Shall in all cases, except treason, felony and breach of the 
peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the session of their 
respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same.”35 Lyon decided to 
get out of Vermont as quickly as possible and return to the nation’s capital, 
Philadelphia. Lyon biographer Tom Campbell notes that since Lyon “had been re­
elected to Congress while in jail and Congress was then in session, the moment he 
entered his sleigh and started en route to Congress, he was, by the express mandate 
of the Constitution, privileged from arrest, since the indictment pending against him 
did not charge him with treason, felony, or breach of the peace.”36 Once in the 
nation's capital Lyon was free to go about his legislative business without fear of 
further arrest.
As Lyon conducted his official business no doubt he had occasion to reflect 
upon his trial. No doubt he believed that he had not received fair treatment.37 One of 
the most difficult aspects of the trial revolved around his utilization of the truth of his 
statements as part of his defense. Ideally the American judicial system is supposed 
to consider the defendant to be innocent until proven guilty. Lyon enjoyed no such 
luxury, for he had been forced to prove his innocence to those who were convinced of 
his guilt.38 Under the Sedition Act the defendant had to prove his statements were 
true. In legal terms this practice is called “presumptive guilt.”39 Presumptive guilt
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stands in direct opposition to the Fifth Amendment, which states that no person
“Shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”40 One
other aspect that no doubt bothered Lyon and the scholars who have since studied the
sedition trials, was the fact that most defendants were allowed to call on only one
witness, and in the case of Lyon, he was his one and only witness.41 Such practices
called into question the issues of due process and the right to a fair trial.
The concerns Lyon may have had relating to his trial were dwarfed by the
worries he encountered when he was again targeted by the Federalists for expulsion
upon the grounds that he was not a fit member of Congress. This was due to his
violation of the Sedition Act and subsequent conviction. James Bayard, a Federalist
from the state of Delaware, believed Lyon to be unfit, effectively disqualifying him from
serving in Congress. Bayard drafted a resolution and introduced it onto the House
floor on February 20, 1799, demanding his expulsion. The resolution read as follows:
Resolved, That Matthew Lyon, a member of this House, having 
been convicted of being a notorious and seditious person, and of a 
depraved mind, and wicked and diabolical disposition; and of 
wickedly deceitfully, and maliciously, contriving to defame the 
Government of the United States, and to bring the said Government 
and the President, the hatred of the good people of the United Sates— 
wickedly, knowingly, and maliciously, written and published certain 
scandalous and seditious writings or libels, be therefore expelled 
from this House.42
The resolution sponsored by Bayard continued the political rollercoaster ride Lyon had 
been experiencing since his first altercation with Roger Griswold. Bayard’s resolution 
was very strongly worded and left little room for compromise. Bayard and many other 
Federalists wanted to rid themselves of Lyon’s presence once and for all, and this 
time they were not faced with having to expel one of their own members to get rid of 
him.
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Debate took place on the House floor over Bayard’s resolution. The main 
question the Congressmen faced was the same question the jury had considered 
before convicting Lyon of violating the Sedition Act: Did Lyon intentionally attempt to 
defame President Adams in a scandalous, malicious manner, with the goal of stirring 
up sedition?4  ̂ For the Federalists the most outspoken member on this question was 
the resolution’s sponsor, James Bayard. Bayard believed that Lyon was an unfit 
member of Congress, because he actively participated in disseminating gross 
falsehoods, which in turn bred hostility among the American people. Bayard believed 
that Lyon posed a threat to the stability of the national government because he was 
thought to be a leader of a disloyal faction that desired to reign supreme in the United 
States. Referring to his own resolution, Bayard said, “However upright the 
Government, or however correct the first magistrate may be, the hatred of the people 
may be excited against them by means of false information; and when a foreign foe, or 
domestic traitors join the standard of rebellion, the best Constitution and Government 
may be subverted.”44 Bayard believed Lyon to be a threat to the stability of the 
United States House of Representatives, but to the nation as well.
Other Federalists attacked Lyon on the grounds that, as an elected official, and 
one who had served during the passage of the Sedition Act, there was no excuse for 
his not knowing what the laws of the United States allowed and disallowed. The 
Federalists maintained that Lyon should have known better than anyone that his 
actions and publications might possibly be interpreted as seditious.45 The Federalists 
believed that Lyon was fully aware of the consequences of his actions, yet chose to 
challenge the law, diminishing the esteem of the House and the President. In short, 
Lyon threatened the existence of the national government. Because of Lyon’s 
knowledge of the possible consequences of his actions, the Federalists believed that
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he ought to be held fully accountable. The honor and the esteem of the House 
depended upon Lyon’s being punished for his actions.
The Federalists also demanded Lyon’s expulsion in the belief that anyone who 
knowingly and recklessly breaks the laws of the nation, ought not be in the business 
of making them.46 Lyon’s opponents believed that they had no right to expect citizens 
to abide by the laws enacted by Congress if Congress did not expect its own members 
to abide by them as well. The Congress would be setting a double standard if it 
allowed Lyon to remain. It did not wish the country to think that the Congress had 
one set of rules which applied to it, and another set of rules which applied to the rest 
of the nation. Like the debates earlier in this study, the discussions of Lyon’s Final 
expulsion proceedings contained a high degree of politics and hypocrisy. The 
Federalists would probably not have worried about what the nation might have 
thought had one of their own members violated the Sedition Act, but since it was a 
Republican, they pulled no punches.
The final major point the Federalists utilized in support of Lyon’s expulsion 
concerned the issue of the publication of Lyon’s letter in Spooner’s Vermont Journal. 
Some Federalists maintained that it was not so much the fact that Lyon had written 
the letter, but the fact that he had it published, knowing that it was a violation of the 
Sedition Act. Bayard also had a comment on this point saying, “The crime consisted, 
not in the wickedness of his own heart, but the intention to corrupt others; the design 
to scatter Firebrands through the community, with a view of exciting insurrections.”47 
According to Bayard, the fact that an insurrection as a result of Lyon’s publication had 
not yet taken place was not the most important point, since he believed that Lyon’s 
publication resulted in numerous embers throughout the nation, which had the 
potential of erupting into flames sometime in the future. Bayard believed that the
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national government had an interest in limiting Lyon’s choice of expression, as well as 
expelling him from Congress.48
However, the Republicans had good reasons for opposing Lyon’s expulsion. 
The first point they tried to make was that Lyon’s letter was written before the 
passage of the Sedition Act. They did not believe that Lyon ought to be held 
accountable for actions which had occurred before the Act became law. Republican 
John Nicholas of Virginia expressed his feelings on this point during the debates when 
he said, “No evidence was adduced in court to show that Mr. Lyon did any act 
subsequent to the writing of his letter in the publication, and that though the thing 
appeared in print after the law took its effects, all that was done by the writer was 
done before the law was passed.”49 Nicholas and other Republicans chose to ignore 
the fact that the letter was published after the Act took effect, even though it had been 
written before its passage. Another avenue of Republican argument was that an 
opinion cannot be considered libel.50 Republicans asserted that Lyon was merely 
speaking his opinion on the subject of John Adams, and had not intentionally sought to 
defame the president. Republicans sympathetic to Lyon maintained that the Sedition 
Act was not intended to apply to expressions of opinion; therefore Lyon was falsely 
accused and wrongly convicted, making their discussion of Lyon’s fate unnecessary. 
The Republicans were really questioning the ability of the jury to determine accurately 
whether or not Lyon’s opinion of Adams was correct. John Nicholas claimed, “Juries 
cannot possibly say whether an opinion be true or false. They can only determine 
whether or not it is their own opinion.”51 What the Congressmen of the Fifth 
Congress were really involved in during Lyon’s latest expulsion proceeding was a 
debate not so much on Lyon’s expulsion, but about the results of his trial, and whether 
or not the Sedition Act resulted in a workable, realistic law. John Nicholas again 
spoke on the subject saying, “The member from Vermont ought not to have been
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inquired into under the sedition law; since two of the counts contained in the 
indictment are matters of opinion, not containing the least suggestion of facts; and the 
third rests so much on matter of opinion, that it is impossible, according to a sound 
construction of the law, for any guilt to be incurred by the act.”52 Republicans still 
maintained their belief in the unconstitutionality of the Act, and believed that they had 
real proof with Lyon in its inability to be applied in a non-partisan manner.
Republicans believed they were involved in a party battle, a battle likely to be decided 
by sheer numbers. Many thought that it was too political an issue to undertake. 
Albert Gallatin spoke to this point, asking whether, if “the law [be] constitutional, is 
the crime an infamous one? Certainly not. It is a political crime, and will always be 
determined according to the situation of the parties at the time.”53
The final roll-call vote of this study pertaining to the expulsion of Matthew 
Lyon, roll-call nine, occurred on February 22, 1799, fifteen months after his first 
altercation with Griswold. The motion introduced by James Bayard, if passed, would 
have expelled Lyon from the House. Again the Federalists were faced with the need 
to achieve a two-thirds majority to expel him. Again they were unable to garner 
enough votes, as the vote to expel Lyon from the House failed with 49 votes in favor 
of the resolution, and 45 votes opposed.54 Of all the congressmen who voted, every 
Federalist voted in favor of expulsion, and every Republican voted in opposition to 
expulsion. Lyon again succeeded in retaining his House seat. One important 
question remains, did Lyon retain his seat because Republicans successfully 
persuaded Federalists that the law could be used against them, or because enough 
Congressmen valued freedom of speech enough to keep Lyon in Congress? Whatever 
the answer to this question may be, the fact remains that the Federalist Era had been 
a less than honorable period of American history, since one of the most important
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rights within the Bill of Rights, freedom of speech, had been placed in considerable 
jeopardy.
One of America's most noted scholars on this issue was Zecharian Chafee, Jr. 
In one of his most enlightening publications. Free Speech in the United States. Chafee 
presents his reader with a fundamental issue, the same issue faced in this study, of 
attempting to analyze the status of free speech in Federalist America. As Chafee 
stated, “The real issue in every free speech controversy is this: whether the state 
can punish all words which have some tendency, however remote, to bring about acts 
in violation of law.”55 In short, Chafee was posing the following questions: Can the 
government repress speech only if a violation of the law is imminent? May it restrict 
speech because it is believed that it might possibly lead to a violation sometime in the 
future? The answer to these questions may be found by investigating the roots of the 
American legal system, which invariably leads to England. The American colonists, 
and the citizens of the newly independent United States, believed themselves to be 
fundamentally different from the English on many issues, including freedom of speech. 
Americans believed that freedom of speech was important because it allowed them to 
speak freely about their government without fear or reprisal. The English could not 
say the same, for in England, as Chafee stated, “The people could not make adverse 
comments in conversation, in clandestine pamphlets, or later in newspapers. The only 
lawful method of presenting grievances was through their lawful representatives in the 
legislature, who might be petitioned in an orderly and dignified manner.”56 Inherent in 
this English practice was the belief that the government was never wrong, and that 
public criticisms were unnecessary and improper. In America the citizens believed 
that they had a perfect right to call attention to the actions of officials; hence Matthew 
Lyon.57
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The problem faced by Lyon and many others during the Federalist Era over the 
issue of free speech involved the extent to which the ideas inherent in freedom of 
expression had evolved since the adoption of the federal Constitution and the Bill of 
Rights just a few years before.58 Lyon believed that the nation had evolved in such 
manner that created an ever-broadening right of American citizens to discuss openly 
the nature of government, and if need be, to criticize individuals in positions of power. 
Others, mainly Federalists, disagreed, believing that the nation had not evolved to the 
extent envisioned by Lyon, instead retaining the English tradition of opposing citizen 
criticisms of government. In English tradition no prior restraints ought to be placed on 
speech before being communicated, which was better known as the “Blackstonian 
Theory.” According to Chafee’s interpretation of this theory, “The government cannot 
interfere by a censorship or injunction before the words are spoken or printed, but can 
punish them as much as it pleases after publication, no matter how harmless or 
essential to the public welfare the discussion may be.”59 The Sedition Act, a law 
which did not place any prior restraints on the press, instead punishing those involved 
after the fact, fit nicely into the Federalists’ Blackstonian definition of freedom of 
speech. Chafee went on to state that the supporters of the Sedition Act believed that 
“liberty of the press meant the observance of no prior restraints of licensing and 
censorship, not the right to publish writings which would undermine authority.”60 
Unfortunately for Lyon and the Republicans, American legal thought had not evolved 
enough to embrace the theory that, just as prior restraint on speech is 
unconstitutional, so too is punishment after the fact.
Although not violating the Blackstonian Theory of no prior restraint, the 
Sedition Act must be questioned, as it touched upon the First Amendment ‘s right of 
freedom of speech.61 The Federalists benefited from the debate over the exact 
meaning of the First Amendment, and Lyon and the American people became victims
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of the Federalist belief that the press ought not to be completely free. It is difficult to 
believe that anyone could deny that the framers of the Constitution believed freedom 
of speech to be at the pinnacle of all basic rights. Still, during the Federalist Era, and 
continuing to the present, Congressmen and citizens alike have disagreed over the 
true meaning of free speech.62 Most people of the Federalist Era did not believe that 
the press should be completely free of governmental restrictions. Limited and 
necessary regulations were tolerated. Most Americans, including Lyon, did not 
believe that the First Amendment’s right of freedom of speech was an absolute right 
to say or print whatever one liked.65 They believed in the right to speak their minds 
openly and without fear of retribution, while at the same time not seeking to 
undermine the authority of the government.
The right to speak out, and at the same time to accept the consequences of 
what was said, involved a balancing act. The First Amendment involves not only an 
individual interest, but a social interest as well.64 The individual interest, the interest 
Lyon believed to be of the utmost importance, is the belief that as an American citizen 
one has the right to express his opinion. The social interest involves the government. 
Its purpose involves respecting the rights of citizens to freely express their opinions, 
yet at the same time protecting the rights of all of society. The question remains, how 
does a government balance its right to intervene, and a citizen’s right to express 
himself? The Federalists believed that they had struck a proper balance with the 
Sedition Act. They believed that the government had been assaulted by the opinions 
of Lyon, and had a perfect right to protect the government and its officials from any 
further onslaught.65 The Republicans did not believe that a proper balance had been 
achieved. Instead they believed that it had tilted radically in favor of government, at 
the expense of the freedom of expression.
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In defense of Lyon’s right to freely express himself, it must be pointed out that 
much of what he said about President Adams was basically true. It was true that 
Adams approved the pomp and ceremony of his position. If Lyon’s remarks were true, 
should they have been considered libelous? Also, the remarks made by Lyon were not 
in any way designed to call people to rebellion. He was not creating an atmosphere 
whereby the nation was placed in imminent danger of rebellion; therefore the 
government did not have a legitimate interest in further upsetting the balance between 
freedom of speech and the general welfare of the country.66 Because of this, his 
indictment, conviction, and sentence were politically motivated, and has left the 
Federalist Era with an unfortunate legacy.
The claims of the Federalists that the Sedition Act was necessary, and that 
violators of the Act ought to be punished because of tense foreign relations, are 
questionable. The effect of the Federalist position was the interpretation of the United 
States Constitution as a peacetime document only, that only during times of peace 
would its contents be upheld. In times of war or increased tensions the basic rights 
within the Constitution could be discarded, including freedom of speech. This belief 
was very dangerous, one that calls into question whether or not Americans during the 
Federalist Era actually enjoyed the fundamental rights included within the 
Constitution. Of course the debate over whether or not the Constitution is a 
peacetime document has surfaced on numerous occasions throughout the history of the 
United States. For all practical purposes this issue has not been settled.67
In retrospect. Federalist attempts to invoke the necessary and proper clause of 
the Constitution to bolster their position failed. The Federalists believed that the 
necessary and proper clause lent validity to their cause because they believed that 
they had a constitutional right to do anything which the U.S. Constitution did not 
expressly forbid. Thomas F. Carroll in the Michigan Law Review went so far as to
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assert that the use of the necessary and proper clause smacked “of the McCulloch v. 
Maryland decision in which chief Justice John Marshall said, ‘Let the end be 
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are 
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and 
spirit of the Constitution is constitutional.”’68 Most historians of the period however 
have rejected this assumption. Yet some Federalists embraced the idea that the ends 
justify the means, even if it involved a serious breach in a fundamental right of 
American citizens.
Finally, with the passage of the Sedition Act and its subsequent trials,
Matthew Lyon and the rest of Federalist America became victims of repression.
Freedom of speech and of the press was violated, if only for a few years. Thomas
Jefferson said it most succinctly when he wrote to Charles Yancy:
If a nation expects to be ignorant and free in a state of civilization, it 
expects what never was and never will be. The functionaries of every 
government have propensities to command at will the liberty and 
property of their constituents. There is no safe deposit for these but 
within the people themselves, nor can they be safe with them without 
information. Where the press is free and every man able to read, all is 
safe.69
Without freedom of speech and of the press the American people have been victimized 
by its government, and will no doubt again be victimized in the future if they fail to 
keep freedom of expression completely free. Not until 1964 did the Supreme Court 
declare sedition acts and seditious libel unconstitutional with its decision in New York 
Times Company v. Sullivan.70
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CHAPTER SIX
AFTERWORD
The Sedition Act of 1798 affected the country in a number of ways. The most 
significant effect was the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions.1 These resolutions 
were drafted in direct response to the perceived threat to the civil liberties of the 
American people. The Resolutions resulted from a feeling, mainly experienced by 
Republicans, that the Acts ought to be declared unconstitutional. The Kentucky and 
Virginia Resolutions began with a declaration of loyalty, as they embraced upholding 
the U.S. Constitution against domestic and foreign aggressors. The Resolutions listed 
the perceived abuses of the federal government at the expense of the state 
governments. The major abuse listed was the fact that Congress had 
unconstitutionally passed the Alien and Sedition laws.
The Kentucky Resolution, written by Thomas Jefferson, was printed on 
November 10, 1798.2 Although the Kentucky Resolution was written by Jefferson, it 
was introduced into the Kentucky legislature by John Breckenridge. Jefferson’s desire 
to remain secretive about his authorship resulted from his desire to have the 
resolution gain as much support as possible, even if that included leaving off his name. 
In its most basic form, the Kentucky Resolution declared the Alien and Sedition Acts 
void, unconstitutional, and ripe for repeal. Jefferson believed that the Resolution 
would divide the supporters and the enemies of the Acts more definitively, which in 
turn would make the issue of the repeal a top priority. The Kentucky Resolution was 
approved by the Kentucky legislature almost unanimously, and then distributed to the 
people of Kentucky. Jefferson called on other states in the union to follow Kentucky’s
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lead, but only Virginia followed suit. James Madison was responsible for authoring 
the Virginia Resolution, which was introduced into the Virginia legislature by John 
Taylor of Caroline.3 The Virginia Resolution was for the most part more moderate in 
tone that the Kentucky Resolution, but received less support from the Virginia 
constituents.
The Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions reflected a states’ rights interpretation
of the Constitution. This included the idea that the states were sovereign, with the
national government being of secondary importance. The Resolutions also included
the belief that the states and the national government were partners in a general
compact, an agreement of sorts, with the states reigning supreme. The states were
responsible for protecting the rights of their citizens. This responsibility also would
have included a protection from the evils associated with the Sedition Act.4 Referring
to this compact the Virginia Resolution states:
In a case of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of other 
powers not granted by the said compact, the States, who are the parties 
thereto, have the right, and are in duty bound, to interpose for arresting 
the progress of evil, and for maintaining within their respective limits, 
the authorities, rights and liberties pertaining to them.5
In short, as the supreme parties to the U.S. Constitution, the states had the right to
stop any perceived evil perpetrated by the national government. Bear in mind that this
particular states’ rights interpretation was not well received by the Federalists. They
maintained that the national government was supreme, and that the states had no
constitutional right to pass judgment on its actions.
The Resolutions also supported the perceived notion that the national
government was fast becoming too powerful with its utilization of implied powers.
This situation could conceivably have led to despotism. The Virginia Resolution
states:
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A spirit in sundry instances been manifested by the Federal Government, 
to enlarge its powers by forced constructions of the constitutional 
charter which defines them; and that indications have appeared of a 
design to expound certain general phrases so as to destroy the meaning 
and effect of the particular enumeration, which necessarily explains and 
limits the general phrases, and so as to consolidate the States by degrees 
into one sovereignty, the obvious tendency and inevitable result of 
which would be to transform the present republican system of the United 
States into an absolute, or at best, a mixed monarchy.6
Whether Jefferson’s fears of absolutism were warranted or not, the fact is that a fear
of an all-powerful central government was common during the latter half of the
Federalist Era. The “forced constructions” were not only feared by Jefferson and
Madison, but by Lyon and others as well.
The Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions were very direct when it came to the
subject of the Alien and Sedition Acts:
The other of which acts [Sedition Act] exercises in a like manner a 
power not delegated by the Constitution, but on the contrary 
expressly and positively forbidden by one of the amendments 
thereto; a power which more than any other ought to produce 
universal alarm, because it is leveled against the right of freely 
examining public characters and measures, and of free 
communication among the people thereon, which has ever been 
justly deemed the only effectual guardian of every other right.7
The Kentucky Resolution declared that the Sedition Act directly violated the First
Amendment, that it significantly diminished the ability of the citizens to monitor its
public officials, and that
the act of Congress of the United States, passed on the 
14th day of July, 1798, entitled, ‘an act in addition to the act for the 
punishment of certain crimes against the United States,’ which does 
abridge the freedom of the press, is not law, but is all together void 
and of no effect.8
The Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions were an attempt to establish the right of the 
states to identify when the national government had overstepped its bounds, and
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declare the actions of the national government void. According to the Resolutions, the 
Sedition Act was not law.
The Resolutions forwarded the concept of dual federalism, whereby the 
national government was given relatively few powers. This fact scared Federalists, 
many of whom believed that the next step taken by the states might possibly be 
insurrection and civil war.9 Some Federalists maintained that the Resolutions were a 
part of a French plot to forcibly remove Virginia from the union. Others, like 
Alexander Hamilton, believed that the Resolutions amounted to a plot to overthrow 
the national government.10 Federalist fears over the Resolutions were unfounded, 
and were mainly due to their fears over the increasing popularity of the Republican 
party.
Not only did the Federalists have doubts about the Resolutions’ true meaning, 
but so too did one of their authors, James Madison. Like the Federalists, Madison 
had significant concerns about the act of “nullification,” the practice of the states’ 
passing judgment upon the various laws of the national government. Jefferson 
probably did believe that the states had the right to nullify national laws, but Madison 
had his doubts. Perhaps neither of the authors had expressly intended to establish 
the practice of nullification. Historians still argue today over what Jefferson and 
Madison really had intended with the Resolutions, as well as how much of their 
contents they had embraced.11
Speaking on the effects of the Resolution, historian Adrienne Koch has stated:
Although the effect of the Resolutions is almost impossible to evaluate 
in quantitative terms, there is no doubt that they served as efficient 
rallying devices for Republicans from Vermont to Georgia. As 
campaign documents, the Resolutions are of unusual significance: for 
they overtly condemned the suppression of the public opinion in any 
form and provided powerful precedent against future attempts to 
destroy the sound status of civil liberties in the United States.12
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The Sedition Act would be a hot topic in the election of 1800, but before the election
took place, a repeal effort was started in the House of Representatives.
Since the passage of the Sedition Act in July of 1798, Republicans in the House
had vowed to repeal the law they believed to be unconstitutional. Briefly, they
underlined their demands for repeal by rehashing the objections they had made when it
was initially introduced. First, they reasserted their claim that the prosecution of
seditious libel was an activity best left to the various states. Second, the Republicans
believed that the necessary and proper clause of the U.S. Constitution did not apply to
the Sedition Act. The Republicans asserted that the Sedition Act was not necessary
in order to stop seditious activities, nor was it a proper avenue of prosecution.
Finally, the Republicans reasserted their earlier claims that the Act violated the
protections guaranteed by the First Amendment.13 The main impetus behind the
repeal attempt was the belief that the United States national government had
overstepped its legal limits, infringing upon the rights of the various states. During
the repeal process the Republicans used the Tenth Amendment to support their
position, which states that “The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.” 14 Since the U.S. Constitution had not specifically
given to the national government the power to pass a law on sedition, Republicans
thought it was therefore a power reserved to the states.
The debate over the proposed repeal of the Sedition Act was both brief and
philosophical in nature. The philosophical aspect of the debate concerned the following
question posed here by Republican John Nicholas:
The question, then, whether the government ought to have control 
over the persons who alone can give information throughout the 
country, is nothing more than this, whether men interested in 
suppressing information necessary for the people to have, ought to 
be entrusted with the power, or whether they ought to have the
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power which their personal interests leads to the abuse of.15 
The debate took place in an atmosphere of scholarly curiosity, as if Congressmen were 
primarily interested in arriving at a formal understanding of what the effects of the 
Sedition Act might be. Urgency was not a critical factor. However, the need for 
Congressmen to have a final word on the subject was very important. Republicans, no 
doubt realizing that their numbers were not great enough to affect a repeal, simply 
desired to go on record one more time expressing their profound dissatisfaction with 
the law. Federalists, responding to the repeal effort, tried to limit the debate to two 
members on each side of the aisle.16 The Federalists believed that by limiting the 
debate the chances of its repeal would be minimal.17
The Federalists were successful in opposing the repeal effort not only by 
limiting debate, but upon legal and constitutional grounds as well. The Federalists 
opposed the repeal effort because, in their estimation, seditious libel did not enjoy 
First Amendment protection; hence it was not a restriction on freedom of speech. The 
Federalists maintained their earlier claim that those who speak about their 
government must do so in a responsible manner, and not recklessly espousing 
inaccuracies. The Federalists also claimed that the Sedition Act was merely an act 
educating the American public on the common law, an attempt to clarify the existing 
laws of the states for all to understand. Finally, the Federalists made a distinction 
between the freedom of religion clause and the freedom of speech clause of the 
Constitution. The religion clause of the First Amendment expressly bars Congress 
from legislating on religion, while the press clause only prohibits Congress from 
passing laws “abridging the freedom of the speech, or of the press.”18 According to 
constitutional law scholar David M. O’Brien, “From that language, the committee [of 
the House] surmised that Congress was not precluded from passing legislation
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respecting speech and the press.”19 Largely as a result of these Federalist claims, 
little support was generated to repeal the Sedition Act.
As a result of the lack of firm support for the repeal, the Federalists submitted 
the following resolution: "Resolved, That it is inexpedient to repeal the act passed 
the last session, entitled, ‘An act in addition to the act, entitled An act for the 
punishment of certain crimes against the United States.”20 A vote was taken on the 
resolution, 52 in favor, 48 opposed.21 Again, of those congressmen who voted, not 
one crossed party lines. Those who found the repeal of the Act to be inexpedient 
outnumbered those who thought it expedient, thus killing repeal. The Republicans’ 
only hope of ridding themselves of the Act would be in its expiration, which would 
occur at the end of the Sixth Congress. Thomas Cooley, another constitutional 
scholar, stated well the status of the First Amendment after the failure of repeal, 
when he said that the First Amendment guaranteed “a right to freely utter and publish 
whatever the citizen may please, and to be protected against any responsibility for so 
doing, except so as far as such publications, from their blasphemy, obscenity, or 
scandalous character, may be a public offense, or as by their falsehood and malice they 
may injuriously affect the standing, reputation, or pecuniary interests of individuals.”22 
This was the reality of freedom of speech in Federalist America, which would continue 
until the Republicans came to power.
Yet the Federalist Era was not the only period of American history which 
witnessed attempts at limiting freedom of speech. The next instance of the national 
government’s attempting to limit freedom of speech by congressional legislation was 
in the passage of the Espionage Act of 1917. The Espionage Act was in response to a 
growing distrust of aliens and political extremists who were sympathetic to the 
Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. The parallels between the Espionage Act of 1917 
and the Sedition Act of 1798 are strikingly familiar. Both were based on the mistrust
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of a particular group, largely resulting from a revolution abroad. Both Acts also 
included the idea that the nation would not be safe until it limited the subject group’s 
freedom of speech. In short “the Espionage Act of 1917 penalized circulation of false 
statements made with the intent to interfere with military success, or attempts to 
cause insubordination in the military and naval forces of the United States, or 
obstruction of the recruiting and enlistment service of the United States.”23 Although 
the Espionage Act of 1917 was aimed mainly at the obstruction of the military, the fact 
remains that the Act penalized those who were believed to have spoken falsely about 
the U.S. military, a definite attempt to limit free speech.
The next act, the Sedition Act of 1918, was also in response to the Bolshevik 
Revolution, as well as economic dislocation due to World War I.24 The Sedition Act of 
1918
prohibited speeches or acts obstructing the sale of government bonds, or 
speaking or writing anything intended to cause contempt for the American form 
of government, the Constitution, the flag, or the military uniform, or urging any 
curtailment of production of things necessary to the prosecution of the war with 
intent to hinder its prosecution, or supporting the cause of any country at war 
with U.S., or opposing the cause of the U.S. therein.25
Again, like the Sedition Act of 1798, the Sedition Act of 1918 made it illegal to speak
or write anything that might bring the government and its officials into contempt.
Anyone found guilty of violating the Sedition Act of 1918 was subject to a $10,000 fine,
twenty years in prison, or both. Both sedition acts resulted from increased foreign
policy tensions, with the intended remedy being a curtailment on freedom of speech.
Approximately 2,000 cases resulted from the Espionage Act of 1917 and the Sedition
Act of 1918, with 1,000 defendants being found guilty.26 Unlike the Sedition Act of
1798, the constitutionality of the Espionage Act of 1917 and the Sedition Act of 1918
were upheld by the United States Supreme Court in the cases of Schenck v. U.S.. and
Abrams v. U.S.27
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In 1940 the United States Congress passed the Smith Act, another law aimed 
at aliens and those sympathetic to Communism. Most people tried in violation of the 
Smith Act of 1940 were tried because they were accused of conspiring to overthrow 
the government of the United States. The Smith Act was upheld by the Supreme 
Court in Dennis v. U.S.28 The Smith Act was followed by the McCarren Act, or the 
Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950. The McCarren Act declared “the 
Communist movement to be dedicated to the overthrow of the United States 
Government, orders that all Communist-action organizations must register data about 
their activities, officers, and membership with the department of justice, and subjects 
persons so registered to certain disabilities, such as the denial of the opportunity for 
government employment.”29 The McCarren Act sounded very similar to the Alien 
Registration Act of 1798. Finally, during World War II, the House Committee on un- 
American Activities (HUAC), was an attempt by Congress to label certain American 
citizens disloyal and seditious. Many historians have contended that the 
investigation of un-American activities was perhaps the most serious threat to civil 
liberties in U.S. history. That contention must be recognized as valid, since despite a 
string of repressive legislation from the Sedition Act of 1798, to the McCarren Act, the 
HUAC was the most feared of all.30 It is important to note that the Sedition Act of 
1798 was not the only instance of a curtailment of free speech, and Matthew Lyon was 
not the only person to have been convicted of sedition or espionage, or similar activity. 
The United States has enacted a number of repressive national laws, and will no doubt 
continue to do so until the First Amendment becomes a more sacred principle of the 
American people. If this fails to happen, which will likely be the case, attempts at a 
whittling away of American’s most basic freedoms will continue.
The Sedition Act of 1798 does, however, overshadow the others simply for the 
fact that it was the first national law targeting sedition—a precedent . It had other
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very tangible results besides those already mentioned. The Alien and Sedition laws 
affected the legacy of John Adams. The presidency of John Adams has become 
synonymous with the passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts, diminishing more 
positive achievements of his presidency, such as preventing war between the U.S. and 
France. The criticism of John Adams for his support of the Alien and Sedition laws is 
to a certain extent warranted. Adams did possess the power to veto the legislation. 
Yet Adams neither initiated the Acts, nor forcefully advocated their passage, nor 
forcefully enforced them.31
Furthermore, Adams’ approval of the Acts, and Federalist support for their 
passage, caused a political backlash. The party went into a downward spiral, as it 
lost its grip upon the country to the Republicans. By the election of 1800 the 
Federalist party was no longer a strong, unified organization. Instead it was beset by 
internal power struggles and a general lack of a political agenda. The Alien and 
Sedition Acts were designed to entrench the Federalists firmly at the helm of 
American government. Instead, “they failed, leaving a party whose philosophy was 
outmoded and whose peculiarity was destroyed.”32 Ironically the Republican party 
was the main benefactor of the Alien and Sedition laws, as it grew to be extremely 
unified in its opposition to the repressive measures of the Federalists. It was able to 
develop its own philosophy of government, one that received significant support 
throughout the country.
The true test of the increasing strength of the Republican party was the 
presidential election of 1800. The voters decided between the tickets of John Adams 
and Charles Cotesworth Pinckney for the Federalists, and Thomas Jefferson and 
Aaron Burr for the Republicans The Federalists, despite the notoriety they had 
achieved as a result of the Alien and Sedition laws, actively sought to retain their 
control over the country. An article in the Maryland Gazette on September 11, 1800,
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portrays well the position and the tone of the Federalists at the dawn of the 
democratic republic, 1801-1815:
Much has been said and written to prevail on you to prefer Mr. Jefferson to him 
[Adams]. The principle objections made against Mr. Adams, and on which a 
very great clamor has been excited against him are the following: That he 
approved and assented to the sedition act, the alien act, and the act to raise a 
provisional army; and that he is the friend and advocate of monarchy I shall 
endeavour, my fellow citizens, to convince you that the objects of these laws 
were just, reasonable, and proper, and that Mr. Adams, in assenting to them, 
acted under impulse of duty .33
In maintaining that the Acts were justified, the Federalists had blinded themselves to 
political realities. They still held firmly to the belief that only the rich and elite were 
capable of government. They characterized Jefferson as a radical southerner who 
represented the fringes of southern society.34 They would be sadly mistaken when 
the votes were counted, for Jefferson was elected the third president of the United 
States.35
Interestingly enough Matthew Lyon played an important part in the election of 
1800, casting one of the deciding votes in Jefferson’s favor in the House. Prior to 1804 
and the ratification of the Twelfth Amendment, electors did not vote for president and 
vice-president individually. Instead they voted for two people. The one who received 
the most votes became president, and the one who achieved the next highest number 
of votes became vice-president. This situation potentially allowed a president and a 
vice-president to be from different parties, such as John Adams and Thomas Jefferson 
had been after the election of 1796. If no candidate received a majority of votes in the 
Electoral College, the election went to the House of Representatives, where each 
state cast one vote. Such was the case in 1800, when Jefferson and Aaron Burr each 
received 73 electoral votes.36 After 36 ballots, and poor weather which precluded a 
number of Federalists from reaching the House, Lyon cast the vote for the Vermont
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delegation which broke the tie with Burr.37 Thanks to Lyon’s timely vote, Thomas 
Jefferson had become president.
After the election of 1800 it became even more apparent that the statements
made on the House floor during the debate over the Sedition Act were highly political.
Once the Federalists lost their grip on the nation and their majority in Congress, they
amazingly became advocates of free speech and champions of the Bill of Rights.38
After 1800 the Federalists were no longer the most powerful party; they had instead
become the minority party, fearful of the potential reprisals from the Republicans. In
all fairness, the Republicans too conveniently changed their spots after the election of
1800. Once in the majority, they became less tolerant of freedom of speech, as they
had become the target of Federalist criticisms.
After taking office Jefferson immediately pardoned those convicted of violating
the Sedition Act and remitted their fines. This action on Jefferson’s part seems very
compassionate at first glance, but the true reason for pardoning those convicted was
not that he felt an acute sense of sympathy for those involved, but because he
believed that it was not the national government’s duty to punish seditious libel.39
During Jefferson’s presidency the function of punishing seditious libel was left to state
courts. As a result, the federal courts would not officially be involved in deciding
cases of seditious libel again until the Espionage Act of 1917. Explaining why he
pardoned those convicted of violating the Sedition Act, Jefferson wrote to John Adams:
The judges, believing the law constitutional, had a right to pass a sentence of 
fine and imprisonment; because that power was placed in their hands by the 
Constitution! But the Executive, believing the law to be unconstitutional, was 
bound to remit the the execution of it; because that power has been confided 
to him by the Constitution. The instrument meant that its coordinate branches 
should be checks on each other. But the opinion which gives to the Judges the 
right to decide what Laws are constitutional, and what not, not only for 
themselves in their own spheres, would make the Judiciary a despotic 
branch.40
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This last statement of Jefferson’s demonstrated his feeling that the federal judiciary 
was intended to be a co-equal branch of government, and that it had the potential of 
becoming a “despotic branch.” Jefferson was advocating not only a states’ rights 
position, but also a position rejecting the concept of judicial review, which had just 
stung him in Marburv v. Madison.41
As for Lyon, he did not run in the election of 1800, due primarily to the hostile 
nature of his opposition and bitter partisan strife. Because Lyon would lose his 
congressional immunity after his term, and aware that state charges awaited his 
return to Vermont, he decided to move to Eddyville, Kentucky, in 1801.42 There Lyon 
resumed business pursuits similar to the ones he had undertaken in Fair Haven, 
including a saw mill, a paper mill, and a tannery.43 As a result of his successful 
business ventures he again became important in frontier politics. In 1802 he was 
elected to the U.S. House from the state of Kentucky, and served until 1810.44
When the War of 1812 arrived Lyon’s entrepreneurial nature surfaced once 
again, and he undertook a shipbuilding operation in support of his country.45 Most of 
the funding came from Lyon himself. He in fact did not even have a government 
contract. He simply realized that the nation lacked a sufficient navy, and contributed 
accordingly. Lyon eventually incurred a large debt from his shipbuilding operation, but 
did not ask the national government for reimbursement. In 1820 Lyon was appointed 
by President James Monroe as United States Factor to the Cherokee Nation in the 
Arkansas Territory.46 This appointment would be Lyon’s last public role, and he died 
on August 1, 1822, in Sparda Bluffs, Arkansas Territory.47 In 1839 Lyon’s body was 
moved to the side of his wife, who had died in Eddyville.48 Lyon’s life after Congress 
was in many ways very similar to his life before Congress. As Aleine Austin put it, 
“Thus in 1800 Lyon was repeating an old pattern: following the dream promised by a
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new land of opportunity. His was the eternal quest for perfection—ever restless, ever 
ambitious, ever driven.”49
But Lyon’s story was not over. The refund of his fine was not paid to his heirs
until 1840, forty-one years after the Sedition Act took effect. Although Jefferson had
pardoned Lyon, for unknown reasons Lyon had not received his remittance. In 1839 a
bill was introduced into Congress intended to refund the money paid by Lyon, plus
interest, for his violation of the Sedition Act. The Act read as follows:
‘An Act to refund a fine imposed on the late Matthew Lyon, under the Sedition 
law, to his legal heirs and representatives’ . . . .  Be it enacted that the 
Secretary of the Treasury, and is hereby, authorized and directed to pay the 
legal heirs and representatives of Matthew Lyon, out of any money in the 
treasury not otherwise appropriated, to the sum of one thousand and sixty 
dollars and ninety-six cents, with interest thereon from the day of February, 
seventeen hundred and ninety-one, to the passing of this Act.50
Matthew Lyon’s estate was fully reimbursed for the payment of his fine in violation of
the Sedition Act of 1798. Matthew Lyon was finally vindicated.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CLUSTER BLOC
Like the rest of American society, the legislators of the Fifth Congress 
possessed divided opinions on the issues of Matthew Lyon and the passage of the 
Sedition Act of 1798. Those with similar opinions either consciously or unconsciously 
joined with one another and formed voting blocs. This chapter will deal with the blocs 
that emerged during the Fifth Congress concerning Matthew Lyon's political fate and 
the passage of the Sedition Act. Both issues were highly divisive and extremely 
partisan, with sectionalism playing only a minor coincidental role. Because the Lyon 
and Sedition Act issues were very divisive, significant groupings occurred. As a 
result of Rice-Beyle Cluster Bloc analysis these voting groups became clearly 
recognizable.1 Legislators who made no comment in debate that might have indicated 
their opinions usually left a sufficient voting record that is just as eloquent as any 
speech, and allows us to determine their positions quite precisely. This is especially 
important in the late 1790’s, when there were still a few legislators whose party 
affiliations were uncertain.
Voting blocs can educate the historian in many ways. First, they can originate 
within and between parties. Naturally, if a particular issue is profoundly partisan the 
voting blocs will be identified specifically along party lines. The degree of factionalism 
within and between parties may also be gauged through cluster bloc analysis. For 
example, a number of congressmen may cross party lines and vote with those of 
another party on certain roil call votes. Cluster bloc analysis is a good tool with which 
to judge the level of factionalism on a given issue. Congressmen who do not vote on a
156
157
particular issue may be just as important as those who do. This is so because by the 
simple act of not voting the legislator may be demonstrating his sense of 
dissatisfaction with the issues, or even with the legislation before him.2 Other 
reasons may also apply, such as the avoidance of a controversial subject, or chance 
absence of the congressmen at the time of the vote. Such a group is important enough 
on some occasions to form a distinct bloc.
Cluster bloc analysis provides the researcher with a tool with which to 
understand the positions of those congressmen who did not speak during debate. 
Often times when historians undertake legislative studies they limit themselves to 
the congressmen who spoke on the subject, when in fact on most issues only a small 
number of legislators will actually speak, either in support of or in opposition to 
proposed legislation. Limiting information only to those congressmen who spoke on 
an issue handicaps research conclusions, as historians may possibly have studied 
only the speeches of the leadership. With cluster bloc analysis the researcher has the 
ability to find out the opinion of the legislator even if he did not speak during debate. 
This provides a more thorough understanding of the issue.
Rice-Beyle Cluster Bloc analysis was used in this study because it added a 
dimension that had not been utilized by past historians, at least to the extent used in 
this study. Lyon’s fate and the Sedition Act of 1798 are important issues that have 
already been studied by a number of noted historians. Yet this study is unique and 
relevant due to the use of cluster bloc analysis. It will provide quantitative results 
that past historians have not been able to muster because cluster bloc analysis was 
not a part of their methodology. The method provides us a more precise understanding 
of Lyon and the Sedition Act than was formerly possible.
The first task in cluster block analysis is the selection of the relevant roll call 
votes to be used in the study.3 There were nine votes on Matthew Lyon, and four on
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the Sedition Act. These thirteen roll calls constitute the foundation upon which this 
study was based. The second step is to establish the extent of agreement between 
the representatives by running the computer program. This “running” of the program 
will provide the researcher with the percent of times that two representatives voted 
the same way on the selected relevant roll calls.4 These indices of numbers are then 
placed in a matrix that resembles a mileage chart. For example, instead of the reader 
locating two cities such as Minneapolis and Denver, the reader would line up two 
congressmen, like Edward Livingston and Hezekiah Hosmer. Where the two 
congressmen meet in the chart a number would be found. Instead of identifying how 
many miles between two cities, the number would demonstrate the percent of votes 
on which the two congressmen cast their roll calls the same way.5 For example, if the 
number was 100, the two congressmen voted the same on 100 percent of the roll calls. 
Their interests were likely the same. If the number was only 30 or 40, they agreed on 
only 30 or 40 percent of the votes, and likely had quite different interests.
The blocs are formed by locating those congressmen on the matrix who 
demonstrate the highest level of agreement. Those with the most agreement, 
invariably 100 percent, are placed in one corner of the matrix. Those in the group with 
the highest level of agreement are called the “core” group. Those demonstrating the 
lowest levels of agreement are placed at the opposite corner.6 One question remains, 
what thresholds are used to differentiate the various levels of support? Those used in 
this study are arbitrary, but fall within the customary 70-80 percent threshold. If the 
threshold is set too high it may appear as if no blocs existed, and if set too low the 
reader may think that the level of disagreement was insignificant. If a member does 
not meet the established threshold, but comes close, he may become a “fringe” 
member. If the index of agreement between the two congressmen is less than the 
established criteria, a zero is placed in the matrix for the index of agreement. This
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does not mean that the two did not ever agree. Instead it shows that the level of 
agreement did not meet the minimum threshold and does not provide enough 
information to permit reliable judgments.
Although sectionalism played only a minor role in this study it is important to 
note the particular groupings of states into their respective regions. Those in the New 
England group included the states of Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 
Rhode Island, and Vermont. The mid-Atlantic states included Delaware, New Jersey, 
New York, and Pennsylvania. The Southern states included Georgia, Maryland,
North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia.7 With this background into the workings 
of cluster bloc analysis and the parameters used in this study, the reader can achieve 
a sound understanding of the relevant issues. The rest of this chapter will deal 
exclusively with the analysis of Lyon’s roll calls, followed by the analysis of the 
Sedition Act. Finally, the two sets will be combined in order to prove the hypothesis 
that the congressmen who voted to expel Lyon from the House are the same ones 
who voted in favor of the Sedition Act of 1798.
Analyzing the nine relevant Lyon-related roll calls of the Fifth Congress using 
Rice-Beyle Cluster Bloc analysis at a minimum index of agreement of seventy percent, 
two blocs emerge, each with a fringe. The first bloc is a core bloc of Lyon’s 
opposition.8 This bloc will be called the anti-Lyon bloc from this point on. This group 
consisted of 35 Federalist congressmen, eighteen of whom demonstrated 100 percent 
opposition to Lyon, as shown by the relevant matrix. This amounted to stiff 
opposition to Lyon. What is most significant about this group is that all members of 
the core group were Federalists. Not one Republican voted often enough with the 
Federalists to qualify for membership in the core. This solid core of Federalists 
demonstrates well the partisan nature of Lyon’s expulsion proceedings. It was 
relatively easy to identify instances of party animosities over this issue when reading
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the debates in Congress, yet cluster bloc analysis provides an added dimension 
through the utilization of the legislators’ votes, instead of just their voices. 
Table 1
Blocks Represented by Party on Lvon-Related Roll Calls
Pro-Lyon Anti-Lyon Total
Federalist Core 0 35 35
Federalist Fringe 0 15 15
Republican Core 34 0 34
Republican Fringe 11 0 11
Total 45 50 95
Beside the core anti-Lyon group other congressmen also opposed Lyon, but not quite 
to the same degree as the core opposition. This anti-Lyon fringe consisted of fifteen 
Federalist congressmen. Again, not one Republican voted with the anti-Lyon voters 
enough to be considered even a fringe member. It really boiled down to either 
opposing Lyon or supporting him. The only difference revolved around the degree to 
which each congressman suported or opposed him.
Any discussion of sectionalism over the Lyon issue can be tricky since it was 
so partisan in nature. Because the sections of the country were basically dominated 
by one party or the other, differences between the sections were obvious, but not 
significant. This situation is a bit like the question, which came first, the chicken or 
the egg? Did sectionalism play a significant part in deciding which party the people 
would support? Did the party come first, with little importance being placed on 
section? It is difficult to place much importance on sectionalism because most 
Federalists came from New England, with a scattering throughout the mid-Atlantic
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states, and South Carolina in the South. Out of the 35 congressmen within the 
Federalist core group, 29 came from New England, four from the mid-Atlantic states, 
and two from the South.9 It seems that the issue demonstrated clear sectional lines, 
but the lines were of little significance because they were based upon party, and not 
upon geographical uniqueness. Those congressmen from outside New England who 
voted in this core group were Henry Glen of New York, Thomas Hartley of 
Pennsylvania, William Hindman of Maryland, James Imlay of New Jersey, John 
Rutledge Jr. of South Carolina, and Richard Thomas of Pennsylvania. Note that only 
two of them were from the South.
Table 2










New England 2 0 29 3 34
Middle Atlantic 7 3 4 2 16
South 25 8 2 10 45
Total 34 11 35 15 95
Sectionalism was more interesting for the Federalist fringe than the Federalist 
core. Of the fifteen members of the fringe, ten came from the south, three from New 
England, and only two from the mid-Atlantic states. Realizing this, one can say with 
relative certainty that the New England Federalists exhibited a very strong opposition 
to Lyon’s presence in the House, while the southern Federalists were not quite as 
adamant in their opposition. They were more moderate than their northern 
counterparts, at least as far as the roll call record is concerned. This could be due to
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the aristocratic nature of New England, and the fact that Lyon was always viewed as 
an outsider. The South was perhaps more accepting of Lyon, despite his repeated 
challenges to the government. Perhaps southern Federalists saw a little bit of a 
southerner in Lyon. Still, whether fringe or not, this group opposed Lyon’s presence in 
the House, if slightly less so than the core group. The only non-southern fringe 
members were Samuel Sitgreaves of Pennsylvania, John Williams of New York, Peleg 
Wadsworth of Massachusetts, Thomas Tillinghast of Rhode Island, and Nathaniel 
Freeman, Jr. of Massachusetts.
Even though Lyon had his enemies he too had his friends. As Table 1 
indicates, his supporters all came from within the Republican ranks. Not one 
Federalist voted enough in support of Lyon to become a member of the core or fringe of 
the pro-Lyon bloc. The core of the pro-Lyon bloc consisted of 34 Republican 
congressmen. It is obvious that the Republicans could be just as partisan as the 
Federalists when it came to the issues surrounding Lyon. Whether one supported 
Lyon or not can be reduced to party affiliation. The pro-Lyon core group, although 
having roughly the same number of members as the core anti-Lyon group, exhibited 
100 percent agreement, whereas the core of the anti-Lyon bloc only had 18 of the 34 
members demonstrating 100 percent agreement. The pro-Lyon camp was much more 
unified than the anti-Lyon camp. This is due mainly to the fact that Lyon and Griswold 
were both on the same expulsion resolution, with many Federalists unable or 
unwilling to decide if it was worth ridding themselves of Lyon if it meant getting rid of 
one of their own in the process. The pro-Lyon fringe consisted of eleven 
congressmen. Again, a majority came from the Republican-fertile south. Seven of the 
eleven fringe bloc members came from the South, three from the mid-Atlantic states, 
and one from the frontier state of Kentucky. Those non-southerners voting with the 
fringe bloc in support of Lyon were Joseph Hiester of Pennsylvania, Edward
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Livingston of New York, and David Bard of Pennsylvania. Thomas T. Davis was the 
frontiersman from Kentucky. This fringe group was smaller than the fringe group of the 
anti-Lyon voters which points to a more cohesive Republican party. The Republicans 
were a much more disciplined, organized party at the turn of the century than were the 
Federalists.
In short, Lyon survived the attempts of his Federalist enemies to oust him 
from Congress because the Republican party had enough members to prevent the 
Federalists from achieving the two-thirds vote needed for expulsion. Because the 
Republican party was so unified on this issue, Lyon remained a representative from 
the state of Vermont. In terms of sectionalism the 34 members of the pro-Lyon bloc 
included 25 southerners: only two were from New England: Thomas Skinner and 
Joseph B. Varnum of Massachusetts. Lyon received the majority of his support from 
the South simply because that was where most Republicans called home.
Sectionalism came into the equation only because most Federalists were from the 
North, and most Republicans were from the South. The only reason sectionalism 
seemed to be an issue was because of the geographical uniqueness of the Federalist 
and Republican parties during the Federalist Era. Through cluster bloc analysis, and 
despite the extreme political nature of Lyon’s expulsion proceedings, Lyon’s fate may 
safely be determined to have been decided along strict party lines, with sectionalism 
only playing a coincidental, relatively minor role.
Switching gears now to the four relevant Sedition Act roll calls, and using a 
minimum index of agreement of 75 percent, two blocs emerge.10 The core of the first 
bloc, the pro-Sedition Act bloc, consisted of 37 Federalist congressmen, with 22 of 
them demonstrating 100 percent support on the relevant roll calls. Again, like the roll 
call votes on Lyon, the votes on the passage of the Sedition Act exhibited a large 
degree of partisanship. In general, the Federalists supported the Sedition Act with
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open arms. Again, Rice-Beyle Cluster Bloc analysis allows the researcher to 
demonstrate the opinions of the congressmen on a given subject through their voting 
records. The pro-Sedition Act fringe consisted of only seven Federalist congressmen, 
demonstrating how strongly the Federalist party desired the Sedition Act. Like the 
Lyon fringe, the Sedition Act fringe shows a relative southern dominance, with four of 
the seven fringe members from the South. This may be explained by southern 
skepticism of the central government.
Table 3
Blocks Represented bv Party on Sedition Act-Related Roll Calls
Pro-Sedition Act Anti-Sedition Act Total
Federalist Core 37 0 37
Federalist Fringe 7 0 7
Republican Core 0 37 37
Republican Fringe 0 0 0
Total 44 37 81
The second voting bloc is the anti-Sedition Act group.11 This group consisted 
of 37 Republican congressmen. Republican opposition to the proposed Sedition Act
was so strong that no fringe members emerged from this group. All of the members of 
this core group were southern Republicans, except for two frontiersmen, a mid- 
Atlantic congressman, and only two New Englandmen, Lyon of Vermont and Joseph 
B. Vamum of Massachusetts. Like the frontiersmen of the Lyon roll calls, the 
frontiersmen of the Sedition Act can also be considered southerners. No significant 
East/West differences emerged as a result of cluster bloc analysis.
165
Table 4 indicates the vague relationship of the Sedition Act to sectionalism.11 
Of the 37 Federalist core legislators, 23 were from New England, 12 from the mid- 
Atlantic states, and two from the South. These two were William Hindman of 
Maryland and John Rutledge, Jr. of South Carolina. Clearly the main impetus behind 
the passage of the Sedition Act originated in Federalist New England, and to a lesser 
degree from the mid-Atlantic states. The seven fringe members demonstrated a 
reverse pattern, for four of them came from the South, only two from New England, and 
only one from the mid-Atlantic states.
Table 4










New England 23 2 2 0 27
Middle Atlantic 12 1 11 0 24
South 2 4 26 0 32
Total 37 7 29 0 73
Again, the passage of the Sedition Act was a highly partisan affair, with the 
Federalists strongly in support of it, along with a handful of fringe members, and the 
Republicans even more strongly opposed. This was largely a result of the 
considerable fears the Republicans held that someone in their ranks would be targeted 
by the Federalist legislation. Their fears proved true as Lyon was charged with its 
violation. After cluster bloc analysis is used it becomes apparent that partisan voting 
is not unique to the modern day, but has plagued government from its infancy.
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Turning now to the combination of the two sets of roll calls, two blocs 
emerge.12 The first is a core of congressmen who are in both the core anti-Lyon and 
core pro-Sedition Act groups, or at least in one core group and one fringe group. This 
combined bloc consisted of 23 Federalist congressmen, and no Republicans. The 
fringe became members of the group by being fringe members on both sets of roll calls, 
or who found themselves in only one fringe group, whether it be on the roll calls of 
Matthew Lyon or the Sedition Act. This fringe group consisted of 18 congressmen.
The core group is quite important as it proves the hypothesis that almost all of the 
congressmen who voted in favor of expelling Lyon from Congress voted in favor of the 
Sedition Act (given a voting record sufficiently complete for reliable analysis). Twenty 
three congressmen in fact voted both for Lyon’s expulsion and in favor of the Sedition 
Act. This is a considerable sized voting bloc, and helps to demonstrate how 
partisanship transcended both of the issues. It now appears through the use of cluster 
bloc analysis that the two issues of the expulsion of Matthew Lyon and the passage 
of the Sedition Act of 1798 were quite interrelated. Cluster bloc analysis allowed me 
specifically to identify each congressman who is in both core groups. This task could 
not have been accomplished just by reading the debates in Congress. Once again, it 
appears through the use of Rice-Beyle Cluster Bloc analysis that two blocs may be 
formed from the matrix using the combination of Lyon and Sedition Act roll calls. One 
Federalist core group emerged, consisting of those who voted both in favor of Lyon’s 
expulsion and in favor of the Sedition Act. The fringe group voted in one fringe group 
or both. The opposite is true for those who supported Lyon’s retention and opposed 
the Sedition Act. No member of the Fifth Congress crossed over. That is, no 
congressman both proposed to expel Lyon and opposed the Sedition Act. or sought to 
retain Lyon and favored the Sedition Act.
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Table 5





Federalist Core 23 0
Federalist Fringe 18 0
Federalist Total 41 0
Republican Core 0 34
Republican Fringe 0 11
Republican Total 0 45
The reasons why the congressmen of the Fifth House voted the way they did 
have been dealt with at great length in previous chapters, yet the main reason bears 
mentioning once again. Both issues were highly partisan in nature. From the very 
beginning both the Lyon and Sedition Act issues divided the Federalists and the 
Republicans. Many congressmen looked no further than their party affiliation when 
coming to a decision on either of the two important decisions. They blindly went along 
with their party’s position.
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NOTES
I. See Appendix E for a complete listing of the core and fringe voting blocs 
concerning Matthew Lyon, and for the core and fringe voting blocs on the Sedition Act 
of 1798.
2. The discussion of the Rice-Beyle Cluster Bloc Analysis is taken from Lee F. 
Anderson, Meredith W. Watts, Jr., and Allen R. V/ilcox, Legislative Roll Call 
Analysis. 56-74; Richard Beringer, Historical Analysis. 287-293; Charles M. Dollar 
and Richard J. Jensen, Historian’s Guide to Statistics. 106-109, 214-23.
3. See Appendix B for a complete listing of the congressmen whose voting 
records were not sufficient for the purposes of this study.
4. The computer program utilized in this paper is found in Cluster Bloc 
Analysis, unpublished computer program by Jarvis Ehart and Richard Beringer, 
University of North Dakota, 1972. The Ehart and Beringer program is a modification of 
the Cluster Bloc program found in Anderson, Watts, and Wilcox, chapter 4.
5. For the roll call data relating to the Fifth House, see the Inter-University 
Consortium for Political and Social Research, United States Congressional Roll Call 
Voting Records. 5 House. 1797-1799. machine readable records, ICPSR 0004.
6. A matrix was not included in the text due to space constraints; instead a full 
listing of the core and fringe concerning Matthew Lyon as well as the core and fringe 
on the Sedition Act may be found in Appendix E.
7. See Table 1 for the regional groupings used in this study.
8. See Table 1 for breakdown along party lines on Lyon-related roll calls.
9. See Table 2 for breakdown on Lyon-related roll calls sectional lines.
10. See Table 3 for breakdown along party lines on Sedition Act-related roll
calls.
II. See Table 4 for breakdown along sectional lines on Sedition Act-related roll
calls.
12. See table 5 for breakdown along party lines on Lyon and Sedition Act- 
related roll calls. Also see Appendix E for a complete listing of the congressmen who 
were members of the core group as well as the fringe group after combining all 
relevant roll calls for this study.
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION
From the preceding chapters it should be apparent that Matthew Lyon and the 
Sedition Act of 1798 created considerable controversy during the Fifth Congress.
Lyon was viewed by his Federalist adversaries as such an embarrassment to the U.S. 
House of Representatives that they tried to remove him on more than one occasion. 
They failed at every opportunity because Lyon’s Republican friends came to his 
rescue. The Sedition Act also demonstrated the volatile partisan nature of Congress 
during the Federalist Era. The Federalists strong-armed the Alien and Sedition laws 
through Congress, while the Republicans were helpless to do anything significant 
about it, as they were the minority party. At first glance these two issues of Matthew 
Lyon and the Sedition Act might have seemed completely unique, but with Cluster 
Bloc analysis a clear and strong relationship emerged, as a bloc of Federalist 
congressmen was identified that voted in favor of both Lyon’s expulsion and the 
passage of the Sedition Act. These results were instrumental in proving the 
hypothesis.
There have been a number of politicians throughout American history who have 
exhibited a feisty, argumentative disposition. Matthew Lyon is only one of them, and 
was by no means the most controversial. Yet his behavior did produce reactions in 
others, both positive and negative in nature. For the most part what one thought of 
Lyon really came down to party affiliation. Lyon received considerable support from 
his Republican party, while the Federalists were often foaming at the mouth in the 
hope of expelling him from the House. Lyon was one of many American politicians 
who has challenged the status quo, and because of this his story ought to be told.
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Lyon’s expulsion proceedings can best be described as a political sham. In 
general each side. Federalist and Republican alike, adopted a position that included 
neither any sense of individual decision making nor challenge to the party position. 
Most congressmen were quite comfortable with simply going along with the official 
position of their party. It was almost as if each congressman was a drone of the party 
leaders, doing exactly as they were told in fear of being stung. Of course votes are 
conducted today in Congress that are largely based on party lines, except at least 
today there are more congressmen willing to defy their party. Maybe the importance 
of Matthew Lyon has been misinterpreted. Perhaps the congressmen voted the way 
they did because they really did not think enough of the issue to challenge their 
superiors. Whatever the case may be, the expulsion proceedings that engulfed Lyon 
and Roger Griswold were completely partisan and an embarrassing part of legislative 
history.
The expulsion proceedings did demonstrate Lyon’s innate ability to emerge 
victorious. From the first days he spent as an Irish immigrant in New England, to his 
expulsion proceedings, to his sedition trial, to his life after Congress, Lyon somehow 
was able to land on his feet and live to fight another day. Lyon’s Irish ancestry and 
his argumentative disposition immediately offended many in aristocratic New England, 
yet he did not choose to live a life of obscurity. Instead, he served his country during 
the Revolutionary War, as well as the state of Vermont in the U.S. House of 
Representatives. Lyon’s entire life seemed to be one challenge after another. Some 
he won and some he lost, but he never once surrendered when the going got tough.
Matthew Lyon reflected his times and the new nation he helped to form. Of 
course there were others who played a larger part in this formative process from 
young republic to mature nation, but Lyon’s contributions should not be overlooked. In 
most respects Lyon represented what we call today a true American. These qualities
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included individualism, hard work, determination, ingenuity, and bravery. All of these 
qualities were possessed by Lyon, and some say characterize the American people of 
today. Lyon was a true American, despite his Irish ancestry. Historians should start 
writing about Lyon not as an outsider but as an insider. In short, Lyon accomplished 
many things throughout his lifetime as an American with Irish ancestry, not as an Irish 
immigrant who desired to become a true American some day.
Yet Lyon did have his faults. He was not perfect by any stretch of the 
imagination. Some of his shortcomings included his extreme stubbornness, 
argumentative behavior, provocative nature towards his political adversaries, and 
deep ignorance about when to let an issue rest. Some may argue that these negative 
qualities were merely the flip side of Lyon’s positive qualities, making him a true 
American character. Perhaps so, yet it is accurate to say that even though his 
positive qualities have endeared him to many people who have read about him, so too 
have they repulsed others. Again, Lyon had a way of either attracting or repelling 
those with whom he came into contact. It was a rare occurrence when someone had a 
hard time making up his mind whether or not to accept Lyon. One either loved him or 
hated him.
The Sedition Act of 1798 also presents the reader of American history with a 
confusing array of questions and explanations. For example, was the Sedition Act 
necessary? Why did the Federalists push the legislation through Congress so 
forcefully? Were the Republicans the intended target of the legislation? Of course 
many questions remain to be answered, yet we can at least partially answer some of 
them. It is apparent that many Federalists enjoyed immensely the status quo that 
existed in Federalist America. When news spread of the French Revolution, many 
worried that the status quo might be destroyed at the hands of French sympathizers, 
Jacobins, and even those in the Republican party. In general, Federalists believed
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that in order for the new nation to survive proper precautions had to be put in place. 
The Sedition Act was to be one barrier to violent insurrection.
Of course America did not plunge into another revolution. Instead, it remained 
a symbol of freedom and liberty, although to a lesser extent after the passage of the 
Alien and Sedition laws than before. Taken as a whole these laws represented a very 
unfortunate time in American history. The Sedition Act, especially with its issue of 
free speech, has served as an example of how even the most free of governments can 
act in a repressive manner. The First Amendment was placed in considerable 
jeopardy during the Federalist Era, and the Act itself ought to serve as a reminder of 
the dangers associated with any curtailment of freedom of speech.
Like the Lyon issue, the Sedition Act was entirely political. It was pushed 
through Congress by a strong bloc of Federalists, and opposed by a strong bloc of 
Republicans. Unfortunately for the Republicans and the American people, the 
Federalist bloc was somewhat the stronger of the two. Federalists held the majority 
in Congress and were able to pass the legislation despite repeated calls of 
unconstitutionality.
As with any research project, more unanswered questions remain at the end of 
this study than existed when it began. A few of these need more detailed attention. 
The first question that presents itself is whether or not Matthew Lyon really deserved 
to be removed from his position. Obviously when one congressman spits in the face of 
another the situation ought to be dealt with in an appropriate, official manner, but his 
affront to Griswold should not have been grounds for expulsion. The Federalists 
simply saw an opportunity to rid themselves of a cranky Irish legislator who dared to 
challenge their traditional ways. When the first attempt failed they tried again to 
expel him, this time with one of their own, Roger Griswold, included in the resolution.
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In the end the Federalists failed to expel Lyon, and rightly so, since the behavior he 
exhibited was not so extreme as to have constituted grounds for expulsion.
Another unanswered question revolves around the necessity of the Sedition 
Act. Did the nation need it? Of course the rhetoric of the day points to both yes and 
no, and will probably do the same today. Still, although the nation was still young and 
underdeveloped, America was in no serious danger of collapse at the hands of the 
French and their American sympathizers. Although not the only instance of free 
speech curtailment, the Sedition Act of 1798 was the first and one of the most serious 
threats to the civil liberties the American people have ever witnessed.
There is also the question of Lyon’s trial after being charged with violating the 
Sedition Act. Did he receive a fair trial? The answer may never be known, but judging 
from the available sources it seems that Lyon did not receive a fair trial. First of all, 
he was not allowed to challenge any of his potential jurors. Many of them were his 
political enemies. Second, Lyon was not able to obtain legal counsel and was forced 
to defend himself. Finally, Judge Chase acted improperly when he provided his biased 
opinions to the jury when instructing them in their deliberations. Many issues of due 
process surfaced at Lyon’s sedition trial. Unfortunately for Lyon he was found guilty 
and was forced to serve out his sentence in a makeshift jail. Lyon became a martyr to 
many of his followers after his conviction, yet overcame one more challenge when he 
won reelection to the House from his jail cell.
The methodology employed in this study created some unanswered questions 
as well. Anyone reading this study and taking the time to learn the process of Rice- 
Beyle Cluster Bloc analysis would no doubt be able to challenge many of the 
judgments and conclusions. The parameters and formats used in this study were 
arbitrary, albeit conventional. There are of course traditional parameters to be used in 
a study of this sort, and for the most part they were followed. Through the use of
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cluster bloc analysis historians are able to add an entirely new dimension to their 
research. No longer do they have to rely solely on what legislators said during 
debate, if they said anything at all. Historians can also find out legislators’ opinions 
through the votes they cast. Cluster bloc analysis is an ideal tool forjudging their 
positions by showing with whom they voted and with whom they did not vote. No 
doubt someone utilizing a slightly altered set of criteria than those that were used in 
this study would get somewhat different results. That, fortunately or unfortunately, is 
the nature of this business. But in this instance the results are so striking that 
assumptions and criteria would have to be wildly different from those that were used.
Finally, while conducting a study like this, one is bound to encounter both 
peaks and valleys along the way. The application of cluster block analysis provided 
its own valley of frustration. Identifying the proper parameters involved making 
judgment calls. There were uncertainties in placement of congressmen within the 
matrix that would most clearly delineate a bloc. When the computer refused to 
execute its program, the author experienced feelings of being in a deep valley from 
which one could not extricate onself. But along the way many peaks were enjoyed, 
such as when it first appeared that my hypothesis was indeed correct. If this study 
provides the reader with a better understanding of Matthew Lyon’s controversial 
political career, the passage of the Sedition Act of 1798, and how they were 




1. The parameters used concerning Matthew Lyon included 9 relevant roll calls, 
95 voting legislators, with indices of less than 65 or more than 100 not considered. 
Indices based on less than 6 mutual votes were also omitted. The format for Matthew 
Lyon was as follows: (14X,I5,13X.39X,5I1,2X,2I1/32X,1I1,47X/79X, 1I1/44X). The 
parameters used concerning the Sedition Act included 4 relevant roll calls, 81 voting 
legislators, and indices of less than 75 or more than 100. Indices based on less than 3 
mutual votes were also omitted. The format for the Sedition Act was as follows: 
(14X,I5,61X/80X/36X,1I1,3X,3I1,37X/44X). The parameters used concerning the 
combination of Lyon and the Sedition Act included 13 relevant roll calls, 117 voting 
congressmen, with indices of less than 75 or more than 100 not considered. Indices 
based on less than 11 mutual votes were also omitted. The format for the combined 




Representatives of the Fifth Congress of the U.S. House of Representatives
REPRESENTATIVE STATE PARTY
John Allen Connecticut Federalist
George Baer Jr. Maryland Federalist
Abraham Baldwin Georgia Republican
David Bard Pennsylvania Republican
Bailey Bartlett Massachusetts Federalist
James A. Bayard Delaware Federalist
Lemuel Benton South Carolina Republican
Thomas Blount North Carolina Republican
Jonathan Brace Connecticut Federalist
Theophilus Bradbury Massachusetts Federalist
Richard Brent Virginia Republican
David Brooks New York Federalist
Robert Brown Pennsylvania Republican
Nathan Bryan North Carolina Republican
Stephen Bullock Massachusetts Federalist
Dempsey Burges North Carolina Republican
Samuel J. Cabell Virginia Republican
Christopher G. Champlin Rhode Island Federalist
John Chapman Pennsylvania Federalist
Thomas Claiborne Virginia Republican
William C.C. Claiborne Tennessee Republican
Matthew Clay Virginia Republican
John Clopton Virginia Republican
James Cochran New York Federalist
Joshua Coit Connecticut Federalist
William Craik Maryland Federalist
Samuel W. Dana Connecticut Federalist
James Davenport Connecticut Federalist
Thomas T. Davis Kentucky Republican
John Dawson Virginia Republican
Jonathan Dayton New Jersey Federalist
John Dennis Maryland Federalist
George Dent Maryland Federalist
William Edmond Connecticut Federalist
George Ege Pennsylvania Federalist
Joseph Eggleston Virginia Republican
Lucas C. Elmendorf New York Republican
177
178
Thomas Evans Virginia Federalist
William Findley Pennsylvania Republican
Abiel Foster New Hampshire Federalist
Dwight Foster Massachusetts Federalist
John Fowler Kentucky Republican
Jonathan Freeman New Hampshire Federalist
Nathaniel Freeman Jr. Massachusetts Federalist
Albert Gallatin Pennsylvania Republican
William B. Giles Virginia Republican
James Gillespie North Carolina Republican
Henry Glen New York Federalist
Chauncey Goodrich Connecticut Federalist
William Gordon New Hampshire Federalist
Andrew Gregg Pennsylvania Republican
Roger Griswold Connecticut Federalist
William Barry Grove North Carolina Federalist
John A. Hanna Pennsylvania Republican
Robert Goodloe Harper South Carolina Federalist
Carter B. Harrison Virginia Republican
Thomas Hartley Pennsylvania Federalist
Jonathan N. Havens New York Republican
Joseph Hiester Pennsylvania Republican
William Hindman Maryland Federalist
David Holmes Virginia Republican
Hezekiah L. Hosmer New York Federalist
James H. Imlay New Jersey Federalist
Walter Jones Virginia Republican
John Wilkes Kittera Pennsylvania Federalist
Edward Livingston New York Republican
Matthew Locke North Carolina Republican
Samuel Lyman Massachusetts Federalist
Matthew Lyon Vermont Republican
James Machir Virginia Federalist
Nathaniel Macon North Carolina Republican
William Matthews Maryland Federalist
Blair McClenehan Pennsylvania Republican
Joseph McDowell North Carolina Republican
John Milledge Georgia Republican
Daniel Morgan Virginia Federalist
Lewis R. Morris Vermont Federalist
Anthony New Virginia Republican
John Nicholas Virginia Republican
Harrison Gray Otis Massachusetts Federalist
Isaac Parker Massachusetts Federalist
Josiah Parker Virginia Federalist
Thomas Pinckney South Carolina Federalist
Elisha R. Potter Rhode Island Federalist
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John Reed Massachusetts Federalist
John Rutledge Jr. South Carolina Federalist
James Shureman New Jersey Federalist
Samuel Sewall Massachusetts Federalist
William Shepard Massachusetts Federalist
Thomas Sinnickson New Jersey Federalist
Samuel Sitgreaves Pennsylvania Federalist
Thomas J. Skinner Massachusetts Republican
Jeremiah Smith New Hampshire Federalist
Nathaniel Smith Connecticut Federalist
Samuel Smith Maryland Republican
William Smith South Carolina Republican
William L. Smith South Carolina Republican
Richard Dobbs Spaight North Carolina Republican
Peleg Sprague New Hampshire Federalist
Richard Sprigg Jr. Maryland Republican
Richard Stanford North Carolina Republican
Thomas Sumter South Carolina Republican
John Swanwick Pennsylvania Republican
George Thacher Massachusetts Federalist
Richard Thomas Pennsylvania Federalist
Mark Thomson New Jersey Federalist
Thomas Tillinghast Rhode Island Federalist
Abraham Trigg Virginia Republican
John Trigg Virginia Republican
John E. Van Alen New York Federalist
Philip Van Cortland New York Republican
Joseph Bradley Varnum Massachusetts Republican
Abraham B. Venable Virginia Republican
Peleg Wadsworth Massachusetts Federalist
Robert Wain Pennsylvania Federalist
John Williams New York Federalist
Robert Williams North Carolina Republican
APPENDIX B
The following 22 members of the House of Representatives have not been 
included in the roll-call analysis concerning the expulsion of Matthew Lyon 















Elisha R. Potter (F)
James Schureman (F)
Jeremiah Smith (F)
William L. Smith (R)
Richard Dobbs Spaight (R)
John Swanwick (R)
Philip Van Cortland (R)
Robert Wain (F)
The following 37 members of the House of Representatives have not been 
included in the roll-call analysis concerning the passage of the Sedition Act 





Samuel J. Cabell (R)
William C.C. Claiborne (R)
Matthew Clay (R)
- William Craik (F)
James Davenport (F)








Lucas C. Elmendorf (R)
William Findley (R)
Nathaniel Freeman Jr. (F)




Lewis R. Morris (F)
Josiah Parker (F)
Thomas Pinckney (F)
Elisha R. Potter (F)
Thomas Sinnickson (F)
Samuel Sitgreaves (F)
Thomas J. Skinner (R)
Jeremiah Smith (F)
William L. Smith (R)






The following 15 members of the House of Representatives have not been included 
in the roll-call analysis concerning both Matthew Lyon’s expulsion as well as 







William B. Giles (R)
Daniel Morgan (F)
Thomas Pinckney (F)
Elisha R. Potter (F)
Jeremiah Smith (F)
William L. Smith (R)









A motion submitted by Samuel Sewall, Massachusetts Federalist,
Issue:
to refer the Breach of Privileges Resolution, that Matthew Lyon 
committed a violent attack on Roger Griswold, while sitting in the 
presence of the House, to a Committee of Privileges.
The motion would require a committee inquiry into the attack, and 




ICPSR var. number: 
ICPSR location: 
Attitudinai position:
Yea 49, Nay 44. The motion is passed.
The effort to create a Committee of Privileges is successful. 
Annals, d . 955.
H052006 
Card 2, column 72.
Anti-Lyon representatives would likely vote yea. because refemng 
the Breach of Privileges Resolution to a Committee of Privileges 





A motion by the House to pass a Resolution declaring it a high 
breach of privilege if either Lyon or Griswold entered into any 
personal contest until a decision of the House shall be had, and 
that Lyon be considered in the custody of the Sergeant-at-arms 
until further order of the House.
Issue: The motion considers any other instances of conflict between Lyon 
and Griswoid intolerable, and that Lyon is in effect under arrest.
Vote:
Result:
Yea 29, Nay 62. The motion is defeated.
Neither Lyon nor Griswold will be bound by any extra-legal 
constraints imposed by the House.
Location:
ICPSR var. number: 
ICPSR location: 
Attitudinai position:
Annals, d . 956.
H052007.
Card 2, column 3.
Anti-Lyon representatives would likely vote yea, because the 
motion would require Lyon to be in the custody of the 






A motion submitted by John Nicholas, Virginia Republican, 
authorizing the Committee of the Whole to examine the testimony 
of the report of the Committee of Privileges relating to the Breach 
of Privileges Resolution.
Issue: The motion would deem testimony of the various witnesses to the 
Lyon-Griswold altercation important, as they will base their future 





Yea 88. Nay 4. The motion is passed.
The testimonv of the eve-witnesses to the altercation will be
Location:
ICPSR var. number: 
ICPSR location: 
Altitudinal position:
provided to the Whole house.
Annals, p. 964.
H052008 
Card 2, column 74.
Anti-Lyon representatives would likely vote yea, because they 






A motion submitted by Robert Williams. North Carolina 
Republican, to amend the Breach of Privileges Resolution, to
Issue:
Vote:
limit Lyon’s punishment to a reprimand, rather that expulsion. 
The measure would prevent expulsion of Lyon.




ICPSR var. number: 
ICPSR location: 
Attitudinal position:
The effort to limit Lyon's punishment to a reprimand failed. 
Annals, d . 1008.
H052009 
Card 2, column 7.
Anti-Lyon representatives would likely vote nay, because a simple 





A motion submitted by Abraham B. Venable, Virginia Republican, 
to pass the Breach of Privileges Resolution.
Issue: The motion would decide whether or not Lyon would be 
expelled from the House.
Vote:
Result:
Yea 52, nay 44. the motion is defeated.
The United States Constitution requires two-thirds of the members
Location:
ICPSR var. number: 
ICPSR location: 
Attitudinal position:
present to carry a vote of expulsion; the motion was not carried. 
Annals, p. 1008.
H052010 
Card 2, column 76.
Anti-Lyon representatives would likely vote yea, since the motion, 





A motion submitted by Samuel Sitgreaves, Pennsylvania 
Federalist, to postpone consideration of the Report of the 
Committee of Privileges relating to the Resolution to expel Lyon 
and Griswold.
Issue: The motion would delay any further consideration of the expulsion 
of Lyon and Griswold until March 4, 1799.
Vote:
Result:
Yea 38, nay 53. The motion is defeated.
The postponement being lost, the question of agreeing to the 
report of the committee remained under consideration.
Location:





Card 2, column 79.
Anti-Lyon representatives would likely vote nay, by doing so they 
would prevent any postponement on the discussion of his
184
status in the House. Pro-Griswold representatives would be 
troubled by their decision, as they wanted Lyon expelled, yet not 





A motion submitted by Abraham B. Venable, Virginia 
Republican, to agree to the report of the committee which 
recommended a disagreement to the Resolution for an 
expulsion of Lyon and Griswold.
Issue: The motion, if agreed to, would not allow Lyon or Griswold 
to be expelled from the House.
Vote:
Result:
Yea 73, nay 21. The motion is passed.
The House agrees to the report of the committee, which opposed 
the expulsion of Lyon and Griswold.
Location:





Card 2, column 80.
Anti-Lvon representatives would likely vote nay, since the motion, 
in effect, opposed his expulsion. Pro-Griswold representatives 






A motion submitted by Robert Williams, North Carolina 
Republican, to pass the resolution that Lyon and Griswold, for 
disorderly behavior, are highly censurable, and that they be 
reprimanded by the Speaker in the presence of the House.
Issue: The motion, if passed, would reprimand Lyon and Griswold’s 
behavior by the Speaker.
Vote:
Result:
Yea 47, Nay 48. The motion is defeated.
Lyon and Griswold will not be reprimanded in the presence of 
the House.
Location:
ICPSR var. number: 
ICPSR location: 
Attitudinal position:
Annals, d .  1067.
HO52015 
Card 2, column 33.
Anti-Lyon representatives would likely vote yea, since even a 
reprimand would be better than no action being taken at all. 
Pro-Griswold representatives would likely be split once again, as 





A motion submitted by James A. Bayard, Delaware Federalist, to 
pass the resolution to expel Lyon from the House for violating the 
Sedition Act of 1798.
Issue:
Vote:
The motion, if passed, would expel Lyon from the House.
Yea 49, Nay 45. The motion is defeated because the Constitution 
requires two-thirds of the members present for expulsion.
Result:
Location:
ICPSR var. number: 
ICPSR location: 
Attitudinal position:
Lyon is not expelled.
Annals, d .  2973.
HO5033
Card 3. column 80.
Anti-Lyon representatives would likely vote yea. By doing so 
they sought to expel Lyon from the House.
APPENDIX D





A motion submitted by Edward Livingston, New York
Issue:
Republican, to reject S.R. 31, “An Act in addition to the act for 
the punishment of certain crimes against the U.S.” [Sedition Act], 
The motion requires a vote on additional punishment of certain 





ICPSR var. number: 
ICPSR location: 
Attitudinal position:
Yea 36. Nay 47. The motion is defeated.
Consideration of S.R. 31 will be continued by the House.
Annals, p. 2113.
HO52067 
Card 2, column 37.
Representatives who opposed the Sedition Act would likely vote 





A motion submitted by William C.C. Claiborne, Tennessee 
Republican, to A make the judges of the country decide what 
constitutes libel under S.R. 31, and not the president.




Yea 67, Nay 15. The motion is passed.
S.R. 31 no longer permits the executive to judge libelous 
activity. Instead it is placed in the hands of the judiciary.
Location:





Card 2, column 41.
Representatives who opposed the Sedition Act would likely vote 
yea, since by doing so they would make the judiciary, not the 





A motion submitted by Samuel Smith, Maryland Republican, to 
strike out the words in S.R. 31, “by any writing, printing, or 
speaking, shall threaten su ch office or person in public trust, 
with any damage to his character, person, or estate, or shall.”
Issue: The motion would eliminate one section of S.R. 31, which
Vote:
Result:
would eliminate writing, printing, and speaking from the bill. 
This effectively would take the teeth out of the Sedition Act. 
Yea 43, Nay 39. The motion is defeated.
S.R. 31 still permits the prosecution of sedition via writing, 
printing, and speaking.
Location: Annals, p. 2138.
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Card 2, column 42.
Representatives who opposed the Sedition Act would likely 
vote yea. since by doing so they would eliminate any possibility 
that writing, printing, and speaking would be covered in the 
Sedition Act, resulting in a very weak law.
Roll Call 4
Date: July 10, 1798
Measure: A motion submitted by the House for a final vote on the 
passage of S.R. 31, the Sedition Act.
Issue: This vote would decide whether or not S.R. 31, the Sedition 
Act, will be passed by the House.
Vote: Yea 44, Nay 41. The motion is passed.
Result: S.R. 31, the Sedition Act, becomes law.
Location: Annals, p. 2171.
ICPSR var. number: HO52073
ICPSR location: Card 2, column 43.
Attitudinal position. Representatives who opposed the Sedition Act would likely 
vote nay in order to prevent passage of S.R. 31.
APPENDIX E
BLOC STRUCTURE OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON 13 ROLL CALLS, 





Samuel J. Cabell 
Thomas Claiborne 










John A. Hanna 
Carter B. Harrison 









Thomas J. Skinner 
Samuel Smith 




Joseph B. Varnum 


















New York (R) 
Virginia (R)
North Carolina (R) 
North Carolina (R) 
Pennsylvania (R) 







North Carolina (R) 























James A. Bayard 
David Brooks 
Stephen Bullock 













Hezekiah L. Hosmer 
James H. Imlay 
John Wilkes Kittera 
Samuel Lyman 
Lewis R. Morris 







South Carolina (R) 
North Carolina (R) 
North Carolina (R) 











New York (F) 
Massachusetts (F) 
Rhode Island (F) 




New Hampshire (F) 
Massachusetts (F) 
New Hampshire (F) 
New York (F) 
Connecticut (F)











South Carolina (F) 
Massachusetts (F)
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New Jersey (F) 
Massachusetts (F) 
Connecticut (F)





















Nathanie Freeman Jr. 
William B. Grove 














North Carolina (F) 





Rhode Island (F) 
Massachusetts (F) 
New York (F)





James A. Bayard 
David Brooks 














New York (F) 
Rhode Island (F) 
Pennsylvania (F) 












Hezekiah L. Hosmer 
James H. Imlay 
John Wilkes Kittera 
Samuel Lyman 
Harrison Gray Otis 
Isaac Parker 
John Reed 










John E. Van Alen 
Peleg Wadsworth











South Carolina (F) 




New Hampshire (F) 
Massachusetts (F) 
Pennsylvania (F) 
New Jersey (F) 
Rhode Island (F) 







William Barry Grove 






North Carolina (F) 
South Carolina (F) 
Pennsylvania (F) 
Maryland (F)











South Carolina (R) 
North Carolina (R) 
Virginia (R)
North Carolina (R) 
Virginia (R)
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John Clopton Virginia (R)
John Dawson Virginia (R)
John Fowler Kentucky (R)
Albert Gallatin Pennsylvania (R)
James Gillespie North Carolina (R)
Andrew Gregg Pennsylvania (R)
John A. Hanna Pennsylvania (R)
Carter B. Harrison Virginia (R)
Jonathan N. Havens New York (R)
Joseph Hiester Pennsylvania (R)
David Holmes Virginia (R)
Walter Jones Virginia (R)
Edward Livingston New York (R)
Matthew Locke North Carolina (R)
Matthew Lvon Vermont (R)
Nathaniel Macon North Carolina (R)
Blair McClenehan Pennsylvania (R)
Joseph McDowell North Carolina (R)
Anthony New Virginia (R)
John Nicholas Virginia (R)
Samuel Smith Maryland (R)
William Smith South Carolina (R)
Richard Sprigg Jr. Maryland (R)
Richard Stanford North Carolina (R)
Thomas Sumter South Carolina (R)
John Swanwick Pennsylvania (R)
John Trigg Virginia (R)
Philip Van Cortland New York (R)
Joseph B. Varnum Massachusetts (R)
Abraham B. Venable Virginia (R)
PRO-SEDITION ACT BLOC, CORE
Representative State/Partv
Bailey Bartlett Massachusetts (F)
Thomas Evans Virginia (F)
Abiel Foster New Hampshire (F)
Dwight Foster Massachusetts (F)
Henry Glen New York (F)
Chauncey Goodrich Connecticut (F)
William Barry Grove North Carolina (F)
Robert Goodloe Harper South Carolina (F)
Thomas Hartley Pennsylvania (F)
William Hindman Maryland (F)
James H. Imlay New Jersey (F)
Samuel Lyman Massachusetts (F)
William Matthews Maryland (F)
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Harrison Gray Otis Massachusetts (F)
Isaac Parker Virginia (F)
John Reed Massachusetts (F)
John Rutledge, Jr. South Carolina (F)
William Shepard Massachusetts (F)
Nathaniel Smith Connecticut (F)
Peleg Sprague New Hampshire (F)
Richard Thomas Pennsylvania (F)
Thomas Tillinghast Rhode Island (F)
Peleg Wadsworth Massachusetts (F)
ANTI-LYON/PRO-SEDITION ACT FRINGE
Representative State/Partv
George Baer, Jr. Maryland (F)
James A. Bayard Delaware (F)
David Brooks New York (F)
Stephen Bullock Massachusetts (F)
Christopher G. Champlin Rhode Island (F)
John Chapman Pennsylvania (F)
William Cochran New York (F)
Joshua Coit Connecticut (F)
Samuel W. Dana Connecticut (F)
Jonathan Freeman New Hampshire (F)
William Gordon New Hampshire (F)
Joseph Hiester Pennsylvania (R)
James H. Imlay New Jersey (F)
John Wilkes Kittera Pennsylvania (F)
Samuel Sewall Massachusetts (F)
George Thacher Massachusetts (F)
Mark Thomson New Jersey (F)
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